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This dissertation explores how Trans-Canada Air Lines (1937-1965) built, maintained, 
and subverted what I call the “modern envirotechnical nation” in its public-facing discourse. 
Euro-Canadian national identity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been rooted in both 
the environment—Canada was imagined as very big and very cold—and communications 
technologies that allowed settlers to traverse long distances and transcend harsh climates. At first 
blush, these appear both contradictory and self-reinforcing. How can we, for example, celebrate 
Canada’s size while at the same time technologically annihilating distance? Although clearly 
commensurate, environmental and technological nationalisms must work for that 
commensurability, especially in modern, high modern, and late/postmodern Canada. I refer to 
this work, as well as the discursive products of that work, the “modern envirotechnical nation.” 
I work mainly with the airline’s public-facing material, including advertisements, 
publicity images, media reports, press releases, and speeches by executives and sympathetic 
politicians to explore this phenomenon. As a state airline, TCA was beholden to taxpayers and 
worked with government advertisers, which meant that it forwarded something of a state-
sanctioned narrative of environment, technology, and nation and used its discourse to express 
larger anxieties about what it meant to be a modern Canadian. TCA worked throughout its first 
two decades to maintain the modern Canadian envirotechnical nation in this material. Ultimately, 
it was unable to reconcile the role of air travel in creating new relationships between space, 
place, time, and the everyday experience of mobility with this paradigm as high-powered jets 
took Canadians faster and farther than the “modern envirotechnical nation” would allow. 
I treat air travel in Canada as a high-modern megaproject, a state enterprise designed to 
forward collective visions of nature, technology, and nation through the implementation of large-
scale infrastructure. Therefore, this dissertation brings together the historical study of modernity, 
business, and the relatively new field of “envirotech.” Bridging environmental history and the 
history of technology, “envirotech” sits at the nexus of nature, culture, technology, and power, 
allowing for a multivalent analysis of technological systems as mediators for human experiences 
with their environments. I push the boundaries of “envirotech” by interrogating the role of 
technology in changing perceptions of the environment; TCA’s public-facing articulations of the 
“modern envirotechnical nation” represented Canadian environments not just how they were, but 
how it ought to and appeared to be to the airline’s passengers.  
 
 1 
Introduction: The Modern Envirotechnical Nation 
 “I thought to myself—what an age—what would the Fathers of Confederation say. Here they 
are, the two symbols of this age of speed—the babies of the twentieth century—up in the clouds 
the Airways of TCA—below the Airwaves of CBC—both working like giant needles, knitting 
this country together...bringing Moose Jaw alongside Moncton...Victoria next to 
Vercheres...Edmonton with Edmundston...closing the gaps which worried the Fathers.”1 
 
“You asked for it. Today’s flight from Edmonton to Vancouver was so blame cold...62 degrees is 
not fit for man or beast. On the other hand, it apparently was OK for the Canadians (no slur 
intended)...The least you could do would be warn us [Americans] of your frigid intentions, so we 
could prepare for the ordeal. Other than that, the flight was fine. You have excellent pilots and 
capable Stewardesses (but probably cold-hearted).”2 
 
These two descriptions of flying Trans-Canada Air Lines (TCA, now Air Canada) strike 
at two different aspects of the Canadian flying experience. The first, by Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation human interest reporter John Fisher, imagines air travel as a tool of nation-building, 
knitting the Canadian nation together and solving some of the foundational issues of existing at 
the edge of geographic possibility that had been plaguing settler Canadians since the nineteenth 
century. The other, by an anonymous American passenger nicknamed “Warm-Blooded” in 
TCA’s employee newsletter, sees air travel as a rather more concrete experience informed by 
both his personal comfort level and stereotypes about Canadian affinity for the cold. What can 
these two experiences, each of which happened on board the same type of aircraft, the Canadair 
DC-4M North Star, tell us about the role aircraft, airlines, and the experience of air travel played 
                                               
1 “John Fisher Reports: Up and Down” (script), 2 May 1948, Air Canada fonds, RG-70, vol. 254, 
Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC).  
2 “What Others Think of Us—Warm-Blooded,” Between Ourselves January 1953, 3. 
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in expressing what it meant to be a certain kind of Canadian in the twentieth century? This 
project engages with this question, and the main concerns of both John Fisher and “Warm-
Blooded,” by analyzing TCA’s discursive role in the creation, maintenance, and dismantling of 
some of the foundations of settler Canadian national identity: geography, climate, and 
communications technologies. Fisher’s unabashed technological patriotism—he called his scripts 
“pride-builders”—and “Warm-Blooded’s” sarcastic comments that Canadian stewardesses were 
“cold-hearted” each speak to the work necessary to sustain the scaffolding of national identity 
through the destabilizing tendencies of technological high-modernity. 
They also point to two related threads of settler Canadian national identity. The first, 
what I refer to as “environmental” nationalism, has its roots in Victorian-era science. It connects 
the fundamental nature of settler Canadians to the land on which they have chosen to settle. That 
is, Canada itself was used as a way to carve out a diasporic identity separate from the metropole 
in Europe as well as other Anglo diasporas such as the United States. Canada’s massive size and 
difficult climate especially became parts of this founding myth; Canada was imagined as an 
unlimited land with unlimited resources that could only be truly appreciated and properly 
managed by the hardiest settlers, despite the fact that settler Canadians only occupy a small 
portion of the territory. Of course, unlimited land came with its own set of challenges, and the 
settler responses to those challenges gave rise to the other thread of Canadian national identity. 
Generally called “technological nationalism” in Canadian communications theory, its lineage is 
usually traced to the rail and telecommunications infrastructures built in Canada through the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—both of which are considered communications in 
Canadian scholarship. Technological nationalism is a particularly Canadian version of what 
David Nye might call a “technological creation story,” in which long-distance communications 
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infrastructure was a necessary part of literal and discursive nation-building. A centralized 
Canadian nation could only be possible, and could only be sustained through the twentieth 
century, with a network of long-distance transportation and communication in place. 
At first blush, these two sorts of Canadian nationalisms are contradictory and self-
reinforcing. How can we celebrate Canada’s size while at the same time seeking to annihilate 
distance, or at least make it irrelevant, using modern communications technologies? How can the 
Canadian culture of bigness exist without a way to communicate and subsequently homogenize 
that bigness, turning a variable nation into a single “big” Canada? Although clearly 
commensurate with one another, environmental and technological nationalisms have to work for 
that commensurability, especially in modern, high modern, and late/postmodern Canada. I call 
this work, and the discursive products of the work, the “modern envirotechnical nation.” I 
imagine this as an extension of what Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim have referred to as the 
“sociotechnical imaginary”: “collectively imagined forms of social life and social order reflected 
in the design and fulfillment of nation-specific scientific and/or technology projects.”3 They are 
especially concerned with the role of the state in the development and dissemination of these 
imaginaries as a sort of aspirational version of a national “technological style.”4 Imagination, 
                                               
3 Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim, “Containing the Atom: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and 
Nuclear Power in the United States and South Korea,” Minerva 47 (2009): 120. See also Jasanoff 
and Kim, “Sociotechnical Imaginaries and National Energy Policies,” Science as Culture 22:2 
(2013): 189-196; Jasanoff and Kim, eds., Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical 
Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 
especially 1-33. 
4 “Technological style” is attributed to Thomas Hughes, “The Evolution of Large Technological 
Systems,” in The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology 
and History of Technology, ed. Wiebe Bijker, Thomas Hughes, and Trevor Pinch (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1987), 68-71. For a textbook application of “technological style” to the nation-state, 
see Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World 
War II (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009), 3-4.  
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they argue, is part of the Andersonian sense of belonging in a community, and sociotechnical 
imagination appears not necessarily in the minds of inventors, engineers, and the like, but instead 
inside the policies, hierarchies, and physical structures of the technological systems themselves.5 
These, in turn are intimately tied to “what is good or desirable in the social world writ large—for 
instance, how science and technology can meet public needs and who even are the relevant 
publics,” transforming technological aspirations into “collective visions of the good society.”6  
This is a particularly useful analytic for this project, as it combines what Jasanoff has 
called “performances of statehood in modernity” with the everyday practices of techno-science; 
advertising and engineering are equally part of the construction of the imagined sociotechnical 
nation.7 It also remains ripe for discussion inside specific national contexts, especially since 
Jasanoff and Kim use cross-national comparisons as a way to develop the term. Techno-
nationalism, as David Edgerton calls the assumption that “the key unit of analysis for the study 
of technology is the nation,” takes on new nuance and texture when the everyday experiences of 
engineering, for example, are braided into stories of large state technological projects.8 The 
                                               
5 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983); Eric Hobsbawm, “Inventing Traditions,” in The Invention of 
Tradition, eds. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1983), 1-14. 
6 Jasanoff and Kim, “Containing the Atom,” 122-123. 
7 Jasanoff, “Future Imperfect: Science, Technology, and Imaginations of Modernity,” in Jasanoff 
and Kim, eds., Dreamscapes of Modernity, 10. 
8 David Edgerton, “The Contradictions of Techno-Nationalism and Techno-Globalism: A 
Historical Perspective,” New Global Studies 1:1 (2007): 1. See also Edgerton, The Shock of the 
Old: Technology and Global History Since 1900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 103-
137. For some specific “techno-nationalism” studies that engage with “national styles” in 
engineering, see also John K. Brown, “Design Plans, Working Drawings, National Styles: 
Engineering Practice in Great Britain and the United States, 1775-1945,” Technology and 
Culture 41:2 (2000): 195-238; Mikael Hard and Andreas Knie. "The Grammar of Technology: 
German and French Diesel Engineering, 1920-1940,” Technology and Culture 40, no. 1 (1999): 
26-46; Eda Kranakis, Constructing a Bridge: An Exploration of Engineering Culture, Design, 
and Research in Nineteenth-Century France and America (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997). 
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“collective visions” are borne out at the individual level; the place-based knowledge of 
engineers, policy-makers, laborers, and even the users of the system both reflect collective 
visions of technological style and are reflected back on to them.9  
The specificities of place are what give these sociotechnical imaginaries their particular 
national textures, and I therefore add to the study of the sociotechnical imaginary the tools and 
methodologies of the study of the environment. Aspirational as they may be, sociotechnical 
imaginaries must remain grounded in geography in order for those imaginaries to be enacted and 
to have resonance. The “modern envirotechnical nation” is an expression of place: what makes 
Canada Canada and what makes Canadian-ness unique. Although Canada is not the only nation 
with a pronounced envirotechnical imagination, the way that geography and communications 
undergird the settler nation-state’s foundational principles mean that envirotechnicality echoes 
throughout a variety of expressions of national belonging.10 
This project examines the work required to support the particular sociotechnical 
imaginary embedded in Canadian geography and climate as the everyday experiences of 
modernity revealed its interpretive inflexibility. Commercial air travel was the first major test of 
Canada as an envirotechnical construct, as Canada as a centralized settler nation-state was still 
relatively new when Trans-Canada Air Lines first began operations.11 I situate this test firmly in 
                                               
9 In her work on the early modern construction of the Canal du Midi in France, for example, 
Chandra Mukerji shows that classical construction techniques that the state used to support the 
idea of France as a “new Rome” and the French as “new Romans” were actually passed down 
through the lived experiences of peasant woman laborers in the Pyrenees. Impossible 
Engineering: Technology and Territoriality on the Canal du Midi (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2009), 117-153. 
10 I would point to other large nations that use singular environmental characteristics as part of 
their national identity despite geographic and climatic variation, such as Australia and its aridity 
and wildlife and Brazil’s rainforests. 
11 TCA’s first flight, in September 1937, was two months after the 70th anniversary of 
Confederation; Alberta and Saskatchewan had entered Confederation only 32 years prior. One 
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the experience of modernity, especially as everyday Canadians felt the effects of time-space 
compression beyond technological nationalism’s darlings such as rail, telegraphy, and 
broadcasting. Aviation, of course, took people higher, farther, and faster than rail and removed 
the embodied feeling of traversing the land. This relatively extreme compression of time and 
space was increasingly more difficult to reconcile inside the Canadian socio- and enviro-
technical imaginaries, built as they were on a specific set of compressive technologies. As a state 
airline and the most visible source of Canadian aviation rhetoric in the middle decades of the 
twentieth century, TCA sat poised at the center of these elastic expressions of envirotechnicality, 
relying on, modifying, or rejecting them as the need arose, and eventually revealing when they 
had stretched too thin. 
TCA’s public-facing discourse can therefore tell us a great deal about the modern 
Canadian experiences of time and space. In this project, I highlight in particular a shift in the 
meanings assigned to “time” and “space” and the ways in which they were situated in 
envirotechnical understandings of Canada and Canadians. The particularities of Canadian 
modernity and high modernity changed the meanings of “time” and “space.” To paraphrase 
Marshall Berman paraphrasing Karl Marx, all that was solid about Canadian place—its bigness, 
its coldness, its celebration of communications infrastructure—melted into airspace and airwaves 
and airplanes as modern technologies continually disrupted, renewed, created, and contradicted 
the particular versions of “time” and “space” that were foundational to the expression of the 
modern Canadian envirotechnical nation.12  
                                               
other province (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1949), and one other territory (Nunavut, 1998), 
would join Confederation later in the twentieth century. 
12 Marshall Berman, All That is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity (New York: 
Penguin, 1988), 15. In Chapter 4, I point to the idea that this generated anti-modernisms in 
Canada as well, especially as they pertained to “Canadian values,” tourism, and nostalgia. See 
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This project uses the public-facing material developed by TCA as a way to explore these 
modern relationships between “space,” “place,” “time,” the environment, and techno-science, 
especially in terms of how state agencies used the discourse of national identity to stake a claim 
to belonging. TCA was what is known in Canada and other Commonwealth nations as a Crown 
corporation, run as a private business with arms-length oversight and financial support from the 
federal government. This is therefore also a story about business and government and how state 
enterprises imagine their duty to the nation. Crown corporations were a “distinctively Canadian” 
way to handle “the social and economic questions which arise in the process of exploiting the 
resources of our half of the continent,” historian and essayist Frank Underhill wrote in 1929, 
because it showed that in Canada, at least compared to the United States, “we are still capable of 
using our political machinery for constructive purposes.”13 Crown corporations were what 
historian Matthew Bellamy calls an “increasingly energetic force in the Canadian marketplace” 
in the decades after Underhill’s comments; political scientists and economists imagined them as 
a progressive fusion of the competitive private sector and benevolent liberal governments, and 
Liberal leaders used them to relieve the economic pressures of the Great Depression and Second 
World War.14 Although they differed in structure and organization and their accountability to the 
government varied, Crown corporations in the 1930s and 1940s are generally considered a 
response to the failures of laissez-faire capitalism during the Depression and the emergence of 
                                               
Alan Gordon, Time Travel: Tourism and the Rise of the Living History Museum in Mid-
Twentieth-Century Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2016); Ian 
McKay, The Quest of the Folk: Antimodernism and Cultural Selection in Twentieth-Century 
Nova Scotia (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994). 
13 Frank H. Underhill, “O Canada, Our Land of Crown Corporations,” in H. D. Forbes, ed., 
Canadian Political Thought (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1985), 228-229. 
14 Matthew J. Bellamy, Profiting the Crown: Canada’s Polymer Corporation, 1942-1990 
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), xv. The federal Liberal Party 
was in power in Canada for almost the entire temporal scope of this project: 1935-1957. 
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the Canadian welfare state.15 Crown corporations, as I will show in this project, also allowed for 
what appeared to be a state-sanctioned version of public works such as communications, 
broadcasting, and transportation. Support from the state and taxpayers meant at least an implicit 
endorsement by the state of the form, function, and purpose of these infrastructures, many of 
which emerged from the challenges of modern Canadian life and the threats, imagined and real, 
of American private-sector encroachment. In the areas of wheat marketing (Canadian Wheat 
Board, 1935), broadcasting (Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission, 1932, later Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation, 1936), central banking (Bank of Canada, 1934), and air transport 
(TCA, 1937), for example, “the choice was clear: it was the state or the United States.”16 
In his work on the Crown corporation Polymer Corporation, Bellamy suggests that this 
propensity towards public enterprise may be due to geography, since the nation’s large size and 
scattered population centers required active centralized interventions on economic development 
to avoid unwanted outside influence, but it was also a symptom of a particular historical 
moment. The Crown corporation was a useful mechanism—Harold Innis called it an “effective 
weapon” in the early 1930s—to alleviate the economic anxieties of the Depression, mobilize 
resources during the war, and facilitate a return to normalcy in peacetime.17 It was in the 
Depression in particular that the federal government began to “experiment extensively” with 
Crown corporations, many of which were overseen by engineer-turned-politician Clarence 
Decatur “C.D.” Howe.18 Howe is worth discussing briefly here in his role not only as the 
                                               
15 For a summary of this, see Joe Martin, ed., Relentless Change: A Casebook for the Study of 
Canadian Business History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 80-81. 
16 Bellamy, Profiting the Crown, 34. 
17 Innis referred to it as a “clumsy, awkward means” of co-ordinating massive amounts of 
desirable natural resources in a young country with “retarded development” due to its age. 
Harold Innis, Problems of Staple Production in Canada (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1933), 80. 
18 Bellamy, Profiting the Crown, 33. 
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Minister responsible for founding TCA in 1937, but also in his role as the airline’s greatest 
champion in Parliament.19  
Known colloquially in Canadian political circles as the “minister of everything,” Howe 
was first elected to federal Parliament in 1935 and held the Cabinet portfolios of Railways and 
Canals, Transport, Munitions and Supply, Reconstruction, and Trade and Commerce at various 
times until his defeat in 1957. Because of his engineering background, Robert Bothwell and 
William Kilbourn have pointed out in their rather hagiographical biography of Howe, he was 
more interested in making government “work” than any particular ideology: “he was neither 
Liberal nor liberal...Government interference in the economy, centralized power and drastic 
administrative solutions held no terrors for him. To a degree he remained blithely unaware that 
such things might be a problem for anyone.”20 Historian Don Nerbas has recently shown that this 
characterization—common across many studies of Howe—is overly simplistic, but it still 
suggests that Howe’s view of what governments were supposed to do for their constituents was 
supported by the logic of the engineering profession.21 Howe’s new liberal managerialism, as 
Nerbas has called it, was “more state-centric in its operation, and more continental in its 
geographic orientation” than previous models; his deployment of Crown corporations was more 
pragmatic than ideological, using public enterprise to overcome the barriers of Canadian 
                                               
19 He kept TCA in his ministerial portfolio despite being the Minister of Transportation, 
Munitions, and Reconstruction at various points in his career. 
20 Robert Bothwell and William Kilbourn. C. D. Howe: A Biography (Toronto: McClelland and 
Stewart, 1979), 66. It’s particularly telling that the chapter of Michael Bliss’s massive Northern 
Enterprise: Five Centuries of Canadian Business (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1987) 
about Howe is called “Visible Hand: The Years of C. D. Howe.”  
21 Don Nerbas, Dominion of Capital: The Politics of Big Business and the Crisis of the Canadian 
Bourgeoisie, 1914-1947 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 202. See 200-241 for his 
account of Howe’s engineering management style and Canadian big business. 
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geography, culture, and economic markets.22 That is, Howe’s Crown corporations were designed 
to stimulate and accelerate areas of the economy neglected by private business and support the 
private sector by “providing services, raw materials, and technology that would not otherwise be 
available.”23 During the war, these took the form of research and resource development outfits 
such as Research Enterprises, Ltd (1940) to hasten the development of radar and optical 
instruments and the Polymer Corporation (1942) to make synthetic rubber. Before the war, 
however, Howe’s “Crowns,” as they were occasionally lovingly called, were instead oriented 
towards the structural problems of circulating goods, people, and ideas across the expanse of 
Canadian geography in the face of competitive American enterprise.  
 
What Is (High)Modernity? 
TCA was one such Crown corporation grounded in a newly emerging set of assumptions 
about Canadian land, Canadian technological networks, and the Canadian state. Part of a larger 
suite of communications-related Crown corporations and federal enterprises in the 1930s, such as 
the ones mentioned above and the National Film Board of Canada (1939), TCA represented a 
distinctly modern relationship between communications, business, and the state.24 As I will show 
in this project, it suggested that state control at least appeared necessary to build a united Canada 
                                               
22 Nerbas, Dominion of Capital, 203. Nerbas suggests that this was perhaps because Howe was 
American by birth and therefore did not have the same attachments to British markets and British 
economic models that others might. 
23 Bellamy, Profiting the Crown, 34. 
24 Although a government agency rather than a Crown corporation, the NFB was often 
considered part of the suite of Canadian state-owned communications networks. I would also 
suggest that the wave of new culture-related Crown corporations around the end of this study 
such as the Canada Council for the Arts (1957), the National Arts Center (1967), and the 
National Museums of Corporation (1967), represent a new struggle to codify a sort of modern 
Canadian national culture. 
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in terms of both physical connections and a singular national settler imagination; state 
intervention could both thwart a potential takeover by American free market forces and create a 
Canadian culture of business and technology. Therefore, the story of TCA, its relationship to the 
state, and its role in articulating nationalistic visions of environments and technologies is by 
definition a high-modern story. In this dissertation, I use both “modern” and “high-modern” to 
describe the process by which TCA built, maintained, and destabilized the Canadian 
envirotechnical identity. Here I refer to “modern” as a cultural category and “high-modern” as a 
political and temporal category, inspired by James Scott’s Seeing Like a State. Scott places high 
modernity in the middle part of the twentieth century and associates it with “megaproject” 
regimes: centralized state constructions of science and technology as a solution for society’s ills 
and the imposition of large techno-scientific projects onto an oftentimes unaware or 
uncooperative populace.25 Modern centralized governments relied on science and technology as 
stand-ins for state power and catch-alls for national belonging. In the process, state agents made 
use of modern technological rhetoric, emphasizing human triumphs over space and time, 
mobility, speed, and choice as “modern” technologies intruded into everyday life. This language 
of “modernity” is usually rooted in the Second Industrial Revolution; in this context, it creates a 
discursive lineage between relatively individualistic “modern” technologies and centralized 
“high-modern” megaproject regimes. That is, “high-modern” large-scale megaprojects required 
the discourse of modernity to fit into constructions of technology, identity, and what national 
governments owed their citizens.  
                                               
25 James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition 
Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). 
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 In her work on nuclear power in France, Gabrielle Hecht argues that postwar 
technological projects became staging grounds for anxieties concerning the political and social 
processes of modernization. By clinging to a “national technological style” associated with 
history, language, and aesthetics, centralized megaprojects could perform “the double operation 
of legitimating technology as an expression of national identity and preserving...[national] 
uniqueness” through the complexities of modernization.26 Large technological systems, such as 
the nuclear infrastructure at the heart of Hecht’s study, are modernity embodied, enacted, and 
contested, all at a single site. Other scholars have suggested that in Europe, the re-construction of 
urban infrastructures, as well as the construction of postwar systems such as automobile 
highways, were part of this re-evaluation of landscape and memory.27 In these modern 
“sociotechnical imaginaries” there was a tension between looking backward and forward, 
celebrating a nationalist past and universalist techno-scientific future. State actors sought 
technological initiatives that would establish geopolitical power while still maintaining some sort 
of place-based national character.  
Mid-century Canada saw its fair share of megaprojects imbued with these types of 
meanings, as Daniel Macfarlane, Tina Loo, and Joy Parr have shown.28 For example, just as 
                                               
26 Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France, 52. 
27 Virag Molnar, Building the State: Architecture, politics, and State Formation in Post-War 
Central Europe (New York: Routledge, 2013); Lino Camprubí, Engineers and the Making of the 
Francoist Regime (Cambridge, MIT Press, 2014); Sara Pritchard, Confluence: The Nature of 
Technology and the Remaking of the Rhône (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
28 Daniel Macfarlane, Negotiating a River: Canada, the US, and the Creation of the St. Lawrence 
Seaway (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014); Tina Loo, “People in the Way: Environment, 
Modernity, and Society on the Arrow Lakes,” BC Studies 142:3 (2004): 161-196; Joy Parr, 
Sensing Changes: Technologies, Environments, and the Everyday, 1953-2003 (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2010). For a concise summary of recent works on high-modernism in Canada, see Edward 
Jones-Imhotep and Tina Adcock, eds., Made Modern: Science and Technology in Canadian 
History (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2018), 10-12. 
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France self-fashioned as a nuclear nation, Canada identified with one brand of energy: 
hydroelectricity.29 Of the 613 large dams built in Canada to 1984, nearly 60 per cent were built 
between 1945 and 1975, and perhaps the most visible of these was the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence 
Seaway, constructed between 1954 and 1959.30 As Daniel Macfarlane argues, the St. Lawrence 
River has been “the leading protagonist” in physical and cultural nation-building, “often acting 
as synecdoche for Canada”; a megaproject designed to change the river’s shape and use must 
necessarily be part of the national imagination.31 Megaprojects such as these are intensive 
interventions on a local site or sites, but they also become symbols in the outward knitting-
together of modern nationalisms. In the case of the Seaway, making “wild” nature useful through 
brute technological strength was a continuation of Canadian nation-building storytelling, but also 
appeared to be the absolute measure of modern statecraft as represented in the massive scale of 
the system.32 Macfarlane identifies what he calls “negotiated high modernism,” which takes into 
account the smaller-scale political and social negotiations of high-modern megaprojects. He 
suggests that this is a distinctly Canadian type of high modernism, especially because of how the 
Seaway became a “lightning rod” for different Canadian nationalisms.33  
These small negotiations emphasize the ways in which these types of projects are rooted 
in place and materiality, and, as Joy Parr has argued, involved the sometimes forced re-
                                               
29 “Hydro” has become a colloquialism for “electricity” in both English and French-speaking 
Canada. For more on hydro in Canada, see Matthew Evenden, Allied Power: Mobilizing Hydro-
electricity During Canada’s Second World War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015); 
Caroline Desbiens, Power from the North: Territory, Identity, and the Culture of 
Hydroelectricity in Québec (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013); Christopher Armstrong and H. V. 
Nelles, Wilderness and Waterpower: How Banff National Park Became a Hydro-Electric 
Storage Reservoir (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2013). 
30 Tina Loo, “People in the Way,” 165. 
31 Macfarlane, Negotiating a River, 14. 
32 Sara Pritchard argues something similar for the Rhône in France in Confluence. 
33 Macfarlane, Negotiating a River, 17-18; 228-229. 
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structuring of the everyday sensory experiences of local people.34 The “unquestioned priorities of 
modern statecraft,” such as dams and military bases, did not include people interacting with 
those systems.35 Scholars’ attentions to both the large environmental impact and smaller sensory 
impact on lived experiences indicate that there are different types of modern megaprojects. 
Although not entirely mutually exclusive, some involve an intensive top-down transformation of 
a single site or sites, while others build on national imaginaries and everyday experiences as 
embodied by technological systems. Air travel is a high-modern project of this second variety. 
Air travel has had relatively little impact on the physical landscape, even after taking the modern 
airport in account. Instead, it provided Canadians with a new way of seeing themselves and their 
country. Scott has suggested that “it would be hard to exaggerate the importance of the airplane 
for modernist thought and planning”; making the landscape legible was easiest from the “God’s-
eye view.”36 Canada’s size was a real obstacle to building a vision of a united, single country, 
and accessible air travel could add the “passenger’s-eye-view” to the “God’s-eye-view.” I show 
in Chapter 1, for example, that TCA leaned heavily on this construction, working with older 
imaginaries of “bush flying” and aerial mapping to frame looking out of its aircraft’s windows as 
an authentic Canadian envirotechnical experience. My work on TCA therefore expands on the 
pre-existing version of Canadian high modernism by emphasizing the delicate and deliberate 
work necessary to turn air travel into what Macfarlane calls a techno-political “lightning rod” in 
his work on the Seaway. The high-modern “negotiations” at TCA did not result in a radical 
                                               
34 Take, for example, the 6,500 Ontarians displaced from what are now called the “Lost 
Villages” for the construction of the Seaway. Macfarlane, Negotiating a River, 149-178 and Joy 
Parr, Sensing Changes, 79-102. 
35 Parr, Sensing Changes, 3. 
36 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 57-58. See also Jeanne Haffner, The View From Above: The Science 
of Social Space (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013). 
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reshaping of the landscape as they did for the Seaway, but instead pointed towards a discursive 
reshaping of the Canadian envirotechnical imagination to attempt to make aviation in general, 
and air travel by TCA in particular, compatible with it.  
The changing everyday experiences of “space” and “time,” two hallmarks of 
technological modernity, are key to this compatibility. One model for examining this discourse is 
“time-space compression,” where, according to historical geographer Barney Warf, “by 
accelerating the velocities of people, goods, and information, the world is made to feel smaller 
even as interactions are stretched over larger physical distances.”37 Coined by David Harvey in 
his late-1980s work on postmodernity, time-space compression is at once a part of the modern 
capitalistic experience, which connected time to labor and capital and space to new social 
organizations and markets, as well as the modern technological experience.38 Time and space in 
and of themselves became increasingly moored to modern factors—street grids, railway 
schedules, mechanical clocks that signal the break between labor and leisure time, the daily 
printing and broadcasting of the news—but also increasingly unmoored from everyday 
experiences as these time-and-space paradigms in and of themselves changed at a rapid pace. 
Space and time are each produced as modern political, economic, and technological phenomena 
“form a fixed frame within which the dynamics of a social process must unfold”; space and time 
are made, and then conquered by human artifice, and then made again.39 As sociologist Manuel 
                                               
37 Barney Warf, Time-Space Compression: Historical Geographies (London: Routledge, 2008), 
6. See also Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space 1880-1918 (Cambridge: Harvard 
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38 David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 226-232. 
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Castells has famously claimed, “space does not reflect society, it expresses it.”40 This is 
obviously deeply connected to the communications networks developed through the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries—rail, telegraphy, telephone, digital networks, broadcasting, 
steamship, automobile, and eventually air travel—as well as the flows of information, goods, and 
people facilitated by those networks.  
Writing in the 1980s, Harvey was particularly interested in the forms of time-space 
compression that had come to characterize his present. He referred to it as the “speed-up” of both 
communications technologies themselves and also of the economic cycles of industrial 
capitalism in which the turnovers of production and consumption increase in speed to the point 
that they become disorienting. Castells also points to end of the twentieth century as a turning 
point between “spaces of places” and “spaces of flows,” in which an older spatial logic 
foregrounding localized social interaction is replaced by “simultaneous spatial dispersion and 
concentration via information technologies” across space.41 I argue that commercial air travel is 
an early part of this “speed-up” or “space of flows” process because its compressive effects were 
both much more substantial and much more experientially transformative than other forms of 
transportation. That is, airplanes went faster, farther, and over more challenging territory than 
trains, steamships, or automobiles, gave passengers a democratized “God’s-eye-view,” and 
reshaped temporal patterns of labor and leisure in the form of the vacation. As I show in Chapter 
4, for example, the language of the “speed-up” and subsequent monetization of labor and leisure 
affected how vacations to warm-weather destinations were imagined as both keeping in time 
                                               
40 Manuel Castells, “Space of Flows, Space of Places: Materials for a Theory of Urbanism in the 
Information Age,” in Stephen Graham, ed., The Cybercities Reader (London: Routledge, 2004), 
83. 




with the ordered, Fordist system of mid-century labor and also existing outside of it. 
Furthermore, commercial airlines were an early version of this sort of transformation because 
their schedules, set destinations, and increased focus on cities as nodes in its network mimic the 
“space of flows,” especially in the jet age. Although “the city” as a unit of analysis is not my 
focus here, it is worth noting that commercial air travel has been a player in Castells’ “networked 
city” infrastructure. Even before the jet age, as I will show in Chapter 1, spaces between the 
origin and destination were homogenized and flattened to the point of disappearing entirely on 
route maps, reduced to a series of dots and lines.42 In Canada especially, where “space” in the 
form of geographic size was an important aspect of national constructions of belonging, the 
homogenization of space and collapse of time by airplane represented a potential threat to earlier 
paradigms of nationhood developed in Canada’s railway age. 
 
Time, Space, and the Modern Canadian Envirotechnical Nation 
“Space”: Canadian Bigness 
The new movements and flows of technological modernity and the associated 
homogenization of space pose “serious difficulties for the conception of place,” Harvey has 
argued.43 If “place” is a state of being-in, rather than moving-through, then the elasticity of time-
space compression means that this state is not fixed, but can be made and re-made through the 
processes of modernity. James Vernon ties this plasticity of place to new forms of mobility in his 
work on modern Britain and argues that the challenges of governing the unprecedented 
movement of people, goods, and ideas across space disconnected daily life from the local, 
                                               
42 See, for example, Jenifer Van Vleck, Empire of the Air: Aviation and the American 
Ascendancy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 113-115. 
43 Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, 257. 
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creating what he calls a “society of strangers.” This was not an easy process, he suggests, and it 
“generated a countermovement of attempts to reembed social, political, and economic relations 
in the local and personal.”44 Although Vernon is not particularly concerned with modernity and 
place as expressions of national identity, I am; Canada as a centralized nation has never existed 
outside of the compressive effects of modernity, so how do these modern concerns play out 
there? This section will explore how and why “Canadian bigness”—the aspects of geography 
associated with Canada’s large size— has been so important for both actors and analysts 
interested in what makes Canada Canada.  
Much like the United States, the acquisition of territory for empire (and later for country) 
has scaffolded how the nation has been imagined inside popular discourse. Even early settlers 
and explorers needed to adjust their senses of scale in terms of how big the American continent 
truly was, not to mention convincing their patrons back in Europe that the territory was as big as 
they made it out to be. Late-enlightenment-era gridding, mapping, and naming—propelled in 
what would eventually become Canada by the Hudson’s Bay Company—revealed to settlers 
both the barriers and opportunities of such a massive space. The scientific measurement of the 
territory was accompanied by an insistence that these far-flung corners of the land, in which few 
European settlers lived, needed to be legislatively connected to (relatively) densely-populated 
British North America. The latter two-thirds of the nineteenth century saw the consolidation of 
the four provinces of British North America into Canada, the addition of three more provinces in 
the East and West, the resolution of the southern border with the United States, and the purchase 
and acquisition of almost 10 million square kilometers of land from the Hudson’s Bay Company 
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and Great Britain.45 The size of the nation has also had an effect on how the country has 
historically been studied, such as the interrelated Staples and Laurentian theses of Canadian 
history. Harold Innis and Donald Creighton, writing in the 1930s, each suggested that the 
movement of natural resources across large spaces was key to Canadian economic development; 
Innis famously argued that the energy of early Canada was channeled directly and indirectly into 
the extraction, transportation, and production of raw materials, while Creighton saw the St. 
Lawrence River as a geographic axis for political and commercial development.46 Both of these 
theses have been challenged and even displaced in the twenty-first century as environmental 
historians have questioned the characterization of staples and complicated the value of the St. 
Lawrence river to Canadian-ness.47 However, the foundational idea that the land itself has made 
Canada and Canadians special remains in cultural discourse.48 In one of his “pride-builder” 
broadcasts in the late 1940s, Fisher connected breadth of territory with magnanimity of spirit, 
characterizing Canada as a “harmless giant,” performing well on the “test of bigness” set out by 
its founders.49 The experience of Canadian bigness was imagined as an overwhelming sublime, 
since Canada, even in the nineteenth century, was unfathomably big. Popular turn-of-the-
                                               
45 For Canadian expansionism, see Doug Owram, Promise of Eden: The Canadian Expansionist 
Movement and the Idea of the West, 1856-1900 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992) and 
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millennium parody band the Arrogant Worms put this sentiment succinctly in their song 
“Canada’s Really Big”: “it isn’t what you do with it/it’s the size that counts.” Through this sort 
of geographic rhetoric, Canada is kept “imaginatively empty,” implying that Canada only exists 
“by virtue of taking up space.”50 It is the space itself that supports Canadian-ness. 
“Canada is best known for being big,” historian Alan MacEachern has recently written, 
but despite the fact that Canada’s size has been “a constant theme, if not an outright fixation, of 
Canadian scholarship and thought,” there has yet to be a definitive study of Canadian size in 
history.51 That is, we know what Canada’s size means to us, but have yet to critically engage 
with what it has meant to us, why “bigness” became so relevant in the first place, and what 
effects it has had on historical, cultural, and even techno-scientific trajectories. Communications 
and cultural theorist Northrop Frye suggested in the 1970s, for example, that the Canadian 
cultural imagination is framed by a “garrison mentality,” which emerged as a result of “being 
separated from one another and from...American and British cultural sources” while also being 
“confronted with a huge, unthinking, menacing, and formidable physical setting.”52 In her 
contemporary analysis of themes in Canadian literature, Margaret Atwood called it “Survival”: 
an “almost intolerable anxiety” about physically existing at the margins of a threatening physical 
environment. This also refers to intangible obstacles to what Atwood calls “spiritual survival,” 
for which the environment provides a useful literary metaphor.53 However, these postmodern 
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discussions of Canadian bigness are not grounded in the physical realities of living in place, nor 
do they point to the connections between dominion over territory and settler colonialism.  
Although it is not the purpose of this project to engage in any significant way with First 
Nations land use or settler colonial territorial expansion, this vision of Canadian bigness “that 
identifies Canada’s vast spaces as alien while simultaneously assigning them to [settlers] is 
profoundly colonial.”54 The awareness and relevance of Canada’s scale is a product of settler-
colonialism in and of itself, as state legibility by techno-science required a resonant 
transcontinental vision of nation. Furthermore, using outward-focused markers of “wilderness” 
as a way to engage with Canadian size, as commentators such as Frye and Atwood did, allows 
Canada to be defined by “where we are” without actually existing in that space. In this work, I 
will answer, at least to a limited extent, MacEachern’s call for historical interpretations of 
Canadian bigness by including Canada’s size as part of the modern Canadian envirotechnical 
nation. By focusing on specific iterations of Canadian bigness—those necessary to prop up the 
acceptance and use of state-supported techno-scientific infrastructure—I will show that it shaped 
modern Canadian constructions of what it meant to belong to the land, how that belonging 
changed when the land was experienced through time-space compression, and how it was 
stretched thin by increasingly easy departures from a place that seemed to only get smaller. 
 
“Time”: Canadian Climates 
Like the Canadian culture of “bigness,” the aspects of Canadian national identity 
connected to the nation’s allegedly harsh winters are rooted in the politics, culture, and natural 
history of Victorian settler society, especially the neo-Hippocratic sciences linking airs, waters, 
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places, and peoples. Largely associated with eighteenth century French thinkers such as 
Montesquieu and Buffon, environmental or climatic determinism became a convenient method 
by which imperial administrators justified their influence over colonial holdings. Most 
environmental determinists focused on how warm climates affected human temperament and 
government, as this was most useful to European imperial territories in Africa, Asia, and South 
America. The alleged weaknesses of those living in extreme heat both encouraged imperialists to 
take what they saw as natural control over the tropics and also underscored anxieties over 
European colonial settlement.55 These questions about race, climate, environment, and empire 
informed government, resource management, and scientific communities such as the emerging 
field of tropical medicine as settlers and colonial administrators wondered what would happen to 
their bodies as they spent time in tropical environments that appeared to deteriorate their 
inhabitants.56  
Settlers in more northerly holdings such as Canada and the United States engaged with a 
different sort of climate rhetoric. Although early modern settlers wondered why their children 
born in America did not have dark skin like the indigenous inhabitants, climate discourse in the 
northern parts of the Americas eventually coalesced largely around European control over their 
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environments and how those environments could have an impact on governmental and social 
structures.57 In the United States, environmental determinists believed that eighteenth century 
agrarianism was modifying the climate for the better, while natural historians used discoveries 
such as mammoth fossils to refute theories of deterioration.58 In Canada, climate discourse 
became a part of burgeoning ideas of nation and identity. Nowhere is this more apparent than in 
the rhetoric of the Canada First Party, most active around Confederation (1867). Their widely 
circulated addresses and pamphlets concerning what Canada’s northerness meant for Canadians 
as a “race” and as the next generation of imperialists captured the fledgling national imagination. 
Linking settlers to the great northern races of history, especially the Normans, was a common 
strategy that gave both English and French Canadians a special claim to their wintry land. 
Bolstered by the rhetoric of environmental determinism, Canada First member and historian 
Robert Grant Haliburton used his most famous address, “The Men of the North and Their Place 
in History,” to claim that Canadian weather conditions awakened a deep historical ancestry: 
 
“[T]he cold north wind that rocked the cradle of our race, still blows through our forests, 
and breathes the spirit of liberty into our hearts...[W]e must be a hardy, a healthy, a 
virtuous, a daring, and if we are worthy of our ancestors, a dominant race.”59 
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Party leader William Alexander Foster expanded on Haliburton’s metaphor, claiming that 
Canadians were responsive to “the old Norse mythology, with its Thor hammers and Thor 
hammerings...for we are a Northern people…more manly, more real, than the weak...effeminate” 
United States.60 This created a sense of what anthropologist Eva Mackey calls “icy white 
nationalism”; the United States was not an Anglo-Saxon country by Canada First standards 
because the southern climate would cause Euro-American degeneration and also would only 
attract weaker settlers unable to survive in the north.61 Carl Berger’s 1966 essay on Canada’s 
identity as the true north, strong and free is a hallmark in this field, and he argues that boosters 
used Canadian winters to promote national unity, racial purity, personal and state liberty, and 
anti-American sentiment.62 Confederation-era Canadians seemed to be subtly aware that they 
were creating, or at least curating, a climatic identity from this ad-hoc assemblage of nineteenth 
century artistic, scientific, cultural, and political approaches to environment and nation. 
This awareness emerges most often in balancing Canadian settler identity with British 
tourism and immigration. The British press was often accused of exaggerating Canadian winter 
hazards, which made Canada seem less inviting. Newspapers and pamphlets measured 
temperatures, snowfalls, and agricultural and industrial outputs to show that Canadian winters 
were milder than they seemed. An 1885 front-page editorial in the Prince Albert Times refuted 
the London Standard’s claim that “the thermometer has registered 50 below zero at Winnipeg 
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and...that life is not safe during periods of such extreme cold,” by arguing that the Winnipeg 
observatory had never measured temperatures colder than -46°.63 Another strategy was to argue 
that to know Canadian winters was to love Canadian winters. If only British newspapermen 
might “spend one twelvemonths in our midst,” or have “the courage to encounter...[Canada’s] 
world-renowned snows,” then they might understand the invigorating nature of the Canadian 
climate.64 However, British press accounts weren’t the only culprits, as one Globe editorial 
cautioned, “for our own press is continually doing the same thing.”65 Canadian literary and 
artistic self-representations were also guilty of portraying “winter scenes and no others,” 
according to the Calgary Weekly Herald, since “if we wish our portrait taken...we don all the furs 
we own, and arrange for a background of winter, and possibly a fall of snow.”66 Winter sports 
such as sledding, skating, and hockey were championed by Canadian boosters, and a culture of 
winter carnivals—some of which are still in operation—emerged in Canadian cities as a sort of 
conspicuous winter performance. Even attempts to refute potential one-dimensional portrayals of 
Canadians as cold-weather people seemed to increase climate-related discourse and reinforce 
Canadian winter symbols. 
By the early twentieth century, Canadian latitudes, climates, and winter pastimes were 
often treated as a single unit of discussion, an early example of the substitution of space and 
place with time that I discuss in Chapter 1. That is, “Canadian climate” stories became “winter” 
stories, tying the daily experiences of living in Canadian climates to time in the form of seasons. 
This was not an exclusively Canadian change; Megan Prins has recently suggested that through 
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this period, “winter” in North America became an increasingly urban analytic category, defined 
through consumption, infrastructure, leisure, and labor.67 In Canada especially, the experience of 
urban winters and the associated symbols such as toboggans and toques became a part of Gilded 
Age self-fashioning very much separate from the discourse applied to Canada’s Arctic regions. 
Arctic sciences and industries, which often focused on resource extraction, established Canada’s 
northern regions as very different but also connected to Canada’s south. However, as Northern 
Studies scholars Renée Hulan and Sherrill Grace have argued, there are “a wide range of 
fascinating, contradictory associations” between Northern Canada and Canada-as-North, 
implying a divide between “north” as a place and “winter/cold” as times.68 The North, as an 
analytic and as a region, has been used as a multi-faceted proxy for the entire country.69 The 
turn-of-the-century version of Canada-as-North might perhaps more accurately be called 
Canada-as-winter, or at least Canada-as-cold, suggesting a climatic/seasonal identity tied to 
everyday experience and material culture. 
The tropes that Canadians were uniquely suited to cold temperatures, that Canadian 
winters were somehow special, and, somewhat paradoxically, that Canadian technologies 
especially could transcend climatic barriers to mobility, were embedded in settler culture by the 
time TCA began flying, and they were being framed by new modern redefinitions of “time.” In 
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Chapter 2, for example, I examine how Canada’s allegedly harsh winters made passengers wary 
of flying in wintertime and how TCA advertised particular technological systems on its aircraft 
as season-removers. I also show how critics imagined that airliners were part of a cadre of 
technologies responsible for eroding Canadian winter identity by making the lived experience of 
winter optional, or at least less difficult. Indoor heating, covered garages, and municipal snow-
removal services all threatened the allegedly character-building experiences of winter through 
the twentieth century, but because of its ability to transport Canadians to other climates entirely, 
air travel was especially culpable. Chapter 4 is devoted to the roots of the popular “snowbird” 
tradition, in which Canadians (and those from the Northeast USA) flock in massive numbers to 
warm-weather destinations such as Florida and the Caribbean in the winter. TCA’s earliest 
public depictions of flying south for the winter point to emerging tensions between time and the 
modern experience by framing what they sold to the Canadian public as time travel; Canadian 
winters remained discursively intact even if no one was there to experience them. These tensions 
show up again in Chapter 5, in which the increased speed and power and decreased cost of jet 
travel made these climatic escapes even more popular with vacationers and even less popular 
with critics who questioned what was left of Canadian national identity by the final third of the 
twentieth century. 
 
Time-Space Compression: Technologies and Nationalisms 
Of course, these environmental nationalisms could not be culturally resonant, let alone 
manageable by a centralized state, without a corresponding set of Canadian national myths about 
communications technologies. Instead of abstract, sublime “bigness,” Canadian space needed to 
be measurable, or at least concretely grounded in place, in order to be what Scott would consider 
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“legible” to the state. This is what Maurice Charland has called “technological nationalism,” 
relatively unique to English Canada, “which ascribes to technology the capacity to create a 
nation by enhancing communication.”70 Victorian techno-scientific practices in pre-
Confederation Canada were vital to these constructions of Canada as a sea-to-sea nation. As 
Suzanne Zeller has argued, “inventory sciences,” most obviously the Canadian Geological 
Survey in the 1840s, helped Canadians imagine that a single centralized nation could be possible 
in Canada despite the unimaginably large territory. British North Americans living in Canada 
were assigned the same characteristics as the land itself—“extension, construction, permanence, 
grandeur...opening up long, gleaming perspectives into both time and space,” as Thomas D’Arcy 
McGee famously claimed in the 1860s—bolstered by scientific endeavours that connected 
geologic time to the settler geographic imaginary.71 Euro-Canadians therefore self-fashioned as 
being unique products of the land, but in order to build a singular identity they needed to 
communicate with, access, and govern each other across the vast expanse of that land.  
Because of this, rail was absolutely vital to this construction. The Canadian Pacific 
Railway, part of Canada’s first Prime Minister John A. MacDonald’s “national dream” of a 
united Canada, began simultaneous construction west from Ontario and east from British 
Columbia in the early 1880s. The “last spike” connecting the Canadian Pacific network in the 
western provinces was hammered in Craigellachie, British Columbia, on November 7, 1885, a 
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date that is occasionally considered a more appropriate choice for Canada Day, which celebrates 
the British North America Act of July 1 1867. Because the evocative discourse of rail resonated 
through the entire twentieth century, I will spend a moment here exploring both the history and 
historiography of rail in Canada, especially as it connects to technological nationalism and the 
rhetoric of transcontinentality. The railway is the most conspicuous manifestation of 
technological nationalism and is Charland’s main concern in his work on the subject, although 
recent works by Robert MacDougall, Liza Piper, and Caroline Desbiens show how other systems 
such as telephony, freighting, and power generation not only allowed literal access to distant 
regions, but also helped develop an imagined trans-national connectedness.72 However, scholars 
have also situated the codification and most explicit expressions of railway nationalism squarely 
inside late modernity; cultural historian Daniel Francis and communications scholar Robert Babe 
each point to Pierre Berton’s celebrated early-1970s books The Last Spike, The Impossible 
Railway, and The National Dream as some of the most concrete expressions of the 
phenomenon.73 Even Gordon Lightfoot’s “Canadian Railroad Trilogy,” probably the most 
famous musical expression of technological nationalism, was commissioned by the CBC for 
Canada’s 1967 centennial celebrations.74 
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In a recent essay, business scholar Melissa Aronczyk actually divides Canadian rail 
nationalism into two stages; the development of the myth in nineteenth century material and the 
“‘rebirth’ and popularization in the late 1960s.”75 “The myth of the CPR was in the air long 
before Berton,” Daniel Francis also argues, and “is, in fact, as old as the railway itself.”76 Just as 
Zeller suggests that there was no such thing as a settler Canadian nation outside the Darwinist 
ideas of evolution, there too was no such thing as an imagined settler Canadian nation in a world 
without railways.77 Communications technologies were an undergirding for Confederation 
thought and philosophy; the ingenuity of settlers was what allowed for dominion over such a 
challenging territory.78 There was, historian A. A. den Otter suggests, “a political understanding 
that dominated mid-nineteenth-century Canada...a general faith in railway technology as the 
panacea for Canada’s economic and social ills [that] epitomized a remarkable agreement on the 
liberal principle of economic progress achieved through technological advancement.”79 Rail 
access was wielded like a weapon to keep regional interests in line, supported the development 
of other communications infrastructure such as the Post Office and telegraphy, and was imagined 
in nationalist discourse as the primary driver for national development.80 Intellectual historian R. 
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Douglas Francis refers to this as the “technological imperative” and suggests that railways were 
the first technological system in Canada to inspire “sustained reflections on its significance”; 
thinkers imagined that “railways were inaugurating a new world in which technology would be 
the dominant force, an imperative.”81 In the context of this project, not only did the railway do 
the rather practical job of connecting Canadians across distances, but it also was a widely 
recognizable symbol of industry, progress, and modernity. “It embodied the age,” den Otter 
argues, “for here was an instrument of power and speed, noise and fire, iron and smoke, confined 
to a pre-determined path.”82 That is, rail was not only the technological support for the Canadian 
settler nation, but it was the technological support for the modern Canadian settler nation, 
opening a new world in which the technological collapse of space and time could support and 
maintain nationhood. 
This is why railway nationalism was such a potent metaphor during its late-modern 
“revival” by Berton, Lightfoot, and various state agents—the “Confederation Train” traveling 
exhibit made for the Canadian centennial in 1967 appears briefly in my conclusion, for example. 
It suggested that because Canada had always had transcontinental rail infrastructure, Canada had 
always been a “modern” nation while at the same time making “communication” a vital, almost 
ahistorical, aspect of being Canadian. “So ingrained in the Canadian imagination has been this 
purported link between Canadian nationhood on the one hand and media of communication on 
the other,” Robert Babe writes, that it has had “important policy repercussions” well into the late 
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twentieth century.83 This in turn points to the return, so to speak, to the myth of transcontinental 
rail as foundational to Canadian-ness as a response to the same concerns I address in this 
dissertation, a desperate reach towards narratives of special settlers and their special geography 
that hit its apex just as the timeframe for my project ends. 
 “Technological nationalism” and the nationalisms embedded in Canadian geographies 
and climates are compatible. As Edward Jones-Imhotep has recently argued, they can even be 
essential to each other as the state used large techno-scientific communications projects to 
“document and transform” both its physical territory and its visions of geography, sovereignty, 
and nationhood.84 The value of “communication” as both a concept and a physical infrastructure 
to Canadian self-fashioning is especially evident in Harold Innis’ inclusion of natural and 
human-made transportations as “communications” technologies. As Babe has shown, “even the 
production or extraction of natural resources (or ‘staples’) constituted ‘communication’ for Innis. 
The extraction or production of staples creates environments, or ecosystems, that mediate human 
relations and otherwise affect a people’s thoughts and actions.”85 By this token, human 
interactions with communications technologies and the distances they seek to transcend give 
those distances meaning. As perhaps Canada’s greatest railway storyteller, Gordon Lightfoot, 
sings, “the green dark forest was too silent to be real” before settlers arrived with their wheels 
and railways.86 
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However, in making the spatial regimes of a transcontinental Canada “real,” modern 
communications technologies threatened Canada’s identity as a nation existing just at the edge of 
geographic possibility. Northrop Frye argued, for example, that Canada was especially prone to 
the “obliterated environment,” as “jet planes, international hotels, and disappearing landmarks” 
exposed the incommensurability between unity on a national scale and more intimate place-
based belonging; Canada’s vulnerabilities lay in its “empty spaces, its largely unknown lakes and 
rivers and islands...[and] its dependence on immense railways to hold it physically together.”87 
The threat of the “obliterated environment” took two related forms in high-modern Canada. First, 
unlike rail, air travel and other high-modern communications infrastructures did not “hold” the 
territory together because they were not intimately tied to the land, as I will discuss below. 
Airways did not traverse Canada’s vastness in the same way that railroad tracks did, soaring 
above points on a map rather than brutally barreling between them. Second, as Edward Jones-
Imhotep has recently argued, the realities of the early Cold War and hostile Canadian 
environments made certain components of technological orders appear unreliable. Rather than 
producing a distinctive Canadian envirotechnical experience, these components highlighted 
instead the limits of geography as a marker of national ability and subsequently allowed 
instability and unreliability to become part of high-modern “technological nationalism.”88 
Emerging techno-scientific challenges, especially those in “new” environments such as the 
Arctic and upper atmosphere, made Canadian distances and Canadian communications more 
                                               
87 Northrop Frye, “Preface to The Bush Garden,” in Northrop Frye on Canada Volume 12, eds. 
Jean O’Grady and David Staines (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 414. See also 
Jones-Imhotep, The Unreliable Nation, 4. 
88 Jones-Imhotep, The Unreliable Nation, 6-10. 
 
 34 
difficult to reconcile inside high-modern nationalist discourse and had to be therefore united by 
the rhetoric of technological failure.  
Rail was able to escape the most obvious aspects of these challenges because of its 
prominence before high modernity, but also because of the discursive focus on the intimate 
technological body-work of constructing the railway and the lived experience of traversing the 
nation. The act of boring paths through mountains and laying rails across the entirety of the 
Canadian nation had and has more cultural currency than actually travelling on the train. The 
technology itself, the landscapes onto which it was imposed, and the processes of building it 
therefore become wrapped up in what David Nye might call a “technological creation story,” 
where the land appeared to be specially laid out for settlers to apply their technology and 
industry.89 Canada-as-nation could only exist through the labor and power required to construct 
the railways, which in turn could only exist because of the specificities of Canadian geography. 
Air travel, on the other hand, did even more time-space compression than rail and was also 
missing the intimacy that made rail special in Canada, a double-blow to envirotechnical 
constructions of the modern Canadian nation. Certainly, airports have affected how cities grow, 
and the development patterns of Canada’s northern regions were partially dictated by air routes, 
but this is nothing compared to traversing the nation rail-spike by rail-spike.90 The rhetoric of 
struggle to overcome distance by industry and ingenuity that prevailed in railway boosterism was 
much harder to attach to air travel; compared to tunneling through the Rocky Mountains, the 
establishment of sea-to-sea radio communication necessary for transcontinental air travel seemed 
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easy. Regular airline travel also threatened to stretch geographic reach too far, making Canada’s 
special distances irrelevant, or at least mundane. Rapidly expanding air-travel infrastructure 
through the immediate postwar years called for new Canadian envirotechnical paradigms that 
built on older narratives of “technological nationalism” but renegotiated them inside modern 
Canadian contexts. Canada had to be re-imagined as an “aviation nation” that made the virtual 
elimination of Canada’s mythical distances by high-modern systems as vital to national self-
fashioning as the distances themselves. 
 
What Is Envirotech? 
Air travel’s influence on modern Canadian self-fashioning therefore suggests that it can, 
and should, be examined as an envirotechnical system. Scholars have long associated technology 
with the human need to “modify, subdue, and control” their surroundings, but only relatively 
recently have environmental historians and historians of technology actively sought to open the 
black boxes of one field with the crowbars provided by the other.91 “Envirotech” makes use of 
the constructivist and materialist tendencies of environmental history and the history of 
technology in order to examine “nature, technology, and their relationship within and as history,” 
as Sara Pritchard has argued in her 2011 book about the Rhône river.92 Nature and technology 
might both be cultural constructions, as William Cronon has famously claimed about the former, 
but the physical limits nature places on historical and technological change remind us of their 
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tangible effects.93 In so doing, Pritchard identifies a quadripartite set of concerns for envirotech 
scholars—nature, culture, technology, and politics—and suggests that envirotech must engage 
with all four without placing them in opposition or resorting to determinism.94  
Given these concerns, the majority of envirotech study in its first twenty years or so has 
been devoted to large technological projects such as dams, nuclear power plants, and highways, 
which by their size require centralized state investment and control and have large-scale visible, 
measurable environmental impacts.95 Water management in particular has been a popular way to 
observe and analyze the nature-culture-technology-power nexus for the first generation, so to 
speak, of explicitly envirotechnical scholars. Sara Pritchard, Daniel Macfarlane, Chandra 
Mukerji and David Biggs have used “wild” waters as a way to unlock envirotechnical 
frameworks.96 In these studies, the environment in question is given its own form of agency: 
dams flood, runoff appears in unwanted places, and sandbars block the passage of ships. Built 
technologies do not always “triumph” over the natural world, and envirotech gives both nature’s 
and technology’s victories analytic value. Nature, in short, can fight back when treated as an 
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agent in studies of technology and the environment, and water, given its universal properties and 
frequent historical anthropomorphization, has acted as a gateway “nature” for this treatment. 
The focus on large-scale centralized state projects in this first generation of envirotech 
also means that “the nation” is often an analytic inside these envirotechnical stories. One such 
example is Chandra Mukerji’s Impossible Engineering, which tells the story of the 17th century 
construction of the Canal du Midi in southern France. She suggests that this was a historical 
moment when the land itself was imbued with new symbolism, and the Canal du Midi, therefore, 
becomes both a vehicle for and a result of changes in politics, culture, and approaches to 
engineering and the natural world. Thomas Zeller’s work on the Autobahn under two separate 
regimes—the Nazis and the Federal Republic—further shows the interpretive flexibility of the 
same system under different national self-constructions, especially in terms of “the relationship 
of the autobahnen to the landscape surrounding them and shaped by them.”97 The landscape as 
seen from the highways, he argues, was a contested site of political and social meaning, shaped 
by the ruling party’s vision of nature, technology and nation, but also experienced by individuals 
driving their own cars along the route.  
Studying such overwhelmingly large megaprojects almost requires analysis of these 
intimate interactions with it to balance the narrative and give it a “human” dimension. A number 
of envirotechnical scholars have therefore begun to examine how everyday life in built and 
natural environments changes when large-scale technological systems enter. Canadian 
geographer Joy Parr reflects on many of these themes, such as government projects and direct 
technological modification of the natural world, in her pathbreaking book Sensing Changes, but 
instead focuses on what she calls “embodiment history”: “how bodies learn and reason about 
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their habitats and tools.”98 She argues that people who lived and worked in and around military 
bases, nuclear plants, and hydroelectric dams needed to re-organize their senses of place, space, 
and self. By examining how “ordinary” Canadians embodied the changes to their 
technologically-modified environments, she shows how places provide an intangible sense of 
identity and community as they are experienced through technologies.  
As Mukerji, Parr, and Pritchard all argue, “place matters in technological innovation,” 
and it is from here that the envirotechnical aspects of my own work arise.99 In this dissertation, I 
push the boundaries of envirotech by focusing on air travel’s impact on the imagined 
environment. Air travel might not have the same sort of footprint that popular envirotechnical 
subjects such as dams might, but it alters perceptions of geography and nationhood. Canada 
looks different from above and feels different when travelling at five-miles-a-minute, and 
airliners are the mediators for these perceptions. Canadian landscapes may have been minimally 
altered by commercial air travel, but mid-century “imagined” Canada owes a great deal to 
traveling across and viewing the nation from above. Zeller’s “axiomatic statement” that 
“transportation and landscape shape each other” is especially valuable here, as I argue that this 
shaping is both physical and discursive.100 Here, Jasanoff and Kim’s “sociotechnical 
imaginaries” meet envirotechnical impacts; state infrastructure projects are developed inside a 
set of socio-cultural concerns and the particularities of the environment change how the projects 
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are implemented, but, most importantly for this dissertation, those socio-cultural concerns shape 
what the technological system is imagined to do to those environments.  
 
Why Advertising? Why TCA? 
As a way of bridging the top-down state megaproject and the everyday envirotechnical 
experience, I have chosen to engage with the public-facing discourse developed by Trans-
Canada Airlines. Publicity material created by the state is obviously a way in which we can see 
what might be called “official” narratives of nature, technology, and nation, but it can also tell us 
about the intangible ways in which technology disrupts or threatens older paradigms. For 
example, I show in Chapter 4 that anxieties about the “speed-up” in labor and leisure, the 
commodification of vacations, and the modern distancing of Canadians from their winters via 
technologies were coded inside an advertising language of “magic,” “time travel,” and “history.” 
Advertising reveals aspirational, imagined worlds—the way Canada ought to be rather than the 
way Canada is—that are in turn reflected back on everyday life. Cultural historian Jackson Lears 
opens his landmark book on the history of advertising by simply asking, “What do 
advertisements mean?” Advertising is as much about values as it is about selling stuff; the 
“unintended consequences of advertisers’ efforts to vend their wares,” Lears argues, is “the 
creation of a symbolic universe” of idealized social orders.101 In the case of the twentieth 
century, the focus of this project, those social orders were about balance and control over time, 
over money, and over consumer choice about how to participate in global economies.102 In this 
project, I extend these social orders further to examine “the nation” as both the thing advertised 
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and the thing disrupted by advertising, especially since TCA was in the business of selling 
places, services, and experiences, not consumer goods. TCA was a state airline and employed 
advertising agencies strongly affiliated with the government. The material TCA and its 
advertisers therefore produced was not only the most conspicuous source of Canadian air travel 
discourse available to everyday Canadians, but also reproduced larger narratives about 
environments, technologies, and what it meant to belong in modern Canada. 
There was no one person responsible for shaping TCA’s discourse about air travel and 
modern Canada. Therefore, when I discuss “TCA” as an agent in this project, I refer to the entire 
suite of airline allies and boosters who both deliberately and inadvertently worked to build a 
coherent picture of what aviation in general and a state airline in particular was supposed to do 
for Canada: public-relations workers at TCA and the advertising agencies with which the airline 
worked, executives such as TCA president Gordon McGregor, in-house publishers and editors 
who wrote in-flight magazines and company publications, external newspaper- and radio-men 
such as John Fisher, and even sympathetic politicians such as Howe. This is also why I refer to 
the amalgam of advertising, promotions, speeches, reviews, newsletters, interviews, and 
publicity images “public-facing material.” Some of this material was carefully curated and 
constructed—TCA’s Advertising department, for example, had copy-writers and engaged in 
market research, and the airline’s Press Office would draft multiple versions of press releases—
but off-the-cuff remarks in Parliament, speeches at Rotary Clubs, and newspaper profiles of 
famous pilots or coverage of accidents also contributed to how TCA appeared to fit inside 
modern Canada. In this study, I work in particular with over 700 print advertisements produced 
by TCA and its advertisers destined for magazines, newspapers, and direct-mail campaigns. (“No 
wonder so few had taken up the challenge of reconstructing the attitudes and values of an era 
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from its ads!” historian Roland Marchand exclaims in his book Advertising the American Dream, 
and I am inclined to agree, despite working with only about 5% of the volume he did).103 These 
advertisements, coupled with other promotional materials such as brochures, public-relations 
packages for travel agents, and press releases, tell a story about state agencies attempting to 
maintain something “solid” in modern Canadian national identity while the very thing they were 
meant to sell was gradually melting it into air. 
 
The Structure of This Project 
This dissertation is made up of five body chapters. They are arranged roughly 
chronologically, but are designed to be somewhat episodic and subsequently can be taken apart, 
re-arranged, and plugged in to one another to tell different stories about modern Canadian time, 
space, and place. In general, I am less concerned with the nuts-and-bolts study of the airplanes 
themselves or the organizational business history of TCA. Instead, this dissertation explores what 
the airline looked like to its public, how those appearances were constructed and received, and 
what they can tell us about the modern Canadian envirotechnical nation. 
The first, “History, Geography, and Aerial Views,” focuses on TCA’s first decade of 
public-facing material. In it, I trace the process by which TCA was founded in Canadian 
Parliament and argue that it was deliberately assigned the same sort of transcontinental 
symbolism that rail had been two generations earlier. TCA’s earliest promotional material 
manipulated time and space—transportation history and Canadian bigness—to position itself and 
its services as a natural conclusion to a national teleology that previously had ended with the 
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hammering of the “last spike.” The airline also emphasized the experience of flying by 
describing views from its aircraft as an authentic envirotechnical experience that only it could 
provide. Ostensibly a way to calm nervous passengers, the awe and wonder of the aerial view at 
TCA became a way that everyday Canadians could truly appreciate their nation’s 
overwhelmingly large size. 
The second and third chapters employ a narrative-counternarrative structure, modeled in 
David Nye’s America As Second Creation, and focus on a single aircraft: the Canadair DC-4M 
North Star. The North Star was designed and built almost exclusively for the Canadian 
government (TCA and the Royal Canadian Air Force), and therefore provides insight into the 
place of aviation as a specific technological platform, rather than a nebulous symbol, in the 
modern Canadian envirotechnical nation. The narrative chapter, “The Canadair North Star and 
Seasonal Canadian-ness,” looks at the technological and discursive creation of the North Star 
from TCA’s perspective. TCA shaped the North Star—its first new postwar airliner and the first 
to incorporate a number of military-to-civilian diffusion technologies—as a unique Canadian 
technology designed for allegedly unique Canadian conditions. This was, as I show, in response 
to a flying public that was still apprehensive about air travel, which TCA connected in its public-
facing material to Canadian mobility patterns shaped by the lore of its allegedly harsh winters. 
The airline designed advertising campaigns aimed at breaking what it saw as an unfounded belief 
that winters were less safe for flying, in turn destabilizing a century of discourse that linked 
travel in Canada to time in the form of seasons. The relative success of this constructed public 
persona of the North Star is the subject of the counternarrative, “North Star Failures and the 
State,” in which I argue that for all its pointed publicity, the North Star was a failure. From 
outside the airline’s perspective, the North Star appeared to be a poor choice for TCA’s postwar 
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needs, both practical and cultural. First, the aircraft was expensive and took a long time to 
manufacture, making it a lightning rod for politicians already hostile to Crown corporations and 
government spending. Second, it was noisy and uncomfortable for passengers, making it difficult 
to sell as the guiding light for Canadian aviation in the second half of the twentieth century. 
Because of these political and technological failures, the North Star simply was not all it was 
advertised to be. 
The fourth chapter, “Time, Space, and Sun Destinations,” switches focus from what TCA 
flew to where it flew. As a further corrective to imagined Canadian fears of wintertime flying, 
TCA introduced new destinations starting in the late 1940s: Bermuda, various English- and 
French-Caribbean islands, and Florida. Nicknamed “sun destinations” in internal airline 
discourse, these places further removed everyday Canadians from their character-building 
seasons through publicity campaigns that encouraged passengers to exchange winters for 
summers. The North Star was the agent by which summers and winters were overturned, and 
advertising for “sun destinations” manipulated time to not only remove Canadian winters as an 
obstacle to mobility, but to separate “winter” and “summer” from the calendar entirely. Once 
time in the form of seasons was exclusively a construct in TCA’s discourse, it was much easier 
to get passengers to buy in to the extreme time-space compression of its aircraft. This argument 
carries over to my final chapter, “Four Short Stories About Jets.” It is one of the four episodes 
about TCA’s jet age services that I cover; the others highlight TCA’s first turbine-powered 
aircraft, the introduction of “full jets” and their accompanying airport infrastructure through the 
early years of the 1960s, and the development and advertising of “ReserVec I,” the world’s first 
real-time computerized airline reservations system. These “short stories” all show the 
fragmentation of TCA’s publicity in terms of both messaging and literal corporate organizational 
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structure, as well as the difficulty in maintaining the airline’s carefully crafted discourse of 
nature, technology, and nation into the jet age. They also trace four themes which appear 
throughout the previous four chapters: TCA’s introducing new technologies as particularly 
“Canadian” (or not), air travel as a high-modern megaproject, the relationship between business 
and the state, and the links between climate, seasonality, mobility, and belonging. This 
culminates in the airline changing its name to Air Canada in 1964, which is the subject of the 
dissertation’s conclusion. Despite TCA’s best efforts, air travel did not replace rail as the locus 
for twentieth century envirotechnical nationalism, and therefore being “Trans-Canada” did not 













1. History, Geography, and Aerial Views 
Trans-Canada Air Lines turned ten years old on April 10, 1947, but the airline did very 
little to celebrate.104 Passengers on flights that day received what Between Ourselves called a 
“generous cut” of birthday cake “in a neat little silver box,” cut by the “smallest and largest 
passengers leaving Montreal”: a seven-year-old-girl and a famous wrestler called “Da Preem.” 
Other than that, a few more cakes sent to mayors of major hub cities, and a celebratory luncheon 
for TCA managers thrown by a transport company in Saskatchewan, “the birthday passed almost 
like any other day,” with little public fanfare at the airline.105 Outside TCA, boosters such as 
John Fisher used the anniversary as an opportunity to highlight how commercial aviation in 
general, and TCA in particular, had a tradition of serving Canada’s best interests. In a 
characteristic “pride-builder” report on the subject, he highlighted TCA’s new transatlantic 
routes, its newest airliner, the Canadair DC-4M North Star, and its overall effect on Canada: 
“You’ll never learn from TCA that the best record for flying in the world was made in a 
tough northern country of hard winters...Thursday is the Tenth Birthday. Greetings to 
the...men and women who have carried the Maple Leaf high and far. You have helped 
give Canada a feeling of nationhood.”106 
 
What exactly did TCA, as a state airline, do to help give Canada a “feeling of nationhood?” And 
was that “nationhood” different in 1947 than it was a decade or century prior? This chapter will 
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explore TCA’s public-facing material from in and around its decennial year and its implications 
for Canadian envirotechnical identity.  
The tensions between Canadian environmental and technological nationalisms, and 
TCA’s responses to them, were rooted in TCA’s very existence as a state airline and its self-
fashioning during and after the Second World War. TCA engaged with modern and high-modern 
approaches to “space” and “time” as a way to balance popular narratives of Canadian geography 
and history with selling its space-shrinking services. Manipulating “space” and “time” to elide 
the tensions between environment and modern technology helped TCA’s advertising and 
promotional material place airplanes as part of an established timeline of transportation 
technologies, providing the machines themselves with a teleology connected to mythic Canadian 
distances. This had the added effect of turning TCA into the exclusive purveyor of what airline 
advertisers saw as an authentic Canadian envirotechnical experience: viewing the nation from 
above. Passengers were sold a vision of Canadian geography that suggested that the only way to 
truly appreciate the scale and variability of the nation was to see it from an airplane window.  
This chapter will be divided into four major sections. The first will introduce a basic 
history of TCA’s first decade as an airline, from its founding by Act of Parliament to its 1947 
decennial celebrations (or lack thereof). There, I will discuss the support for and criticism of 
founding a state airline in Canada and will trace some of the personnel and organizational 
changes that make the period under study unique in terms of TCA’s self-fashioning. The next 
two sections will examine two discrete but related trends in TCA’s promotional material during 
and immediately after the war: discursive manipulations of space and time. TCA worked with 
“time” and “space” as high-modern categories under the guise of “history” and “geography”; 
Canada’s history and character-building distances were assigned a great deal of elasticity and 
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were stretched, shrunk, and folded into themselves as the need arose. Canada was transformed 
from a land of impossible distances to being only “one day wide” because of TCA’s services, but 
even then, those distances were enrolled as part of Canadian history to make TCA a natural part 
of the Canadian transportation landscape. Finally, I will look at a specific feature that was the 
focus of a substantial part of the airline’s early publicity—aerial views of Canada—which TCA 
constructed as a part of the modern Canadian technological experience that only it could provide.  
 
A Brief History of TCA 
At the end of the 1920s, aviation in Canada took two related forms: “bush flying” for the 
purpose of surveying, fire-fighting, and equipment, medical, and personnel transport in the parts 
of Canada sparsely populated by settlers, and airmail. Airmail, “the first means of adapting 
aviation technology to the task of nation-building,” greatly interested the Canadian government, 
but the task of actually flying the mail was undertaken by a jumble of private and partially 
subsidized enterprises.107 One of those, Manitoba grain entrepreneur James Richardson’s 
Western Canadian Airways (later Canadian Airways Limited), came to control over three-
quarters of Canadian civilian aviation by the time the Depression hit. His network stretched from 
the Pacific as far east as New Brunswick and well into the Northwest Territories, but there were 
gaps which became apparent when Richardson won a contract with the post office in 1930. There 
were no east-west routes crossing the Precambrian Shield or Rocky Mountains; air mail moving 
west to Winnipeg had to enter the American airmail system at Detroit and then resurface in 
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North Dakota, and mail going to Vancouver or Victoria was delivered via Seattle.108 Some 
legislators were troubled by these gaps and interpreted them as a potential threat to national 
security, and in 1929 Parliament began discussing how to best build a coast-to-coast air network. 
The trans-Canada Airway, as that network came to be known, was imagined as a series of 
stations sustaining a continuous radio signal from Toronto (and eventually further east) to 
Vancouver. It would, in aviation historian Peter Pigott’s words, “overcome this country’s vast 
geographical barriers, thwart the Americans, reassure the British, and unite the country.” 109 The 
Airway was part of a coordinated effort by the federal government through first few decades of 
the twentieth century to centralize and unite a geographically scattered nation through state-
supported communications infrastructure such as banking, broadcasting, and regulation.110 
Landing fields and airports in Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, and British Columbia were 
constructed as Depression relief projects, employing thousands of workers. A few years later, 
Canadian pioneer aviator John McCurdy would call this project “the most useful public works 
ever devised in the Dominion.”111 The completed Airway would stretch over 3,300 miles, 
including a sideline north from Lethbridge to Edmonton, allowing pilots to fly “on the beam” by 
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following looped Morse signals of “As” and “Ns.”112 Richardson expected Canadian Airways 
Limited to be the sole operator on the new network, but Prime Minister R. B. Bennett cancelled 
Richardson’s lucrative air mail contracts in 1932, bringing the airline near insolvency. 
Richardson continued to lobby for a role in the developing Airway in the hopes that “ultimately 
we would be accorded some recognition for our accomplishments in opening up the country.” 113 
His lobbying grew more hopeful as Bennett was replaced as Prime Minister by Liberal William 
Lyon Mackenzie King in 1935. Over the next few years, Richardson gradually clawed his way 
back into some airmail contracts and made some expensive aircraft purchases, including the 
Lockheed 10A “Electra” aircraft that would make up Trans-Canada Air Lines’ first fleet, but it 
was not enough to cement his role as the sole operator of the twentieth-century version of 
transcontinental Canadian rail. 
The construction of the Airway and related civilian aviation developments occupied the 
minds of parliamentarians through the mid-1930s, especially in terms of its role in nation-
building. Investing in aviation, according to Vancouver Member of Parliament H. C. Green in a 
1936 House of Commons debate, was “sound national development for Canada” which would 
make Canada “a great northern nation, not a vest pocket edition of the United States of 
America.” He and other air-minded parliamentarians urged for what was frequently called an 
“active” or “bold air policy,” which involved increased investment in the Airway, the 
establishment of an airmail service, a commercial airline, or both, and support of a homegrown 
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aviation industry in general.114 Green reasoned during a debate on the 1936 budget that federally-
supported aviation would accomplish two related goals: 
“In the first place I am sure it will help draw the provinces closer together...After all, 
during the depression the provinces have been hard hit and there have been many 
rumblings, many questions asked as to whether or not confederation was worth while [sic]. 
I think we must remember that it is our duty here in parliament to do everything possible to 
hold the provinces together. 
I am also interested because I do not think anything will do more to strengthen the 
morale and raise the spirit of our people than to make Canada a leader in aviation...Look at 
our background in aviation. In the war we had a far higher percentage of pilots in the air 
force than any other part of the empire...That is the background of Canada in aviation, and 
we also have the deeds that have been done by our fliers in the north. There is no reason 
why we should not go ahead and lead the world in aviation.”115 
 
Green’s reasons for federal control of commercial aviation development echo the pleas made by 
nineteenth-century railway boosters. He saw a technological network as a way to prevent the 
provinces from drifting apart, especially given that his riding was located at the westernmost 
edge of Canadian settlement. With a slight tense change—“confederation will be worthwhile” 
instead of “was worthwhile”—the first part of his speech would not have been out of place 
seventy years earlier. A transcontinental “confederated” nation, as I suggested in the 
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introduction, was only imaginable to Confederation-era intelligentsia because of homegrown 
techno-science, including the railways and “inventory sciences” such as geology and earth 
magnetism. “Homegrown” is the key here, as Green also imagined that state-supported aviation 
would encourage a techno-scientific skillset for which Canadians already seemed well-suited, 
given their performances in war and in the North. 
Air travel was clearly the future, as Green and other air-minded politicians argued, but 
airlines were expensive and time-consuming undertakings. On one hand, it would have been 
wasteful to pass the Airway, which had cost the government nearly $8 million to build, on to 
private enterprises. On the other, civilian air travel in Canada was still relatively untested. Should 
the risks and rewards fall to the federal government, even though private companies such as 
Richardson’s already had a great deal of experience? Minister of Transport C. D. Howe, 
arguably Canada’s most air-minded parliamentarian and the architect of the Trans-Canada Air 
Lines Act, believed so. He compared two popular airline models—the private “somewhat chaotic 
experience” in the United States and the more subsidized British Imperial Airways model—and 
decided that the new company was to be organized as a private corporation underwritten by the 
publicly-owned Canadian National Railways. That is, the government would determine the size, 
shape, and function of the new corporation, but smaller-scale contracts and day-to-day operations 
would fall to the CNR, which could pass 49 per cent of shares to private enterprise.116 Its board 
of directors would be made up of CNR railwaymen and appointed public servants, and, most 
importantly, would give TCA a virtual monopoly on commercial air transport in Canada.117  
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Howe rushed the bill through Parliament at the end of March and beginning of April 
1937—the speed is generally considered by analysts to be an idiosyncrasy of Howe’s rather than 
due to political machinations—and critics were quick to notice the parallels with rail 
development. Some, like Toronto-area MP Thomas Church, saw the CNR as not public enough, 
even “anti-public,” worrying that the government would simply “put up the money” with no 
control over the outcome. “They are going to launch this system with its high-sounding name, 
Trans-Canada Air Lines, and what will happen after that? Parliament...has nothing to do with it 
at all,” he argued at a reading of the bill.118 Furthermore, critics saw TCA’s connection with the 
“debt-ridden and universally derided” CNR as a hint that it would suffer the same fate as rail: 
speculation, overspending on unnecessary routes, political corruption and favoritism, and 
nonstop consolidations, buyouts, and bankruptcies.119 Interestingly, Howe’s interlocutors in 
debates on the bill consistently asked him about international, transatlantic, trans-Pacific, and 
northern routes and he had to keep reminding the House that the new airline was designed to fly 
on the Airway; “after all, that is the most important feature.”120 In general, it appeared that TCA 
was to do much of the same province-binding, techno-science-encouraging work that rail had 
done, but incorporating the lessons learned from it. Richardson and Canadian Airways Limited 
were essentially written out of the airline and Airway. Pigott suggests that this was likely 
                                               
TCA, see C. A. Ashley, The First Twenty-Five Years: A Study of Trans-Canada Air Lines 
(Toronto: MacMillan, 1963), 5-12; Pigott, National Treasure, 24-29. 
118 Canada, House of Commons Debates, March 22, 1937 (Thomas Church), 
http://parl.canadiana.ca/view/oop.debates_HOC1802_02/1008?r=0&s=1. In a tirade as angry as 
Canadian parliamentarians get, Church also questioned whether Howe had ever even “been up in 
the air” and asked if he would “trust these airships”; Howe had and did.  
119 Philip Smith, It Seems Like Only Yesterday: Air Canada, the First 50 Years (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart, 1986), 50. 




because Richardson’s toadying to whichever party was in power reminded Mackenzie King of 
railway corruption, hint at the state’s desire to do transcontinentality differently by air.121  
This would all depend, however, on “how airminded the people of Canada become,” as 
Toronto-area MP Denton Massey argued in early April. Massey wondered how much advertising 
“of a certain definite and specific nature” would be necessary to convince Canadians of the 
safety, reliability, and convenience of air transport, but he was quickly dismissed by Howe as 
“underestimat[ing] the airmindedness of the Canadian people.”122 The pre-existing advertising 
infrastructure at the CNR was an added benefit, Howe suggested, because the railway was 
already poised to undertake any advertising campaigns if necessary. This exchange hints at an 
early, if small, concern with selling the idea of air travel to Canadians. Of course, Massey’s 
claim that Canadians needed convincing to fly and Howe’s assertion that they did not point to 
one of the main issues addressed in this dissertation; Canadians needed to be encouraged to take 
to the air, and they also needed to be encouraged to see aviation as a technological creation story 
necessary to their existence as a modern nation. 
After two weeks of debate, the Trans-Canada Air Lines Act was passed on 10 April 1937; 
as head of the CNR, Manitoba railway manager Samuel J. Hungerford became the airline’s first 
president.123 Discursively, the airline was oriented along the same east-west axis as rail, clearly 
influenced by the same sorts of calls to technological nationhood from half a century earlier. The 
name “Trans-Canada Air Lines” is an obvious expression of this. TCA was not just “Canada,” as 
Canadian Airways was, but it was Trans-Canada, encompassing the whole of the territory and 
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knitting far-flung population centres together. As far as I can tell, Howe chose the name himself 
and included it in the initial wording of the Trans-Canada Air Lines Act: that “it is expedient to 
introduce a measure to incorporate a corporation to be known as trans-Canada air Lines with 
authority to establish and operate air lines and services across Canada.”124 However, the realities 
of existing in Canada in the late 1930s meant that TCA was more Atlantic- and USA-facing than 
transcontinental. The airline began service on September 1, 1937, after Richardson, “accepting 
the inevitability of it all,” sold his two 10-passenger Lockheed Electra aircraft to TCA and turned 
over what would be TCA’s first route: Vancouver-Seattle.125 The airline only began flying 
passengers from Montreal to Vancouver in March 1939, with intermediate stops in Ottawa, 
Toronto, North Bay, Kapuskasing, Wagaming, Winnipeg, Regina, and Lethbridge, and began 
testing flights north to Calgary and Edmonton and east to Moncton by the end of the year.126 As 
the Ottawa Journal reported in late 1939, only after the establishment of the Moncton leg and the 
finalization of a route from Moncton to Halifax could “the Trans-Canada” achieve “the proud 
ambition expressed in its name.”127  
However, true transcontinentality and all the rhetorical fanfare it deserved would have to 
wait.128 TCA’s passenger expansion was derailed by the outbreak of war. This began with a 
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major change in personnel, as Manitoba lawyer and TCA board member Herbert J. Symington, 
who Howe affectionately called “Herbie,” became the airline’s first standalone President in 
1941.129 The airline itself mobilized quickly for the war effort. To become what an early leaflet 
called “a swift and efficient public servant,” the machine shops at Winnipeg doubled in capacity 
to aid Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) instrument repair, and a new shop was built in Malton, 
Ontario under contract with the Department of Munitions.130 Some TCA airfields were 
repurposed as British Commonwealth Air Training Plan (BCATP) stations and personnel 
enlisted as pilots, engineers, clerks, and support workers of all sorts. Troubled by the 
transatlantic experience the British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC, essentially TCA’s 
British counterpart) was gaining by shuttling personnel and supplies to these Canadian training 
fields, as well as the volume of mail piling up at Canada House, Howe proposed a similar service 
be developed at TCA.131 In “TCA’s transatlantic summer” of 1943, the Canadian Government 
Trans-Atlantic Air Service (CGTAS), operated by TCA on behalf of the government, began 
flying military mail and personnel across the Atlantic.132  
Although it was not a direct or permanent part of TCA, this service did two important jobs 
for the airline. First, setting aside the practical experience gained by the airline and its personnel, 
operating the CGTAS re-oriented the airline towards the Atlantic. The high-minded nationalistic 
sea-to-sea rhetoric of TCA’s founding fell by the wayside as the war effort occupied national 
discourse. TCA contributed on the home front as well, “speeding men, machine parts, tools, 
blueprints, specifications, orders, documents, blood plasma, serum and all the other essentials of 
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a war-time society to points of urgent need,” as one wartime publicity document pointed out.133 
These home-front contributions paired with the volume and cultural value of the news and 
personal letters the CGTAS carried helped merge TCA’s unite-the-nation discourse with 
patriotic war rhetoric. The second job it did was normalizing flying across the Atlantic in 
general, as Sean Nicklin has recently argued, giving “transatlantic civil flight a major boost.” 
The necessities of war had transformed the North Atlantic “from a dangerous frontier to a highly 
developed air corridor”; the airplane was forced to be viable alternative to the steamship and 
state and subsidized airlines that had participated in ferry service such as TCA were primed to 
reap the benefits.134  
Those benefits did not come easy to TCA, which faced both operational and systemic 
challenges at war’s end. The aircraft used by the CGTAS, modified Avro Lancaster bombers 
known as “Lancastrians,” were ill-suited to passenger flight. Stripped to their bare bones in order 
to carry as much mail as possible, Lancastrians were noisy, shaky, unreliable, and accident-
prone. Because they had to be filled to the brim in order to make the trip across the ocean, the 
fuel tanks tended to slosh everywhere, making everything especially flammable. Even the 
electricity necessary to operate the radio had the potential to spark and cause a fire. Ferry 
Command pilot George Lothian, who served with TCA before and long after the war, recalled in 
his memoirs “a din that could only be compared to a boiler factory,” a heating system that either 
fried or froze the crew, and makeshift urinals.135 They weren’t much better once permanently 
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adapted for postwar civilian flight. Onboard toilets were infrequently available, and passengers 
“cannot...look out the windows in a downward direction without rising from their seats,” as a 
reporter wrote for the British Flying magazine in 1945. Lancastrians also did not have the range 
for a transatlantic flight without a fuelling stop in Newfoundland, creating further disruptions and 
potential unpredictability. They simply weren’t designed for repeated long-haul flights, and were 
therefore the first casualty when TCA officials began looking towards the airline’s postwar 
civilian travel needs. The “big lesson” to be learned from the Lancastrians, Flying magazine 
suggested, “is that each aircraft must be designed for the specific purpose for which it is 
intended.”136 The general conclusion at TCA was that the Lancastrians were a useful stop-gap 
measure, but unsuitable for regular, reliable, postwar civilian transport, especially given the 
assumed increase in passenger traffic at the end of the war. TCA’s eventual replacement for the 
Lancastrians, the Canadair DC-4M North Star, began flying the Atlantic in 1947 and is the 
subject of Chapters 2 and 3. 
The airline also had to face emerging mid-century paradigms of mobility. Canada’s 
involvement in the war effort had split families across the ocean, and these cultural and social 
ties with Britain pulled relatively quick and accessible transatlantic travel back into the spotlight, 
much as it had been at the end of the nineteenth century and after the first World War.137 TCA 
aircraft carried war brides, war babies, orphans, and immigrants to Canada through the mid- and 
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late-1940s, making air travel appear necessary for the postwar return to normalcy.138 On the 
home front, TCA grew alongside a surge in automobility and a new form of publicly-funded 
transcontinentality: the Trans-Canada Highway. Proposed as the war was ending, the Highway 
was announced in stages starting in 1947 to respond to the same concerns proponents of the 
trans-Canada Airway were addressing ten years earlier. Motor vehicles traveling from Toronto to 
Vancouver (and points between) had to cross into the United States, which one MP considered 
“preposterous”; it was imperative “that we have good highways in these modern times.”139 
Although the Trans-Canada Highway was not direct competition for TCA, especially since it 
took thirty years to complete because of a lack of federal-provincial cooperation, it hints that the 
“democratized” mobility represented in postwar car travel was alive and well in Canada. It also 
suggests that there was still room for the symbolic value of sea-to-sea communications, despite 
the dampening effect of the war. Much like rail and early long-distance telephony, Canadians 
were generally not interested in driving from the Atlantic to the Pacific; it was the fact that they 
could that mattered.140  
These new—and old—ways of thinking about mobility in Canada were accompanied by 
another set of organizational changes at TCA. An amendment to the Trans-Canada Air Lines Act 
in 1945 allowed the corporation to set up subsidiaries, the first of which was “Trans-Canada Air 
Lines (Atlantic).” Designed to take some of the financial burden off the airline as it expanded its 
transatlantic (and later Caribbean) services and to seamlessly take over the CGTAS, TCA 
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Atlantic turned out to be a disaster for the airline as we will see in Chapters 2 and 3. On the 
personnel front, CGTAS pilots and crew, including George Lothian, returned to full-time TCA 
service, and a number of RCAF servicepersons joined TCA as pilots, engineers, and ground and 
cabin crew. One of those was Anglo-Montrealer Gordon R. McGregor, who joined TCA in 1945. 
McGregor was a decorated amateur pilot and Bell Telephone Company manager and engineer 
before the war, was the oldest and top-scoring Canadian pilot in the Battle of Britain (with five 
victories credited and at age 38). In his memoirs, McGregor remembers writing to Hungerford in 
early 1937, when there was “talk of a new airline being formed,” to say that “my work and my 
hobby have combined to make me of more value to...air transportation than any other field of 
endeavour.” After the war, he told Bell of his “expressed inability to resist the temptation to have 
some part in the rapid development of air transportation sure to take place in the coming years,” 
and left to become TCA’s “General Traffic Manager”; the airline had essentially split into 
“Operations” and “Traffic” departments to meet both rising passenger volume, which had 
doubled between 1944 and 1946, and increased fleet capacity.141 
Meanwhile, TCA turned ten. It is unclear why there was so little celebration.142 In 
general, advertising and self-promotion were not a terribly high priority at TCA in the first few 
years after the war, but a major anniversary seems like a natural promotional opportunity that the 
airline did not capitalize on. Perhaps it was because the founding of the airline and the fulfilment 
of its mandate were separated by several years; TCA did provide another birthday cake for 
passengers flying on the tenth anniversary of the first Vancouver-Toronto flight in 1948. Perhaps 
also it was because the airline did not want to draw attention to itself as it struggled to expand its 
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passenger capacity, respond to a series of publicized accidents, maintain regularity during two 
particularly harsh winters, and keep North Star construction on schedule.  
A major concern during TCA’s ninth and tenth years was the airline’s apparent inability 
to show the public that it was improving its fleet and infrastructure to meet postwar Canada’s 
needs. “The war magnified our responsibilities manyfold and at the same time paralyzed much of 
our ability for compensatory expansion,” claimed an article in an early 1947 employee 
newsletter, “[and] today we inherit the legacy of those critical days.”143 These struggles were 
alarming to TCA executives, and as Traffic Manager, McGregor was asked through 1946 and 
1947 to explain why the Canadian public looked so unfavorably on TCA and what the airline 
could do about it.144 McGregor saw TCA’s “continued inability to cope with the present volume 
of potential air travel” as the major culprit in “public antagonism towards the Company” and 
recommended a series of public articles that would “avoid any note of apology” but would 
explain the that situation was out of TCA’s control and was being remedied.145 These piecemeal 
public-facing materials were gradually replaced by what McGregor called “a sustained and 
comprehensive program of advertising,” especially once he replaced Symington as President in 
1948.146 Given his previous experience in the traffic department, he focused on transforming the 
commercial side of TCA “from an order-taking department to a sales department actively 
stimulating business” through advertising, promotions such as fare plans, and increased booking 
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capacity.147 By early 1949, TCA’s Advertising department had expanded so much that it 
separated from the airline’s Public Relations umbrella; this expansion will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 2.148 McGregor served as TCA president until 1968 and retained an interest in 
passenger relations throughout, appearing on radio shows, giving public addresses, and even 
responding personally to passenger complaints.149 
 
Transatlantic Travel, Canadian Crossings, and the Uses of History 
 Just before and as McGregor took office, TCA began promoting two new aspects of its 
service: the debut of regular passenger flights between Canada and the United Kingdom, and the 
North Star, TCA’s first new postwar airliner. Although I will not discuss the North Star in detail 
here—it is the subject of the next two chapters— its recognizable image and evocative name 
featured heavily in promotional material, especially as it was used on TCA’s new routes. Built at 
the Canadair plant in Cartierville, Quebec, it combined the American Douglas DC-4 troop 
transport fuselage with four British Rolls-Royce “Merlin” engines, and featured a number of 
military-to-civilian transfer technologies such as cabin pressurization, long-range navigation, 
tricycle landing gear, and electric de-icing. Its Canadian manufacture in particular was celebrated 
as symbolic of national engineering prowess, industry, and air-mindedness. Just like its 
namesake, the North Star was to be the guiding light for the next generation of air transports. 
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TCA’s transatlantic flights are the focus of this section, as promotions for this service 
incorporated many of the history-and-geography themes that carried through TCA’s public-
facing material in this period.  
TCA began regular commercial flights to London and Prestwick on non-pressurized 
North Stars in 1947, and promotions for the new service made liberal use of the themes of time-
space compression by invoking a deep history of transatlantic travel using symbols of 
exploration and discovery.150 In flying across the ocean, the North Star represented the future of 
oceanic travel and the final step in a progress narrative that began with “the Vikings...in their 
little dragon ships,” as they were called in 1947 promotional copy. The Vikings were followed 
by “the coming of Cabot” and Jacques Cartier, the steamship Royal William “and her queer 
cargo,” and John Alcock and Arthur Brown’s 1919 transatlantic flight in a “tiny biplane” that 
looked “like a frail box-kite.” TCA’s “great new aircraft, the North Star,” was imagined as the 
heir to these great exploratory traditions, carrying future generations of oceanic travellers with 
ease since “after a thousand years, the wide ocean has been reduced to a narrow pool.”151 
The wide-ocean-narrow-pool transformation was evocative not necessarily of Canadian 
rail but another harbinger of time-space compression: steamship travel. Through the nineteenth 
century, advances in steamer technology, such as surface condensers to assist reliable operations 
in salt water, made travel across the Atlantic increasingly easy and comfortable, and steamship 
velocities increased sevenfold between approximately 1800 and 1900.152 Contemporary 
commentators pointed out how the world’s oceans and rivers “have contracted their streams to 
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infinitely less than half their lengths and breadths, and the great lakes of the world are rapidly 
drying into ponds!”153 Calling the Atlantic “the pond,” as in “hopping the pond,” allegedly dates 
from this period as well, discursively reducing the distance between Europe and the Americas. 
By 1900, high-powered steamships could cross the Atlantic in five days and pleasure travel 
became an important source of revenue to the North American and British steamer industries.154 
Historian Cecilia Morgan has shown how traveling on Canadian steamship lines was a point of 
pride for tourists, helping them to feel “truly part of an international and technologically 
sophisticated community.”155 Crossing the ocean by steam as a tourist was a tangible way in 
which the world seemed “smaller,” especially when traveling between the Dominion and its 
metropole, and allowed middle-class Canadians to participate in what felt like the progressive 
march of technological modernity.156 
TCA’s promotions for transatlantic travel also made the modern compression of space 
and time central to technological and historical progress by incorporating regularly scheduled 
airliner travel into the canon of exploration and adventure. Other transatlantic “firsts” had taken 
place between Alcock and Brown and the North Star, such as Charles Lindbergh’s solo flight in 
1927. Other regularly scheduled trips across the Atlantic had existed too, such as commercial 
steamship services and the CGTAS. But still TCA led with comparisons to Jean Cabot instead of 
the Lancastrian, which would have made an obvious choice and still would have reflected 
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favorably on the North Star.157 The overall effect of this tactic was one of multiple temporal 
accelerations. Not only did transatlantic travel times reduce drastically with each technological 
system from Cabot’s seven weeks to the Royal William’s 25 days to the North Star’s 14 hours, 
but the time between each transportation also accelerated. Approximately five hundred years 
passed between the Vikings and early modern explorers, three centuries between Cartier and the 
Royal William, and 86 years between the first steamship and air crossing. “In a millennium, 
eighty-six years is little more than the tick of the clock,” making the three decades between 
Alcock and Brown and the North Star even more impressive.158 This double-acceleration made 
time appear especially elastic, placing the Vikings, great explorers, and aviation pioneers both 
very near to and very distant from TCA and its North Stars. TCA passengers were only a few 
steps removed from the Vikings, but each step was a longer jump into the past.  
Furthermore, pushing the North Star’s lineage as far back as the Vikings provided 
airplanes with a history, which they lacked as a quintessentially modern technology. As 
Bernhard Rieger has shown for nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Europe, many anxieties 
about modern technologies were rooted in their relative complexity and how they appeared to 
“burst into the present from nowhere.”159 The overwhelming size of luxury ocean liners, 
locomotives, airliners, and other “modern wonders” made it difficult for consumers to place 
them into already-established paradigms of technology, place, and mobility. Airplanes in 
particular had the dual problem of being so complex that their manufacturing processes were 
black-boxed to the average consumer and going against the forces of nature by flying. Like other 
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mid-century airlines, TCA had to sell potential passengers on the idea of flying, not just on their 
particular services.160 TCA’s passenger comments through the late 1940s are littered with stories 
from “first flighters” and “land lovers”; one apologized because he was “not a good sailor” until 
a stewardess calmed him down, and another took “a long time to convince” his wife to fly.161 
Constructing transatlantic travel as a continuum of multiple time-space compressions offset some 
of these problems by tying airplanes to the great transports of history and providing them with 
the same heritage as other more familiar methods of transportation. This worked the opposite 
way as well in that that those great 
transports had the same time-space effect 
as an airliner, showing consumers that the 
overwhelming feelings associated with 
modern air travel were not, in fact, unique 
to modernity or air travel.  
These themes were made obvious 
by the juxtaposition of easily-
recognizable symbols of exploration, such 
as compass roses, sextants, and sailing 
ships, and ultra-modern aircraft in both 
images and copy. A widely-circulated 
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informational booklet from 1949 showed an image of colourfully dressed voyagers on an early-
modern sailing ship pointing excitedly at an airplane in the distance, claiming “TCA flies the 
Atlantic on a schedule that would have filled the voyaging Norsemen with awe.” 162 An air route 
map from the mid-1950s (Figure 1) featured an illustration of an airliner flying past a sextant, 
since “the land beyond the horizon has always held a fascination for adventurers armed with a 
parchment map, a dream of discovery—and often very little else...Today...air travel is a certain, 
scientifically controlled excursion, but should the pioneer spirit of adventure still spark within 
you, TCA invites you to chart your course...beyond the horizon.” 163 This particular “Chart Your 
Course” slogan and “art treatment” were highlighted by advertising manager Jack McGee as 
likely to “arouse the interest of the reader.”164 Perhaps the most popular example of this was 
TCA’s 1952 corporate Christmas card, which was “met with such favourable comment,” 
according to the Advertising department, that it was re-printed as seat-back material the 
following year with a total circulation in the hundreds of thousands (Figure 2).165 Designed as a 
stylized early modern “seafaring mappe,” the card manipulated space and time by showing 
geographic features of the Atlantic and the paths of various voyages of exploration, from Eric the 
Red to the North Stars that “flieth” across the ocean. Time here appeared so compressed by 
advances in transportation that history happened all at once.  
                                               
162 Booklet, “Horizons Unlimited,” 1949, Air Canada Collection 005.003, CASM. 
163 Brochure ADV. 41603-11-56-250M, “Chart Your Course,” 1956, Air Canada Collection 
005.003, CASM. 
164 Memorandum by J. A. McGee, “‘Chart Your Course’—Route Map Booklet,” 18 January 
1957. Air Canada Collection 005.005 Box 06, CASM. 
165 Memorandum by J. A. McGee, “Advertising—Souvenir Flight Portfolio,” June 26 1953, Air 
Canada Collection, CASM. 
 
 67 
These themes were also very present in TCA’s advertisements for its Canadian destinations 
and in “system” advertisements designed to instill positive feelings about flying in general. 
Despite the different historical and contemporary challenges in crossing the Atlantic and crossing 
Canada, oceanic and Canadian flying were treated with the same discursive techniques in TCA’s 
public-facing material. Vikings and their longboats served a similar purpose to wagons 
painstakingly crossing the prairie hundreds of years later: compressing time-scales and making 
air travel seem not only a natural part of this transportation history, but the only possible 
conclusion to a particularly Canadian teleology of movement across space. This was powerful 
rhetoric, using history to speak to the challenges of modernity. Even when the focus was general 
brand awareness and loyalty, TCA’s aircraft were discursively and pictorially placed along a 
transportation progression from dogsleds and canoes to oxcarts, rail, and eventually airplanes.  
“Does it seem like a miracle?” an early brochure asked. “To speed across Canada on the 
wings of the wind[?] It will, if you give a fleeting thought to the past” when settlers crawled 




“across the prairies in ox-carts that squealed complaint with every turn of the wheel.” 166 This 
progression had been long entrenched in Canadian technological mythmaking, especially in 
terms of the ill-defined “northland.” “Until the advent of the aeroplane,” Department of Defense 
civil aviation controller John Wilson wrote in 1929, “the old, historic means of travel—the canoe 
in summer and the dog team in winter—were the sole means of communication in two-thirds of 
the area of the dominion.”167 Calling canoes and dogsleds “old” and “historic,” especially in 
comparison to modern flying machines, points to the significance of indigenous technologies to 
Canadian settler paradigms of mobility. Scholars interested in mobility, indigeneity, and 
Canadian identity formation have traced how settlers have appropriated indigenous 
transportations while at the same time denigrating them as “backwards.” As Bruce Erickson has 
shown in his work on canoeing, the settler use of canoes for leisure created a performative 
“natural” Canadian-ness which decontextualized settler colonialism, Canadian history, and 
indigenous mobilities by suggesting that canoeing presented an “allure of openness” that placed 
“the birth of the nation in the landscape itself.”168 Daniel Francis has also argued that the 
twentieth-century surge in canoeing, kayaking, and other outdoor recreation was connected to 
nostalgia and “discontent with the fruits of progress.”169 Settlers saw these “native” activities as 
harkening to an earlier, purer form of interacting with the Canadian wilderness largely removed 
from their original purposes as practical methods of transportation.170 For example, tobogganing 
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and snowshoeing were “‘improved’ and made more modern and scientific by the application of 
rules and regulations” imposed by nineteenth-century settlers seeking new symbols of belonging, 
according to sport historian Gillian Poulter.171 She argues that settlers believed themselves to be 
“elevating” indigenous technologies by transforming them into modern British sports, generating 
a homegrown visual symbology while discursively removing the indigenous influence. 
Inside aviation discourse, indigenous technologies such as dogsleds, toboggans, and 
canoes came to stand in for old “backward” ways of travel, as Johnathan Vance has suggested in 
his work on early Canadian aviation culture.172 Indigenous transports were essentially throw-
away punch lines and easy foils to air travel’s self-fashioning as fast, easy, accessible, and 
modern in journalistic and publicity accounts. Aviation, especially in the North, was a tool by 
which indigenous mobilities were replaced with settler ones, like the transition from canoeing-
as-transport to canoeing-as-leisure, but with more drastic results. In a 1941 story on how Canada 
was “The Most Air-Minded Nation on Earth” in Rotarian magazine, the pilot of the first 
controlled powered flight on Canadian soil John McCurdy argued that “even Eskimos of the 
North who have never seen an automobile became [in the interwar period] blasé to flashing 
wings overhead.”173 Indigenous peoples of the North, it seemed, were being fast-tracked to 
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technological modernity, and statements such as these suggested that airplanes (rather than 
automobiles or rail) was the best modern transportation system for Canada.  
Placing older technologies, especially indigenous ones such as dogsleds and toboggans, 
next to its aircraft served several discursive functions at TCA. First, as the journalists and 
passengers imagined it, comparing airliners to other geographically-appropriate transportations 
made them seem even more modern, quick, and reliable. This was a common technique in mid-
century aviation advertising in general, as airplanes were frequently pictured next to slow horse-
drawn carts, broken down jalopies, and even occasionally trains.174 In Canada, though, this 
technique also drew on a century of envirotechnical imaginaries, framing the nation’s history in 
terms of mobility across space with the same compressive flavor as the transatlantic promotions 
from the same period:  
“A little more than a century ago, Sir George Simpson, Governor of the Hudson’s Bay 
Company...left Montreal on a record-breaking 3,000-mile journey to Vancouver. Twelve 
weeks later, after an arduous trip by canoe, ox-cart and on horseback, he arrived at the 
Pacific coast, a little worse for wear, but triumphant. In Simpson’s time that was no small 
achievement. Neither was the much later feat of organized ground transport in reducing 
the transcontinental crossing to four days. Yet now [TCA] bridges that great distance in 
just fourteen hours and sets standards of its own. The contrast is a measure of the swift 
transport progress of our times.” 175 
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Mobility from coast-to-coast was central to the Canadian geographic nation, but Canadians flew 
infrequently from Halifax to Victoria.176 Canadian aerial transcontinentality therefore served a 
symbolic purpose, acting as an heir to rail-based paradigms of transcontinental travel and 
allowing TCA to build a history for aviation in general, and itself as a state airline in particular, 
that fed directly off the problems of existing at the border of geographic possibility. Canada 
seemed like natural fit for aviation, and airplanes a natural fit for Canadian environments, which 
implied that rail was simply a stepping-stone to the real coast-to-coast communications: aviation. 
As a 1930s TCA brochure claimed, “the railways made the Canada of the Nineteenth Century 
and led the way into the Twentieth. Without them, the Dominion couldn’t have been, but they 
were not enough. They still had their part to play, and always will have, but...Canada, too, must 
have wings.” 177 
 Canada’s geographic particularities, such as its variability and largely inaccessible 
“north” inspired what McGregor called a “lusty development of civil aviation” in the form of 
“bush flying.”178 Bush flying, the public and private enterprises that engaged in surveying, 
mapping, fire-fighting, and the transportation of people, goods, and mail to parts of Canada 
loosely inhabited by settlers, emerged as what historian Don Thompson has called “a peculiar 
Canadian phenomenon” in the interwar period.179 Bush pilots—largely former military pilots—
and bush planes—which were increasingly purpose-built through the 1930s—came to represent 
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“the romance of transportation,” as an Edmonton newspaper claimed in 1929, and were cast as 
homegrown heroes.180 The adventures of pilots such as former WWI ace Wilfrid “Wop” May 
and Roméo Vachon, known as the “Flying Postman of the North Shore,” captured the 
imagination of everyday Canadians seeking the next generation of heroes. This was a particularly 
evocative history for TCA to work with, as bush flying was mobilized as a symbol of both 
Canadian technological ability more generally and the specific uses of aviation to tame Canadian 
geography through the twentieth century. Marionne Cronin has argued that the development of 
Canadian purpose-built bush planes and surveying techniques “provides a window into the 
influence of persistent national conditions, particularly geography, on the development of a 
national style of technology.”181 They were also part of a set of “new tools—technological and 
conceptual—that industrial interests,” including the state, used to re-imagine the North “from 
new perspectives,” as Liza Piper has argued in her work on subarctic Canada’s large lakes.182 
Although there has been little scholarly attention paid to bush flying’s status as a Canadian 
cultural icon, Cronin and Piper’s suggestion that purpose-built bush planes might lend 
themselves to a national style and be part of sociotechnical imaginaries about how to best govern 
the nation hints at the discursive uses of this technology. 
TCA relied on bush flying’s pre-existing currency in Canadian history to make aviation 
seem like the expected conclusion to national progress, especially as the “North” became 
increasingly valuable to national mythmaking through the middle part of the twentieth century. 
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One 1946 institutional history suggested that Canadians were active in aviation “when the 
Wright brothers were unfledged youngsters.” Canadian pilots returning from the war took to 
“northland flying,” as it was frequently called, and “began pioneering in forestry surveys and fire 
protection from the sky, in aerial photography and mapping.” Eventually, “Canadians began to 
realize the value of wings in reaching the outposts of their vast northern wilderness.” Mobilizing 
bush flying also helped TCA self-legitimize as a tool of the state. It made sense, according to 
public-facing materials, that the state should control, even at arm’s length, the trajectory of 
aviation in Canada because “it was bush flying that put Canada into the front rank of world 
aviation...T. C. A. grew out of the need for a swift, modern system of transportation between 
communities scattered across an area of more than 3,000 miles, out of a vision of a more closely 
integrated nation.”183 And there was a direct lineage from Canada’s adventurous bush flying 
heroes to regular reliable airline travel, since TCA was founded to operate on the Trans-Canada 
Airway, in turn constructed to consolidate and coordinate the jumble of interwar bush flying 
routes through the 1930s. TCA’s advertising personnel made frequent use of this pedigree by 
highlighting the “northland flying” experience of their personnel and reminding passengers of 
how useful aviation had been to Canadian nation-building.184 
TCA’s early public-facing materials featured several sorts of time-manipulations. Larger 
scale Atlantic history stretching back millennia placed TCA’s newest routes into historical 
perspective. Materials that juxtaposed caravels with sleek airliners made air travel less 
intimidating because it gave the machines and routes a teleology that invoked both adventure and 
routine. They also echoed the “speed-up,” as David Harvey has called it, of modernity by making 
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transportation development appear to accelerate.185 Similar techniques in TCA’s system 
advertisements worked on a slightly smaller scale—the length of time settlers had been in 
Canadian territory—to make airplanes and a state airline a natural, necessary part of national 
progress that could help modernize the nation. Geography, the subject of the next section, is what 
made those histories especially evocative in the mid-century Canadian context. 
Shrinking Canada and the Uses of Geography 
TCA’s promotional materials leaned heavily on constructions of Canada as a nation with 
distances only human ingenuity could overcome. These constructions were artifacts of 
nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century rail and other communications paradigms, but with an 
added level of high-modern techno-scientific rhetoric that suggested that rail was simply not 
enough for the realities of twentieth century life. A state-run commercial airline appeared to be 
natural and necessary, since, as one wartime public relations packet claimed “it had become 
evident that something more was needed; that a nation so vast in its distances and so various in 
its economic divisions could not afford to do without the fullest time and distance-destroying 
advantages of aviation. So Trans-Canada Air Lines was designed to meet a great Canadian 
need.” TCA’s public-facing institutional histories frequently claimed that commercial aviation in 
the guise of a state airline was vital to Canadian success on a national and international scale, 
especially in wartime. That same public relations packet pointed out that “it was a fortunate 
circumstance for Canada that the very moment her geographic immensity most threatened her 
efficiency the distance-destroying power of transport aviation should have come newly to hand.” 
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186 Canadian geography was a double-edged sword, threatening national security and unity while 
at the same time supporting discursive constructions of nation; “Canada has often been referred 
to as a land of magnificent distances,” a 1947 air route map claimed. “That was before the 
coming of Trans-Canada Air Lines. [Now] east and west coasts are less than 24 hours apart.”187 
If Canada was only a land of “magnificent distances” before air travel, how could those distances 
remain foundational to Canadian national identity?  
TCA partially avoided this question by making those distances necessary to the 
establishment of Canadian aviation, which included geography in foundational myths while still 
removing it in the present. TCA’s public-facing material suggested that Canada, which 
McGregor called “by census…a small country, and by Atlas a very big one,” was 
environmentally primed for a successful space-shrinking commercial aviation industry.188 
Geography might have been no match for Canadian techno-scientific expertise, but the fact that 
it was a barrier for Canadians to overcome with ingenuity is what gave it its value; a mid-1950s 
pamphlet pointed out how it was “understandable in a country of great distances” that 
“Canadians are among the world’s most airminded travellers” and were “among the first to put 
the airplane to practical use.” 189  
Air travel’s time-space compression could be a detriment to Canadian environmental 
identity because it made character-building geographic features, such as what McGregor called 
                                               
186 Draft, “Trans-Canada Air Lines: Questions and Answers,” 29 November 1945, Air Canada 
fonds, RG70 volume 5, LAC. 
187 Brochure, “Air Lines Map of Trans-Canada Air Lines and Connections in Canada & United 
States,” 1947, Air Canada Collection 005.003, CASM. 
188 Address by Gordon McGregor to the Royal Canadian Flying Club, 25 January 1949, Gordon 
R. McGregor fonds, MG-30-E283, volume 94, LAC. 
189 Brochure, “Winged Facts about TCA,” c. 1955, Air Canada Collection 005.003, CASM. 
 
 76 
the “great natural barriers” of the Rockies and “Precambrian Shield,” disappear.190 It could also 
be a benefit because it extended travelers’ geographic reach towards those features, increasing 
accessibility to a diversity of Canadian vacation experiences. Shrinking the nation by air allowed 
access to “all Canada’s famed vacation lands...the Rockies—the Prairies—the holiday resorts of 
Ontario, Quebec, and the Maritimes,” as one 1947 advertisement suggested, because “T.C.A. 
takes you there in hours instead of days.”191 It also democratized access to, with apologies to 
David Nye, a sort of “Canadian technological sublime”: envirotechnical experiences “organized 
for crowds of tourists” and underscored with enthusiasm for technology and its intrusions on the 
natural world.192 I would suggest that the Canadian sublime retained more of its focus on the 
natural world than the American, but still embraced “the reconstruction of the life-world by 
machinery” and reimagined the “dislocations and perceptual disorientations caused by this 
reconstruction in terms of awe and wonder.” That is, the Canadian culture of bigness was 
supported and dismantled in the same breath, turning the disorienting effect of time-space 
compression and seemingly unnatural altitude into an awe-inspiring Canadian experience of 
nature. The Rockies in particular, as an especially beautiful and treacherous mountain range, 
were no longer an obstacle to mobility; as “new technologies become self-justifying parts of a 
national destiny,” more Canadians could visit them and appreciate what it meant to nationhood 
to overcome those same character-building obstacles.193 
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The other way TCA supported 
and dismantled Canadian bigness in 
equal measure was by discursively 
substituting time for space. Canada’s 
“magnificent distances” were subtly 
transformed into magnificently long 
travel times; time-space compression 
and time-space conflation went hand-
in-hand. This allowed Canada’s size to 
remain the same, but highlighted 
TCA’s role in making that size less 
overwhelming to the popular 
imagination as well as addressing more 
tangible concerns such as the 
movement of goods and information. 
Thanks to TCA, the Canadian businessman “can now fashion his activities and 
ambitions...secure in the knowledge that Canada is only twenty hours wide and that time of 
travel has ceased to be a major obstacle.”194 In so doing, TCA explicitly used the rhetoric of 
space and time, arguing frequently, as one of the airline’s first newspaper advertisements 
claimed, that “a people of vision and enterprise could not be held back by the barriers of time 
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and space. Trans-Canada Air Lines came into being, and now the Dominion is no wider than a 
single day!”195  
  This is especially evident when TCA’s promotional material addressed airmail and 
freight. Airmail in particular had the added benefit of substituting time for distance on a number 
of scales, connected as it was to two communications infrastructures, and promotions for the 
service used language that would not have been out of place in an advertisement for telegraphy. 
Early brochures explaining how air mail worked framed it as receiving “tomorrow’s mail today,” 
because of “you are in fact mere hours rather than days away from your loved ones.”196 Air 
freight and airmail were more tangible clues that “Canada’s vast distances are diminishing 
rapidly as modern airplanes...bring the far-flung communities within a few hours of each 
other.”197 It was also a visual metaphor; the 1948 TCA promotional film “A New Map for 
Canada” opens with a boy drawing a map of Canada as a homework assignment, “but it proves a 
task too large and too overwhelming.” He asks a family friend, a TCA Captain, for help and is 
taken on an imaginary coast-to-coast air journey along TCA’s routes to learn “that the Dominion 
is not the wide expanse of past generations but the ‘one-day-wide’ Canada of today.”198 A 1949 
newspaper advertising campaign literally juxtaposed time and space by replacing the hands of 
clocks and watches with a North Star flying over maps of Europe.199 The airmail brochure 
discussed above featured a sample letter sent from Montreal to “Everywhere, Canada”; the idea 
that letters could be sent virtually instantaneously to all places suggested that time and space 
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were rendered meaningless by the transformative power of the airplane. These sorts of images 
often appeared alongside violent language when discussing TCA’s role in transforming space 
into time; North Stars “will scatter our old concepts of distance...by slashing” travel times, and 
“so effective has been the attack of TCA upon Canadian distances that already they have lost 
much of their old significance.” 200 It was with great force, apparently, that TCA and its machines 
eliminated distances in Canada, but it still maintained the value of those distances by making 
time and space interchangeable and turning distance into a foundational myth.201 
In its replacing distance with time—“Canada is now one day wide”—TCA was pointing 
out that it had caused Canada to “effectively shr[i]nk in size,” as James Vernon has argued for 
roads and rail in Britain, while still predicating the resulting “closely knit national space” on the 
idea of bigness.202 Not only was the substitution of distance with time a symptom of modern 
time-space compression, but it was also a symptom of the modern obsession with speed. Speed 
was TCA’s most obvious benefit over rail, but speed could be scary. Even as late as 1961, the 
advertising department labelled “FARE and FEAR” as “the main barriers against flying.”203 
Evoking speed in promotional material meant dealing with passengers’ greatest anxieties about 
the air travel experience, as Rick Popp has recently shown for the United States. Just as railway 
accidents in the nineteenth century exposed the hubris of speed, “puncturing the veil of the 
ordinary that such technologies needed to pass as natural fixtures of the modernizing landscape,” 
                                               
200 “North Stars Across the Continent,” Between Ourselves, December 1947, 16-17. “Doing a 
Job for Canada,” Between Ourselves, March 1947, 12. 
201 For more on using time to measure distance and geographic difference, see Chapter 4. 
202 Vernon, Distant Strangers, 30. 
203 Memorandum by J. A. McGee, “North American Services—Canada,” 12 April 1961, 
Air Canada Collection, CASM. 
 
 80 
so too did airlines struggle with routinization.204 Popp suggests that mid-century air travel was 
one of the only instances where advertisers’ goals were “to allay fears, rather than amplify 
them,” and they developed a core set of themes and techniques to accomplish this goal such as 
reducing advertising after a crash received a great deal of media attention.205 TCA faced similar 
obstacles, perhaps amplified by its public ownership; McGregor complained in 1950 of the 
“blinding light of publicity which is turned upon all [TCA’s] activities...with the astonishing 
result that even a blown tire at an airport 10,000 miles away is faithfully reported by press.”206  
Flying’s disorienting altitude, which appeared to go against the laws of nature, and 
frightening speed were tricky themes for advertisers to address. One of the airline’s strategies, 
relatively unique to TCA, was to imagine transportation in Canada as a competition between air 
and rail. Although TCA was generally reticent to draw direct comparisons between flying and 
traveling by train, largely because of TCAs relationship to the CNR, references to train travel did 
appear. They were sometimes hidden—one late 1940s “sun destination” campaign only 
referenced rail in the French-language version of the ad—and sometimes used obliquely to make 
a larger statement about time, space and speed. A 1949 brochure compared the costs of a TCA 
ticket from Montreal to Vancouver with first-class rail along the same route; although airfare 
“would cost you only a little more than your rail fare,” the real savings were in “work done or 
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leisure gained” in the time saved by flying. 207 TCA also issued a “passenger’s handbook” called 
“Facts About Flying” for first-time or nervous fliers, which told passengers to:  
“Relax. Make yourself comfortable. Don’t give it a thought...Incidentally, there is little to 
no ‘height sensation’ in an aircraft. This is purely visual and, with no line-of-reference to 
the ground...is all but eliminated. Similarly, there is little ‘speed sensation’ in flight 
because of the absence of such reference points as the trees and telephone poles that 
whizz past the window of the surface traveller.”208 
 
The whizzing trees and telephone poles are a clear reference to rail, which faced its share of 
speed-related anxieties in the nineteenth century, as Wolfgang Schivelbush and others have 
shown.209 Speed, as modernism scholar Jeffrey Schnapp reminds us, is the “distinctive drug of 
modernity,” and TCA’s public-facing materials from around its decennial year were a clear 
attempt to make air travel appear faster than rail, but somehow less speedy, given the absence of 
visual cues that created the perception of speed.210 Even in one of TCA’s first publicity 
brochures, passengers were reassured that “you have scarcely any sense of motion, certainly no 
sense of the speed which so astonishingly shortens your journeys.” 211 Motion and speed were 
discursively separated, allowing flying to be constructed as part of the modern experience 
because of its “fastness,” but also removed from it because of the safety, mundanity, and 
regularity that made “speed” less of an issue. 
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Canada From Above and TCA’s Aerial Views 
If speed was the drug of the long nineteenth century, altitude was the drug of the 
twentieth. Aerial views, especially views of cities, and the production of vertical spaces in 
general are hallmarks of the modern experience, as Nathalie Roseau, Thomas Campanella, and 
art historians and geographers Denis Cosgrove and William Fox have suggested.212 Furthermore, 
the vertical and the view from above shaped perceptions of modern warfare, and, in turn, the 
airplane, thanks to the preponderance of aerial reconnaissance and aerial bombing.213 In his 
landmark book on high modernism, James Scott has argued that “it would be hard to exaggerate 
the importance of the airplane for modernist thought and planning”; verticality and the “God’s-
eye view” transformed city planning and megaprojects such as the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence 
Seaway.214 Although Scott and other scholars of modernism point out that the “God’s-eye-view” 
eliminated local and regional texture, Jason Weems has recently argued that aerial views actually 
created a regional identity for the American Midwest, where “the prairie landscape, with its vast 
and undifferentiated topography and its rigidly imposed cadastral grid, resisted conventions of 
horizontal vision...aerial views made it possible to see the region as a unified whole and to 
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understand the relationships that shaped regional life.”215 The view from above has been a 
conduit for the creation, maintenance, and disruption of modern communities of belonging and 
difference on a variety of scales.216 
Passenger aviation has received relatively little attention from scholars interested in these 
themes, despite it being one of the few channels through which everyday consumers could 
experience these unique views. Other sorts of “democratic” modern technological views have 
been analyzed as symptomatic of modernity and high-modernity: Krista Thompson and Bernhard 
Rieger have both examined cameras and photography as conduits for modern communities of 
belonging, and David Louter and Ben Bradley have used car windshields as focal points for their 
studies of North American parks.217 Commercial air travel touches on many of these gazes, as 
passengers frequently looked through windshields and cameras, sometimes at the same time. 
Aerial photography had been possible since the mid-nineteenth century, but it was only after 
controlled powered flight that it could be used reliably for more than novelty purposes.218 The 
democratization of both airplanes and cameras—two “modern wonders”—opened up the 
experience of aerial photography to the masses. TCA estimated in the early 1950s that up to 75% 
of passengers carried cameras and provided travel agents with information on how “to get the 
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best results from in-flight photography ...through Skyliner windows,” including how to hold the 
camera to avoid vibration—“well braced against the body”—and glare.219 Furthermore, any gaze 
from an airplane was a modern technological gaze; TCA’s airliners acted as mediators between 
Canadians and their surroundings, providing them with a concrete experience of time-space 
compression. 
Aerial photography as a technological gaze grew up in Canada with the bush flying 
industry.220 Viewing Canada from above was necessary to make Canada legible, and making 
Canada legible was necessary to making Canadian governance possible.221 In the Arctic 
especially, photography had long been a way for Canada to claim sovereignty. One series of 
voyages through the late 1900s and early 1910s laid claim to the land by erecting a cairn 
containing a metal box with a “proclamation of Canadian occupation” and a British flag, and 
then photographing it, providing “visual proof of Canadian actions and intent.”222 In 1925, 
Ottawa mobilized an arm of the RCAF to conduct aerial surveys of the North, mostly for the 
Department of Mines and Resources, and established the National Air Photo Library as a 
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repository of photographs of the dominion.223 This had a practical purpose, as a survey that took 
seven months by canoe, on foot, and by snowshoe in 1900 took just two days by air in 1930, but 
it also shaped how Canadian landscapes were captured in the national imagination. These 
photographs emphasized vast expanses of wilderness over evidence of human activity, which 
meant that from a distance, Canada appeared “open and undeveloped.” Aerial photography 
“normalized” the view from above as a dominant form of understanding Canadian landscapes 
intimately connected to both pragmatic state control and longstanding myths about the 
apparently infinite nature of Canada’s landmass.224 
The long history of photographing Canada from above as a state project made the aerial 
views of Canada provided by TCA easy to portray as a comfort and a corrective to air-travel-
related ills instead of a cause of them. “There’s no boredom in air travel,” a 1947 brochure 
claimed. “The miles pass too quickly for that. Forest and farm land, wide prairies, rolling 
foothills and the majesty of the Canadian Rockies...the landscape is always changing.”225 
Canada’s geographic variability worked to break up the perceived monotony of air travel while 
representing Canadian techno-scientific ingenuity and evoking the conditions that made air travel 
part of the Canadian environmental imagination. Passengers were told that “from your skyliner 
window the world below is a fascinating display of our resources and the way we use them,” and 
the airplane itself was “an illustration of science at work on these same resources to overcome 
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time and space. We hope you feel by now that ‘flight-seeing’ adds measurably to the pleasure of 
your trip.”226 
 More importantly, TCA’s supply of altitude made looking at Canada from above an 
authentic Canadian envirotechnical experience that only it could provide. Aerial photography 
and illustration featured heavily in TCA’s public-facing material, appearing everywhere from 
airmail envelopes to the “not in any way promotional...[and] purely functional” passenger 
comment cards.227 Postcards showing aerial views of TCA’s destinations, and often meta-views 
of the aircraft flying above a destination, were provided in seat-back portfolios through the late 
1940s and early 1950s. Visitors to the TCA booth at the 1949 Canadian National Exhibition were 
greeted by “eight large window frames through each of which...[was] shown as series of 30 
coloured slides” of aerial views of TCA’s destinations, which the advertising department 
considered “one of the most extensive showings of photographs of this type ever brought 
together.”228 This was not an uncommon strategy at other airlines, as aerial photography was still 
relatively novel, but at TCA aerial views echoed the “romance” of bush-flying-era aerial 
surveying and photography, made air travel an organic part of the Canadian transportation 
pantheon, and gave passengers something they could not get with train travel.  
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The emphasis on the aerial view seemed to work. Passengers came to expect a view and 
complained when they did not get what was promised, as one passenger did in 1948: “our only 
disappointment was the weather. We couldn’t see New Brunswick from the air.”229 The “dirty 
state of windows” upset “camera fiends” on a different 1948 flight.230 A Lethbridge “land lover” 
on a flight to Winnipeg was left uneasy because “it was necessary for the plane to fly above the 
clouds and the earth was not visible” and a couple’s trip from Saskatoon “was largely reduced 
from a holiday trip to mere transportation” when “a line of men pushed in and took all the 
window seats.”231 Passengers asked for more windows, larger windows, tinted windows, for the 
glass to be removed from the windows to “see that much more,” and that the “wings be painted a 
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drab black” to reduce glare.232 One even asked, tongue-in-cheek, for “deck chairs on the wings. 
Of course, tied down.”233 Historians of advertising have pointed out the problems with isolating 
the efficacy and success of individual advertisements and campaigns, but the volume of 
passenger requests for more or better views shows that TCA’s public relations priorities 
resonated with at least some of its passengers.234 
Some of them may have resonated too much, as passengers sometimes wondered why 
their views didn’t look like what they expected from high-modern aerial photographs or maps. 
One 1953 passenger was surprised that “that the Stewardess could not tell me anything about the 
geographic nature of the country over which we flew,” and suggested educating the cabin crew 
in geography and cartography.235 Usually, though, passengers wanted detailed topographic maps, 
which TCA eventually released in the mid-1950s, announcements of landmarks by the pilot, or 
that “the names of larger places over which the plane passes [be] given by flashing on a screen or 
similar device.” 236 They also occasionally asked for access to the same altitude, airspeed, and 
positional information the pilots had, generally in the form of “flight instruments” displayed in 
the cabin, which would help passengers identify their views while at the same time giving them a 
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glimpse into the inner workings of the aircraft.237 Passengers seemed to want the same kind of 
legibility that the state got from aerial surveys, and their requests for flight aids also suggested 
that demystifying their views might also help demystify the aircraft itself.  
In general, passengers were receptive to TCA’s aerial visual priorities, and they found 
viewing Canada from above as transcendent as the airline hoped they would. The fact that they 
wished for a “plane made of transparent material” as well as “a map handy with plenty of 
topographic information” shows that they wanted their air travel experience to be as visually rich 
as possible.238 And, as a handful of passengers said, it was that they were flying over Canada 
that made air travel worthwhile. An American passenger flying to Canada for the first time 
thought that “God planted the most beautiful landscape directly beneath TCA’s routes.”239 A 
1950 passenger praised the “perfect visibility” on their flight from Calgary to Vancouver that 
allowed them to enjoy the “clear skies above and snow and glacier covered mountains below.”240 
Still another, from summer 1948, “wondered if your publicity department has played up” how 
beautiful flying was compared to ground transportation—“not even a Winston Churchill could 
properly describe the allure of it all.” 241 Clearly the publicity department had played it up, as 
Canada’s overwhelming size, and the already-established role of bush flying in reducing that 
size, made the manipulation of geography by airplane especially evocative. It also involved an 
appeal to technological history, discursively opening the airplane’s intimidating black boxes and 
making it seem as organically connected to the Canadian landscape as rail appeared to be. Rail 
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may have been seen as responsible for coast-to-coast connections and the confederation of the 
Canadian state, but flying made those connections visible and legible to everyday Canadians. 
One 1950 passenger brought these themes together by claiming that only a “poet-scientist” could 
properly describe the power of flying over Canada in a TCA aircraft: 
“Riding a TCA North Star is the closest you can get to Heaven—It’s an experience that 
no human being should miss. Besides, it gives one a new and unusual sense of the one-
ness of Canada. As you watch the provinces slip beneath your eyes in all their colorful 
beauty—the breath-taking magnificence of the Rockies, rich-chequered Prairies, small 
lonely farms, brilliant welcoming cities—you discover with a freshness and impact never 
achieved by history books or geographies that this is one country, our own.”242  
 
This was not entirely unique to Canada. A National Geographic feature from the 1930s 
described flying across the United States as a way to get “a more realistic picture of the 
geography of the country...for aloft one sees as one piece man-made works too large to 
comprehend from the ground.”243 However, statements like these had special currency in 
Canada. Bush flying in the form of aerial photography, surveying, and mapping Canada’s vast 
“unpopulated” North had become an important part of national technological culture by the 
1940s. More importantly, imagining the country as unimaginably big, so big that only Canadian 
technological ability could make anything useful of a landmass of that size, was as old a concept 
as the nation itself. By flying on their state airline’s Canadian-build aircraft, increasingly large 
numbers of Canadians could finally place themselves inside that history and that imagined 
geography and experience their country in a uniquely modern way. 
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Conclusion: Space, Time, and the Postwar “Travel Boom” 
By addressing the aviation-based annihilation of distance as a given, building a 
transportation teleology that placed airplanes at its conclusion, and emphasizing the visuality of 
flight, airlines, advertisers, and the media were primed to approach aviation as something 
increasingly mundane. The emerging focus in early promotions on what it felt like to fly—the 
comfort of the seats, the views out the window—was only possible because the scaffolding of the 
post-war “travel boom” was falling into place. By mid-century, tourism had become what 
historian Rick Popp has called “almost an exclamation point” to the increasing democratization 
of leisure. The rise of arcades, movie halls, ball parks, and other commercial amusements in the 
last decades of the nineteenth and first decades of the twentieth century added “short blasts of 
fun” to the weekly rhythms of industrial modernity in large cities.244 This rhythm was further 
syncopated with the gradual addition, at least for the urban middle class, of annual vacations to 
beachside resorts, campgrounds, and other local or regional attractions.245 This new cadence of 
labor and leisure was cemented by changes in labor policy that granted even blue-collar workers 
some paid vacation for the sake of the literal “recreation” of a more efficient labor force. Most 
public and private sector workers in most Canadian provinces had achieved mandatory one-week 
paid vacation leave by the end of the 1940s and paid vacations were an expected part of 
workforce bargaining agreements, as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.246 The 
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discourse of vacationing, even if few could afford lavish trips abroad or even outside their state 
or province, was becoming a regular part of North American narratives of leisure and 
consumption. Even though air travel appeared to be the most elite, so to speak, method by which 
everyday North Americans could vacation, it was still a part of the new postwar “travel boom” 
landscape. Increasing number of middle- and even working-class Canadians could imagine 
availing themselves of air travel thanks to this tourism imaginary. Even if they could not afford 
to fly TCA, the discourse was falling into place that would help them believe they might, and 
airlines and advertisers made use of this new discourse by selling their services as an experience 
rather than selling the idea of aviation as some sort of symbolic ideal. 
In the postwar pre-jet age, before air travel became a form of mass transit and after 
wartime diffusion technologies increased its accessibility, regularity, and reliability, Trans-
Canada Air Lines had a void to fill. Rail was becoming less practical, especially as emerging 
geographic realities required a longer reach, but its mythic status could not be disrupted, 
necessary as it was for a nation scrambling for identity in the new global landscape. In the 
public-facing material released in and around its decennial year, TCA worked inside the rhetoric 
of postwar high modernity, centralizing human techno-scientific triumphs over the natural world 
while delicately maintaining the value of this natural world to Canadian national identity. As a 
public airline, its growing focus on public relations through the late 1940s and early 1950s meant 
that TCA represented what appeared to be a state narrative of technology, environment, and 
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nation. In what remains the only cultural history of Canadian aviation, Jonathan Vance argues 
that Canada was “a nation tailor-made to be exploited by air.”247 This wasn’t just because of 
Canada’s sheer size and geographic variability, but because it was a nation clamoring for new, 
modern technological creation stories of its own. Aviation, especially commercial aviation, was 
easy to fold into already-established sea-to-sea technological nationalisms established around 
Confederation. It also fit into the environmental constructions of Canada as a special place with a 
unique set of geographic and climatic obstacles to mobility and unity. Canada had to be made 
tailor-made to be exploited by air, and TCA’s public-facing material in and around its decennial 
year reveals the uses of, contradictions in, and anxieties about such a project that were emerging 
as TCA worked to find a place inside modern Canadian identity formation. 
Discursively manipulating time and space—those great axes of modernity—in its early 
public-facing material reveals how TCA placed itself inside collective visions of modern 
Canadian envirotechnicality. In its brochures, advertisements, publicity broadcasts, and 
employee newsletters, TCA self-fashioned as a key part of the Canadian past and the Canadian 
future, premised as it was on the further reduction of distance by communications technologies. 
However, TCA could not engage with this rhetoric without a reason to; it needed a homegrown 
technological standard-bearer to carry it and its services into the air age. It needed a guiding 
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2. The Canadair North Star and Seasonal Canadian-ness 
Trans-Canada Air Lines’ first new aircraft after the end of the Second World War was the 
Canadair DC-4M North Star, which entered service in the spring of 1947.248 Built by private firm 
Canadair at a government-owned plant outside Montreal, the North Star featured for the first 
time in Canada a number of new systems that had been developed during the war such as cabin 
pressure, electric de-icing, and long-range navigation. It was also the first airplane custom-
designed to TCA’s specifications and saw limited use in the private sector (and even less use 
outside Canada).249 The North Star therefore became a platform on which battles over Canadian 
industry and government, everyday mobility, and what makes a technology “Canadian” played 
out. I have organized this chapter around two sets of problems that TCA was facing by the end of 
the war, as well as some discursive techniques TCA used to solve those problems. The first 
problem was how to transition its fleet from its wartime mobilization to a purely civilian 
operation catering to the new needs and desires of postwar life. I consider these “technological” 
problems, as they mainly had to do with the enrolment of wartime diffusion technologies such as 
cabin pressurization, de-icing, and tricycle landing gear, as well as the choice of airplane in 
general. Instead of purchasing an off-the-line model or modifying its Lancastrians, TCA decided 
to combine an American fuselage with a British engine and add what became known as the “all-
weather” technological suite. This decision became the defining technological aspect of how the 
airline represented itself as especially Canadian. In the first part of this chapter, I will trace how 
and why the North Star took the form that it did, replacing what might be seen as an ordered, 
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military flying experience based on efficiency, power and output with a desirable, comfortable, 
accessible flying experience for a new set of postwar consumers.250 
The second set of problems was what might be called “environmental.” I use this term to 
refer to Canadian geographies and climates, as well as TCA’s political and corporate climate in a 
more colloquial sense. As I will show in the middle sections of this chapter, TCA could build 
whatever advanced planes it wanted, but it would not matter if passengers did not purchase 
tickets to fly on those planes. TCA suffered financially in the first few years of North Star 
service, and the airline and its technological choices were maligned by critics in Parliament and 
the media. The exact nature of these criticisms and their impact on Canadian politics is the 
subject of Chapter 3. In this chapter, I will show how TCA’s responses to these criticisms 
reframed them as “environmental” and a product of Canadian geography and climate. Seasonal 
imbalances in passenger traffic, which were a concern at all airlines, were alleged to have hurt 
TCA especially because of the perceived harshness of Canadian winters. As a response to both of 
these sets of problems, the North Star became TCA’s literal and figurative vehicle for its postwar 
self-fashioning, and the final section of this chapter will be devoted to how the North Star 
appeared in TCA’s promotional material and fit into the airline’s already-established vision of 
what it imagined itself doing for its individual passengers, for technological development, and 
for the nation as a whole.  
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Technological Problems: Building the North Star 
TCA began searching for a new aircraft to add to its fleet in 1943. That spring, Prime 
Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King reminded the House of Commons that TCA had 
“already been designated as the instrument of the Canadian government in air transport service 
across the north Atlantic” by virtue of the Trans-Canada Air Lines Act.251 As discussed in 
Chapter 1, this meant that TCA took over the previously unaffiliated Canadian Government 
Trans-Atlantic Air Service (CGTAS), using modified Lancaster bombers known as 
“Lancastrians” to ferry government and armed forces mail and passengers to Britain. These 
airplanes were simply not suited for the demand TCA expected in peacetime, and the airline 
began looking for new airliners while the Lancastrians were still in service. In the words of 
aviation historian Larry Milberry, TCA’s search for replacements for the Lancastrians “covered 
the whole aviation scene” and found it wanting.252 After visits to British and American 
manufacturers, it was “soon obvious,” TCA Director of Engineering J.T. Dyment wrote in a 
report to Howe, that “the design of a four-engined airplane for postwar use did not exist in 
1943,” but what he called the “planned DC-4” looked to be the airline’s best hope.253 The DC-4, 
designed by Douglas Aviation in the United States before the war, had been re-imagined as the 
popular C-54 “Skymaster” troop transport through 1942 and 1943 with the civilian model placed 
on the back burner. Historian Daniel Rust has suggested that these planes, as well as the military 
version of the DC-3, primed a generation of travelers to be air-minded by exposing young GIs to 
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air travel as an acceptable form of long-distance transportation.254 DC-4s were adopted en masse 
by American airlines after the war, but TCA executives had known early that they wanted their 
postwar fleet to be pressurized based on their wartime experience flying the Atlantic, and 
military production demands had prevented Douglas from designing a pressurized version.255  
TCA was therefore left with what Pigott calls a “Hobson’s choice”: continue to use 
Lancasters and wait for Douglas’s first pressurized airliner (the DC-6, already in development), 
or buy an inferior aircraft (the British Avro Tudor).256 The best option, TCA and Howe 
eventually agreed, was building a new plane by modifying the DC-4 to meet the airline’s postwar 
needs and adding pressurization and an improved powerplant. The DC-4 fuselage’s performance 
in a variety of climates was key in this decision and helped it fit into Canadian envirotechnical 
paradigms; one 1946 promotional pamphlet suggested it “knew the sub-zero winds of the Arctic 
and the blazing heat of sand-swept tropics.”257 Furthermore, because of its widespread use as the 
C-54, TCA was under the impression that the airframe had “been through its teething troubles” 
and would therefore require relatively little maintenance.258  
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Canada obtained DC-4 manufacturing licenses in 1944, and, after a lengthy, politically-
charged process, the popular British Rolls-Royce Merlin engine was chosen as the power plant. 
Aside from the public relations value in their use on some of Britain’s most iconic warplanes—
Supermarine Spitfires, Avro Lancasters, and de Havilland Mosquitoes—Merlins were also seen 
to have the same climatic flexibility as the DC-4 fuselage. Not only had they had been used 
around the world in wartime, but they were more powerful than any of TCA’s North American 
options. The extra power was necessary since “Canadian airlines require more take-off power for 
the same airplane than most of the United States lines because our runways are snow-covered for 
a large portion of the year,” as one engineering report put it.259 The main reason that the Merlins 
were chosen, however, was that Rolls-Royce, desperate to break into the postwar North 
American market, added a “never-be-sorry” clause to their warranty, in which Rolls-Royce 
essentially guaranteed to service their engines for a reasonable cost.260 Furthermore, Rolls-Royce 
had a better record of maintenance and repair than TCA’s American choices, largely because it 
manufactured the entire engine. In an early memo, Dyment expressed his frustration with the 
“American habit” of contracting out the manufacture of cowl flaps, exhaust systems, air intakes, 
and other accessories, which created an “evasion of responsibility” and made “the elimination of 
troubles” much more difficult and expensive.261 This was a bit of dramatic irony, as the public 
did not see the Merlins as Rolls-Royce’s responsibility when they failed, but instead placed the 
blame squarely on TCA; the airline spent the late 1940s trying not to say “sorry” for its engines. 
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Finally, the Canadian Vickers plant in Cartierville, QC was released to Canadair, Ltd., the 
newly separated air arm of ship and flying boat manufacturer Canadian Vickers, and began 
building Canada’s newest transports.262 Canadair’s very existence as an aircraft manufacturer is 
owed to the modified DC-4s. Canadian Vickers had been offered the contract in March 1944, 
and immediately sent engineers and “assembly and planning people” to the Douglas plant in 
California and Rolls-Royce in England.263 As this was going on, the general manager of 
Canadian Vickers told Ottawa that the company could not sustain both its previous naval 
contracts and a new aircraft manufacture at its Cartierville plant and was planning to get out of 
the aircraft game entirely. By the end of the year the government had taken control of 
Cartierville and leased it to the newly-formed Canadair with the express purpose of building 
modified DC-4s. The new company was headed by former Canadian Vickers manager Benjamin 
“Benny” Franklin, who had been hand-selected by Howe not because of his aviation expertise 
(Milberry notes that “he had none”) but because of his management experience.264 Franklin and 
his team at Canadair immediately began buying surplus aircraft and parts “at scrap metal prices” 
for the C-54 and DC-3, the workhorse airliner of the late 1930s and 1940s that was supposed to 
be phased out by the new DC-4s.265 This turned out to not be the case—TCA and other airlines 
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used DC-3s into the 1960s on their short-haul flights—and Canadair eventually became a global 
center for repairing and refurbishing older Douglas models.266 In the 1940s, however, Canadair’s 
main technological focus was the modified DC-4, destined to be used by both TCA and the 
RCAF in pressurized and non-pressurized forms respectively. Designated the “DC-4M” (for 
“modified,”) the new airplane went into production in 1944.  
TCA attempted to publicize the airplane almost immediately. This was, after all, a new 
paradigm of passenger comfort and accessibility, as I will discuss in the next section. Artist’s 
renderings of the airplane were prepared for advertising purposes in late 1944 and a newspaper 
and magazine advertisement—a relatively rare sight during Symington’s tenure as president—
was drawn up. The advertisement was equal parts backward- and forward-looking, discussing 
both the role of “Canada’s National Air Service” in linking Canada’s far-distant cities and how 
the airline’s forthcoming aircraft would further cement that role.267 TCA Public Relations 
Director W. S. Thompson was unusually enthusiastic about this campaign, telling Symington in a 
note attached to an early proof that publishing it in all ninety Canadian dailies would be 
“productive of good” heading into 1945.268 Symington did not share Thompson’s excitement and 
limited the newspapers running the ad to those in major TCA hubs such as the Montreal Gazette 
due to financial concerns.269 Regardless, this early attempt to advertise what would eventually 
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become the North Star hints at what was to come: using the airplane itself as a stand-in for air 
travel, TCA, and the value that they both had to mid-century Canada. 
Symington was right to curb Thompson’s enthusiasm. Production of the new plane was 
painfully slow through 1945 and 1946. Symington complained of the “pretty heavy pressure” 
and “good deal of criticism” he and his airline were under because of this, especially since TCA 
did not purchase other aircraft to make up for the rise in postwar passenger demand.270 TCA did 
purchase three DC-3s in 1945, but the fact that they were a pre-war design, unable to make the 
Atlantic crossing, and were primarily used for cargo made them an unsatisfactory solution even 
in the short term. These production delays were caused by technological issues, especially in 
terms of the pressurization system, and also labor disputes at Stelco, Canada’s largest steel 
manufacturer, and they severely limited TCA’s ability to introduce new routes, self-promote, and 
placate critics.271 The highly publicized official “christening” ceremony of the new aircraft that 
was scheduled for July 7, 1946, for example, had to be performed with a non-pressurized 
military version. In the weeks leading up to the ceremony Howe, Symington, and Franklin 
wondered if they could even use the newly chosen name “North Star” in their publicity because 
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it was not truly a North Star, or if a name chosen by the RCAF (the military’s two finalists were 
“Dominion” and “Beaver”) had to be used instead.272 Luckily for them, Franklin had to delay the 
final trial flights, moving the ceremony back to July 20. As a result, there was sufficient time to 
work out that “North Star” could be used at the ceremony—it was eventually used colloquially to 
designate the military type anyway. It was also lucky for Howe, Symington, and Franklin that the 
press could not tell the difference between the two models.273 Ceremonial considerations aside, 
TCA still had to put its passengers, who were clamoring to participate in the postwar “travel 
boom,” in something, and the pressurized versions of the North Star were months from being 
ready. In this regard, being a state airline had it advantages; TCA was able to borrow half a 
dozen non-pressurized DC-4M1s from the RCAF in late 1946 as a stopgap measure. TCA began 
training flight crews on these aircraft in November 1946, started flying them in April 1947, and 
had replaced them entirely with the airline’s proprietary pressurized DC-4M2s by midsummer. 
Even so, these technological problems had disrupted not only the airline’s anticipated service—
such as the revenue lost because the North Stars weren’t ready for the 1946 summer tourist 
season—but also the vision of Canadian technological ability, mobility, and accessibility that 
TCA was beginning to cultivate for itself, its services, and its machines. 
 
Naming the North Star 
Naming individual aircraft, aircraft types and even the entire fleet was a relatively high 
priority at TCA in order to develop name recognition and encourage loyalty to the airline, 
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especially in the rapidly expanding postwar air travel landscape.274 “DC-4” or “DC-4M” simply 
would not do. Even while preparing the first round of publicity in 1944, TCA public relations 
executives suggested that it was too different from Douglas’ original flavor to warrant the DC-4 
name, and Douglas did not include TCA in its publicity as an operator of the DC-4. In late 1944, 
Director of Public Relations W. S. Thompson floated a few names—“Sky Cruiser,” “Sky 
Courier,” and “Sky Liner”—for the advertisement discussed above, although the eventual 
campaign omitted any specific names entirely.275 Choosing a name for TCA’s four-engined 
airliners gained a new urgency in the postwar years, especially as TCA prepared for them to 
enter service. First, the aircraft was repeatedly (and mistakenly) referred to in internal 
correspondence and the popular press as the “DC-6” through spring 1946. This prompted no less 
an authority than Donald Douglas, President of Douglas Aircraft, to remind Symington that 
“there is no provision [in the original 1944 license agreement] for the use of Douglas symbols 
other than ‘DC-4.’” Douglas was prompted to “suggest that T.C.A. select a name for the 
Canadian-built aircraft rather than continue using a model designation composed of symbols.”276 
Symington responded immediately—using the name DC-6 was “quite wrong and shouldn’t have 
been done”—and by midsummer the airline had settled on “Northern Star” for the aircraft and 
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“Skyliners” for the entire fleet.277 It is unclear how Northern/North Star was first thought up—
allegedly, Franklin suggested it after he heard some engineers batting around the name 
“Polaris”—but airline officials did explore other options.278 During the summer of 1946, 
Symington was interviewed by the Toronto Star Weekly, and the ensuing article suggested the 
airline was looking to name their newest airliner and fleet. Although not directly prompted, 
somewhere around 150 readers sent the airline an assortment of “weird and wonderful” name 
suggestions, which Vice President Bill English forwarded to Symington in their entirety. The 
suggestions speak to both Canadian national symbols and belief in the global future of air travel: 
animals such as “Arctic Tern,” “Muskox,” and “Snow Goose”; historical and geographic 
“Frontenac,” “Coeur [sic] de Bois,” “Niagara Falls,” and “Hudson Bay”; and futuristic-sounding 
portmanteaux such as “Can-Nation-Air” and “Supersym.” The most popular? “Beaver,” and 
variations such as “Flying Beaver” and “Beaver Airlines.” Most importantly here, about 10% of 
the suggestions referenced climatic and “northern” imagery such as “Chinook,” “North of the 
Border,” and “Aurora Borealis.” English eventually concluded that “I don’t see anything better 
than the present designation, ‘North Star,’” and the name stuck.279 
As soon as it entered popular discourse, “North Star” immediately gained traction among 
airline officials and, apparently, the public.280 Although the name had been chosen somewhat 
                                               
277 Letter from H. J. Symington to Donald W. Douglas, 10 May 1946, Office of the President 
papers, Air Canada fonds, RG-70, volume 16, LAC. 
278 According to Milberry, he also came up with the name “Canadair.” Milberry, The Canadair 
North Star, 27. 
279 I’m assuming that “Supersym” is in reference to Symington. Letter from W. F. English to H. 
J. Symington, 19 October 1946, Office of the President papers, Air Canada fonds, RG-70, 
volume 16, LAC. 
280 Male TCA staffers in Vancouver began performing in drag as the “North Starlettes” at 




organically, the campaign to strike all mentions of “DC-4M” from TCA’s public-facing material 
was swift and deliberate. Howe himself pressed Symington, Thompson, and their staff to quickly 
“fasten the name ‘North Star’ to these aircraft as a type name” by emphasizing it in their 
publicity related to various inaugural flights through mid-1947.281 Despite it being, as English 
claimed, an “almost accidental process,” the airline had “profited enormously” from “North 
Star,” since: 
“Ease of identification and recognition is the very condition of familiarity. Given names  
that tickle the fancy, that evoke mental pictures, that appeal to popular loyalties—and that 
therefore persist in the memory—the battle is half won...The name is a good one in that it 
possesses a degree of visual authority and therefore vitality and value.”282 
 
The “visual authority” in the case of the North Star referred less explicitly to envirotechnical and 
more to celestial—and even subtly religious—discourse. The North Star was to shine bright in 
what Douglas called the “Canadian Heavens” in a 1947 public statement, carrying “forward the 
proud heritage of Canadian achievements” in the air age and providing direction to the next 
generation of air travel.283 The celestial rhetoric showed up just about everywhere; English wrote 
in his 1946 annual report to employees, for instance, that “the glint of the North Star became 
steadily brighter” that year.284 The Between Ourselves employee newsletter called April 15, 1947 
the “most significant day in the whole of TCA’s bustling career” because “on that day a shining 
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new North Star” was to be unveiled; “although the North Star equipment is new, we must put our 
faith in it.”285  
This sort of imagery reached its peak in 1947, when the airline used the forward-thinking 
North Star as a way to look back on TCA’s, and Canada’s, aviation achievements during its 
decennial. For instance, new transatlantic passengers were given cards featuring “Some North 
Star Facts” that claimed: 
“High in the northern sky, a new star shines brightly. It is called ‘North Star’ in tribute to 
that age-old guide of the world’s travellers. But this is no astral body in the usual sense. It 
is a great airliner, the first of its kind. Built in Canada, the North Star represents the skills 
of nation long-famed for aviation achievement in peace and war.”286 
 
Since the North Star’s first service was between Montreal and Britain, decennial promotions 
made a point to place the North Star, and Canadian aviation more generally, at the pinnacle of a 
long history of crossing the Atlantic. As discussed in Chapter 1, TCA manipulated history and 
geography to make aviation seem like a natural part of the Canadian transportation teleology and 
maintain an Atlantic orientation. More importantly here, this symbolism was heaped upon one 
specific airliner. One week before TCA began flying its North Stars to Britain (on April 15, 
1947), the airline published large newspaper advertisements in every major Canadian daily 
introducing the service. The majority of the ad space is taken up by an illustration of the North 
Star—a four-engined silhouette which proved to be a valuable symbol at TCA for half a 
decade—but the word “Britain” is given the ultimate focus in copy. The planes themselves were 
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the “new stars in the sky” and “Canadian built,” but would “bring you new enjoyment, 
dependability and speed in trans-Atlantic travel.”287 
 
“War Wonders” and Canadian-ness 
Canadian press reports capitalized on the aircraft’s British-American-Canadian heritage 
and evocative name, suggesting over and over that the North Star was, in John Fisher’s words, 
“Canadian as the Maple Leaf.” Fisher suggested in 1947 that inside the new DC-4 “you’ll find 
the personality of Canada” since “like Canada—like TCA itself, it is a compromise.”288 In 
another story a year later he called it the “middle road [between]...American efficiency and 
British caution.” 289 Even Pigott, in his 2002 illustrated aviation history for a popular audience, 
called it “as Canadian as the Bluenose schooner or the RCMP Musical Ride.”290 What made the 
North Star appear especially Canadian in 1947, and why was its being Canadian so important? It 
was not simply that the North Star was the only one of TCA’s postwar airliners to be built in 
Canada, but also that it was the subject of a deliberate attempt by TCA to make it seem Canadian 
by connecting its new technological systems to Canadian mobility. In the last few years of the 
1940s and first few of the 1950s, the North Star became more and more Canadian inside TCA’s 
public-facing discourse, especially as the airline’s advertising became more sophisticated. The 
North Star was the first new airliner that TCA was able to advertise using its own discrete 
advertising department, which in turn meant that the immediate postwar aviation discourse in 
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Canada was saturated with the North Star. The North Star and TCA publicity grew up together, 
and even though the public was not as quick to embrace the North Star as TCA executives 
hoped, it was cemented in public consciousness as a product of TCA, a product of Canadian 
techno-scientific ability, and a product of Canadian envirotechnicality. 
Until this period, air travel was generally reserved for business or elite travellers; it was 
expensive, uncomfortable, and lacked the infrastructure network to support large numbers of 
passengers. As the war ended, however, there appeared to be a great deal of anticipation that 
technologies of all sorts developed for military use might trickle down to civilians; science 
magazines waxed rhapsodic about the “war wonders for you” that would make their way into 
everyday life, including dehydrated food, nylon shoelaces, and walkie-talkie radios.291 Historians 
have looked at this “wartime-to-peacetime technological transfer” from a number of angles, 
using case studies such as nylon, bulldozers, pest control, and food.292 In his work on imagined 
postwar architectural futures, for example, historian Andrew Shanken shows how popular 
discourse about the war front was “nestled” up to discourse about the home front; “readers 
gained a preview of the ‘postwar,’ represented as the tangible aggregation of appliances, steel, 
glass, plastic, lighting,” and other materials and goods through advertising “that completed the 
calculus between the war effort and postwar consumption.”293 As a technological transfer, the 
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technologies on board a North Star were not quite as obvious to their users as consumer 
technologies such as plastic appliances—passengers did not own the navigation system and only 
purchased access to a pressurized cabin—but it was still a part of the “colonizing of scientific 
and technical values upon the material realm of everyday life” that was part of the postwar return 
to normalcy.294  
There was a selection of wartime aviation technologies, such as “LORAN,” or long-range 
navigation, autopilot mechanisms, and electric de-icing, that were expected to (and did) appear 
on postwar airliners, but the technological system most exciting to both the popular press and 
airline public relations was cabin pressurization. Put simply, cabin pressurization technologies 
make the air pressure inside an aircraft’s cabin as close to ground-level pressure as possible, even 
when the airplane is 30,000 feet in the air. This raises the operational ceiling of the aircraft, and, 
more importantly to the 1940s popular press, it also increased passenger comfort since, as one 
Popular Science writer suggested, there would be no ear pain “from altitude changes…no danger 
from lack of oxygen, no discomfort from cold, no gas pains caused by reduced air pressure, and 
no chance of suffering the agony of aeroembolism, or ‘bends.’”295 According to an article in 
Popular Mechanics, these technologies would turn airliners into “parlor cars with wings” flying 
through the “silky smoothness of the substratsophere.” 296  
The North Star was the first airliner in Canada to incorporate all of what CBC personality 
Stephen Brott called “the latest safety gadgets” in his coverage of its first flight: LORAN, 
autopilot, enhanced radio and weather equipment, electric de-icing on the propellers, and cabin 
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pressurization.297 Of all of these, with the exception of perhaps LORAN, cabin pressurization 
was the diffusion system that most interested the Canadian press and, subsequently, airline 
public relations because it re-framed Canadian flying in terms of comfort and the individual 
passenger experience. The Globe and Mail, for instance, introduced the newly pressurized North 
Stars to the public simply by stating that no less of an authority than C. D. Howe had flown in 
one and “found that the plane removed all the discomfort associated with changes in altitude.”298 
In its own publicity material, TCA divided these “gadgets” into two loose categories: 
“operations” features, such as radio guidance, and “comfort features,” such as upholstered chairs 
and climate control. Comfort features were an easier sell than operations features because they 
had a more tangible impact on the everyday experience of flight, but operations features were the 
ones that allowed TCA to highlight its leading contributions to world aviation. Cabin 
pressurization appeared in both categories. Sometimes it appeared alongside descriptions of the 
carpeting and powder room—one 1949 brochure devoted two of its eight pages to describing the 
North Star’s interior style, but also how “the cabin is pressurized, so that, even at high altitudes 
passengers may breathe normally, without oxygen masks”—and sometimes there were 
rudimentary attempts to explain how it worked.299 A Between Ourselves article from 1948 
reminded TCA employees that only “elementary physics” was necessary to understand how the 
system worked, “although the North Star passengers are probably unaware of...[this] engineering 
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accomplishment.”300 Despite being assigned a low level of awareness, everyday passengers were 
occasionally offered at least a basic explanation; a “Facts About Flying” passenger handbook 
from 1947, designed to clear up the “‘mystery’ of flight” to nervous passengers, answered the 
frequently-asked question: “What is a pressurized cabin?” 
“Without one, you would be quite uncomfortable at the higher cruising altitudes where 
the four-engined aircraft frequently move. Two miles or more aloft, the air is too thin, too 
oxygen-starved, for comfortable breathing. The modern airliner has high-powered 
blowers, or fans, to press extra air into the sealed cabin. Thus, the pressurized air is a 
‘bubble’ of breathable air riding the rarified atmosphere at which the ‘North Stars’ 
normally cruise.”301 
 
The explanation continued, providing descriptions of the cubic feet of air fed into the cabin and 
how quickly air is circulated, but the focus was still explaining to the everyday passenger why 
pressurized cabins made the North Star so comfortable. Design historian Gregory Votolato 
argues that cabin pressurization was “possibly the single greatest technical innovation that 
changed the nature of passenger air travel” precisely because it provided passengers with “a level 
of flying comfort previously unknown.”302 The comfort afforded by pressurized cabins was not 
imagined as particularly Canadian in TCA’s public-facing material, but it was part of a suite of 
technological systems, many of which had been transferred from military applications, that 
helped the North Star as an assemblage appear to be the perfect Canadian machine built to 
perform for Canadian passengers in Canadian conditions. 
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 The interior of the North Star itself was also part of creating that experience. Equally as 
important as the engines and fuselage was the interior of the North Star which was designed “to 
create a restful, warm and harmonious atmosphere” in which “physical comfort is supplemented 
by psychological ease.”303 In the first few decades of commercial aviation, aircraft interiors were 
designed to mimic other forms of luxury transportation such as yachts, Pullman cars, and 
limousines. By the time the North Star was in development, however, there was an emerging set 
of demands from organizations such as the International Air Transport Association (IATA) that 
standardized aircraft cabins “with the assumption that engineering and safety would determine 
all aspects of design.”304 In his design history, Votolato traces some of these conflicts between 
“safety” and “engineering”-oriented guidelines and the needs of passengers, who were interested 
in comfort above all else. As sleepers and couches were replaced by aluminum-framed reclining 
chairs in the two- or three-abreast configuration twenty-first century passengers are familiar 
with, the interiors stopped mimicking luxury transportation and started mimicking the 
“comforting, domestic ambience” of parlors and sitting rooms.305 Replicating familiar domestic 
spaces in uncomfortable technological environments allowed for the appearance of the 
democratization and domestication of air travel at a moment in which it really was becoming 
more accessible; it felt like you were sitting in your own home, not an inaccessible, unfamiliar 
luxury transport.306 
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TCA’s North Star interiors were designed by Winnipeg-based designer Janet Lowe. 
Lowe was a graduate of the University of Manitoba’s interior decorating program and replaced 
Diana Dudley, TCA’s first “interior accommodations engineer,” when she left the company to 
marry in the summer of 1946.307 The Winnipeg Tribune reported that Lowe was “responsible for 
the final appearance and comfort of the cabin,” and that although she was still debating a variety 
of colors— “beige for the floor, and perhaps some blue-green...maybe yellow, with light rust 
shades...and perhaps a light yellow ceiling”—she definitely planned for the North Star cabins to 
have “a Canadian touch.”308 This turned out to be a maple leaf motif in the curtains and drapes 
designed by celebrated weaver Karen Bulow, who had also been contracted by the CNR, the 
CPR, and the national headquarters of the Bank of Nova Scotia and was best known for her 
“hand-woven ties [that] are sported by many Canadian males of discerning taste.”309 Lowe later 
recalled that it was a “fascinating job,” especially since the interior design played a part in 
operations. Not only was it “before all the wonderful plastics were invented” and therefore “the 
interior walls of an aircraft were covered with material to cut down on the noise,” but even the 
length of the draperies had to be changed after early test flights to cut back on weight.310 
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The M1 and M2 models had markedly different cabins in terms of color and design. 
Besides the beige maple leaf drapes on the M2’s windows and coatroom, which replaced green 
plaid ones on the M1, the terra-cotta faux-leather sidewalls were changed to a light beige and the 
seats, which were previously a selection of chartreuse, white, terra-cotta and beige plaids and 
stripes depending on the section of the cabin, were all instead upholstered with green tweed.311 
This was accompanied by a new outside paint job, which TCA more-or-less maintained until it 
became Air Canada in the mid-1960s. The M2’s new “glad rags” featured a series of red and 
white bands along the fuselage “to emphasize longitudinal sweep,” “Trans-Canada Air Lines” 
painted in sloping lettering long the bands to “prevent ‘broken’ lines and preserve the impression 
of speed,” and a simplified 34-inch TCA logo on the nose. “Pretty handsome, we think!” wrote 
the editor of Between Ourselves in late 1947.312  
All of these cosmetic changes, from the green tweed seats to the newly italicized “TCA” 
branding on the tail fins, were backed by an optimism that TCA’s North Stars would represent 
both the latest in military-to-civilian transfer technology and an intangible Canadian-ness by 
virtue of being so cutting-edge and performing at climatic extremes. Fisher, for example, used 
his “Canadian compromise” simile in more than one broadcast. He also claimed—rightfully so, 
as far as I can tell—that the North Star was the second ever aircraft built in peacetime in an April 
1947 broadcast, a claim that was repeated on CBC’s News Roundup program two days later. It 
was, according to the Roundup reporter, a “tribute to Canadian industry” and “the pride of 
Canada,” cruising along at 225 miles per hour and “capable of hopping” across the Atlantic in 
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ten hours.313 Because the North Star’s first route was transatlantic, rather than the sort of 
distance-spanning, nation-shrinking travel that had fueled earlier technological nationalism 
discourse, its early publicity was a mish-mash of “hopping the pond” and the Canadian 
transportation teleology discussed in Chapter 1. For example, despite what Thompson called “a 
minimum of ceremony” at the North Star’s first regular service flight on April 15, 1947, John 
McCurdy, the pilot and designer of Canada’s first airplane, the “Silver Dart” in 1909, was in 
attendance. He showed off photographs of his “rickety flying machine” before Symington made 
a speech describing the North Star as “especially conceived to enable Canada to take her place in 
trans-oceanic air travel.”314 McCurdy, who frequently appeared at nationalistic aviation events 
until his death in the 1960s, gave the North Star a sense of Canadian legitimacy, which was then 
parlayed into a legitimation of TCA’s transatlantic service, but what did it mean for an airplane 
to be “especially conceived” for Canada? 
 
Environmental Problems: Seasonality and Traffic 
Despite all the North Star’s introductory fanfare, Canadians just didn’t seem to be 
interested. TCA was operating at a constant deficit in peacetime, which was met with varying 
degrees of alarm by executives, employees, government, and the public. English released a 
booklet-style annual report in 1946—the first year TCA’s deficit hit seven figures—in which he 
reassured employees that “nearly everyone worked loyally and diligently and it can be said of 
TCA...that present financial difficulties are not attributable to the men and women who comprise 
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it.” English’s overall tone was grim, however; the airline had “a pretty gloomy outlook” for the 
future, and even airmail, listed under the “Good Things of 1946” subheading, “was a 
disappointment and a worry.”315 This was generally framed as a problem of “balance.” TCA, 
limited by the demands of its wartime service, could not expand quickly enough to meet the 
needs of individual passengers or the state. A report in Between Ourselves suggested that the war 
had left TCA with, “a permanently established appreciation for air transport (which we welcome) 
and a continuing inadequacy of means and techniques (which we are currently warring against 
and overcoming).”316 Conditions did not improve with the introduction of the North Stars 
through 1947 and 1948. Deficits increased because of the expensive creation of TCA Atlantic 
and the costs associated with the North Star’s inauguration and implementation, and politicians 
opposed to TCA and Crown corporations were watching the airline’s every move. In short, the 
North Star was not the rousing symbolic success TCA wanted and needed it to be. As a result, 
Howe and new TCA President Gordon McGregor, who had taken over from Symington in early 
1948, were constantly on the defensive. These concerns reached a head in 1949, a federal 
election year in which TCA’s operational deficits topped out at $4,000,000 and perennial critic 
and federal Opposition leader George Drew was running for Prime Minister. The political 
debates surrounding TCA and the North Star will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 3, but at 
the very least they triggered a self-evaluation at the airline. TCA needed the North Star and its 
expensive military-to-civilian technological systems to be a source of interest and pride in 
Canadian civilian aviation in general and TCA in particular. 
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Airline executives looking for an easy way to explain TCA’s financial troubles eventually 
focused on the concept of seasonality. Canadians, it appeared, simply did not want to travel 
during the winter. TCA carried 65,000 passengers in the summer of 1948 and 45,000 in the off-
season. McGregor suggested in his autobiography that “by any standards, a differential of 44% is 
a serious matter.”317 This differential was constructed in TCA public relations material, including 
what I call McGregor’s “seasonality spin tour” of speeches at Rotary Clubs and the like through 
early 1950, as a problem that was embedded in the collective Canadian wintertime imagination, 
turning a financial problem into an environmental one. It made for an ideal scapegoat for airline 
officials, as it was easy for taxpayers to understand, easy to combat using education and 
advertising, and fit into already-established paradigms of Canadian climatic identity. TCA’s 
public-facing material suggested that the fear of wintertime flying, which caused especially large 
imbalances in seasonal traffic in Canada, was both very real and an implicit imagined 
consequence of the unique Canadian relationship with winter. The North Star, with its evocative 
name, all-weather technologies, and nationalistic pedigree, became the star player in the shift 
from isolating distance as the primary obstacle to Canadian mobility to isolating time. In so 
doing, Canadian winters became a casualty of the new elasticity of time and space that was 
emerging as part of the modern Canadian envirotechnical nation. 
Turning winter into an obstacle for TCA to overcome in its public-facing material was 
something of a subversion, deliberate or not, of the place seasonality has held in the history of 
Canadian mobility. Historian Merle Massie has recently shown how seasonal use patterns of 
northern Saskatchewan trails shifted with the introduction of wilderness tourism. Frozen 
muskegs and the “wide-open highways on frozen lakes” often allowed for easier movement of 
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freight in winter, but tourists were more interested in reaching northern recreational areas in the 
summer when those same trails ranged from simply uncomfortable to completely treacherous.318 
This inspired the provincial government to undertake a number of road-building initiatives in the 
first third of the twentieth century to increase uses of the trails in both seasons, but those roads, 
with their “scenic but useless curves and hauls up and down hills,” were impractical for 
freighting.319 Although the reasons for being mobile varied, with tourism in the summer and 
freight in the winter, Massie still shows that, as Canadian meteorologist and raconteur F. 
Kenneth Hare has claimed, Canadian “winter was (and still is) the season of mobility.”320 
Canadians should be wholly confident in their ability to travel in the winter; moving around by 
toboggan, snowshoe, sledge, dogsled and, eventually, snowmobile are recognizable parts of the 
national winter imaginary.  
I argue, however, that the postwar “travel boom” represents something of a fulcrum 
between the triumphalist national narratives of overcoming winter by travelling through it and 
the more symbolic winter narratives, where the technologies of modernity made place and season 
increasingly irrelevant, or at least easier to ignore. These two sorts of seasonality—one 
embracing everyday winter experiences, the other reducing them to symbol and performance—
converge in TCA’s concern with seasonal imbalances in passenger traffic.321 According to airline 
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and advertising officials, winter mattered to Canadians, but in all the wrong ways. It was their 
special duty as Canada’s national airline to help Canadians re-shape how they imagined 
wintertime travel and subsequently their relationship to the seasons, and indeed, to time itself. 
Airline seasonality was not unique to TCA, nor was generalized travel anxiety 
particularly Canadian. As David Courtwright has argued for the United States, fear of flying, 
especially before the age of pressurized cabins, was quite common and most travelers were 
“perfectly satisfied to remain on the ground.”322 According to historian Rick Popp, immediate 
postwar air travel was one of the only instances where American advertisers’ goals were “to 
allay fears, rather than amplify them.”323 Mid-century American advertisers used popular 
psychoanalytic theory to diagnose flight-phobics, tying that fear to childhood trauma, the 
Freudian Oedipus Complex—“flying was the unmitigated pleasure associated with assuming 
godlike powers”—and emotional transference and displacement.324 Regardless of how the fear 
was analyzed, airlines and their associated advertising bodies believed that, as Advertising Age 
magazine put it in 1948, “fear of air travel is fundamental.”325 TCA’s first Canadian advertising 
agency, for instance, Vickers & Benson, Ltd., told the airline’s public relations department in 
early 1947 that there was “a nervousness that has been set up in the minds of the public” and that 
“any advertising plan” for the airline must “offset to the highest degree possible the nervousness 
now existing.”326 For both actors and analysts, fear of flying, regardless of the cause, was a key 
part of mid-century air travel. 
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Clearly, fear of flying was not a particularly Canadian problem, but seasonality as a 
Canadian airline concern was also not conjured out of thin air in 1949 to appease TCA’s political 
opponents. As early as 1946—during that first alarming seven-figure deficit year—McGregor, 
then Traffic Manager, suggested that the airline’s financial struggles were due in part to seasonal 
patterns, claiming “airlines, and perhaps particularly T.C.A., are earning the reputation...of being 
particularly prone to delays and cancellations” during the fall and winter.327 However, by 1949, 
nervousness triggered by wintertime flying became somewhat of a specific scapegoat for TCA 
officials under intense scrutiny from the public and political opponents. As Marionne Cronin 
argues in her work on interwar bush flying, even technologies that appear to triumph over 
geography are “profoundly conditioned by geography.”328 In the case of TCA’s perceived 
seasonality problem, a similar argument holds, but for climate instead of physical geography. 
Finding a “solution” to this problem, according to McGregor, was “of more importance to TCA 
than most” because the “fluctuations” between the seasons appeared to be much greater in 
Canada.329 Canadians seemed comfortable with the North Star erasing distance, or flying over a 
picturesque Canadian landscape, but struggled with overcoming their climatic conditioning. 
McGregor was dispatched as the spokesperson for this perspective. He made a number of 
public speeches and interviews through his first eighteen months as TCA President, often 
repeating that Canadians and aviation, more than any other nation or method of transportation, 
                                               
327 Emphasis added. Report by Gordon R. McGregor, “Decline in Volume of Passenger Traffic,” 
7 December 1946, Office of the President papers, Air Canada fonds, RG-70, volume 5, LAC. 
328 Cronin, “Flying the Northern Frontier,” 18. 
329 Address by Gordon McGregor to the Canadian Industrial Traffic League, 14 February 1950, 
Gordon R. McGregor fonds, MG-30-E283, volume 13, LAC. 
 
 121 
suffered from a seasonal drop in passenger traffic.330 In one 1950 speech, he asked “why...has the 
airline operated at an increasing deficit during the last four years[?]...Canadians, both taxpayers 
and such few others as there may be, have every right to ask those questions, and to have them 
answered.”331 His answers in these addresses highlighted the usual suspects, such as the creation 
of the Atlantic branch of service and the purchase of new aircraft, but the first factor he discussed 
was almost always seasonality, blaming a “widely-held opinion that if it is snowing outside, it is 
no day for flying, [and] that airline performance is more irregular in the winter than in the 
summer.” These opinions, which he also called “beliefs,” were “100% wrong” thanks to the 
North Star’s new technologies such as pressurization, radio communications, and weather 
equipment.332 On one of McGregor’s script copies from late March 1950, the words “seasonal 
fluctuation,” “out of date beliefs” and “pressurized cabin” were typed in all-capitals and 
underlined in red in the margins; these were clear and necessary talking points in explaining the 
current state of Canada’s national airline to the press and public.333 
In these addresses, McGregor envisioned a two-pronged attack on the “evil economic 
effects of seasonal fluctuations...[F]irst, everything possible must be done to eliminate the 
primary cause of the disease, and secondly, remedies must be applied to reduce the financial pain 
where the illness persists.”334 The first “medical” intervention—insofar as the “primary cause” 
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was a fear of wintertime flying—will be addressed in this chapter and the second will be 
addressed in Chapter 4. Canadian wintertime conditions, as Edward Jones-Imhotep has shown 
for the Arctic and upper ionosphere, were undergoing a discursive “transformation from natural 
order to hostile environment;” nature worked against technological order and reliability from 
TCA’s perspective by making its passengers afraid.335 Technologically speaking, any reason to 
be wary of wintertime travel had already been eliminated thanks to wartime diffusion 
technologies and enhanced airline infrastructure. The larger issue was convincing Canadians that 
the winters they had been conditioned to see as so treacherous as to be identity-forming could be 
made harmless by way of Canadian-built communications technologies, taming a “hostile 
nature” back into a “natural order.” There were therefore two related barriers facing TCA in its 
fight against seasonality: getting Canadians to disregard their climatic myths and travel during 
the winter, and getting Canadians to disregard their climatic myths and travel by air during the 
winter. These were distinct from one another, and they were both part of TCA’s implicit goal of 
reshaping the Canadian relationship to the seasons to suit its envirotechnical narratives. 
 
A Brief History of TCA’s Advertising Department 
Advertising and promotions were the keys to overcoming these obstacles, and increased 
focus on public relations in this vein was characteristic of McGregor’s tenure as TCA president. 
The first few years of his presidential term saw a dramatic restructuring of the airline, and, 
inspired by his previous position as Traffic Manager, McGregor was especially concerned with 
sales and traffic. In 1946, he pressed English and Symington for a renewed public relations 
focus, since Canadians exposed to the message of “greater capacity, greater speed, greater 
                                               
335 Jones-Imhotep, The Unreliable Nation, 96. 
 
 123 
comfort, and greater flight frequency” in ubiquitous American air travel advertising could not 
“see corresponding remedial action being taken by TCA.”336 After consulting with the Public 
Relations and Advertising departments of the Canadian National Railway (of which TCA was 
still a subsidiary), English suggested that “we sadly need someone to tell our story not 
through...paid advertising or news releases accompanied by pictures of pretty girls, but by word 
of mouth” to trade organizations, “Business Men’s Clubs,” and the like. English suggested hiring 
someone to do this exclusively for TCA who could “sit at the feet of Gamaliel” and absorb as 
much as possible from his counterparts at the CNR.337  
Although both McGregor and English saw the desirability of expanding TCA’s publicity 
capabilities, English’s enthusiasm, as well as that of the Public Relations department at the CNR 
was tempered for two reasons. First, there was not yet a clear picture of TCA’s postwar fleet. 
Although the modified DC-4 began test flying in June of that year, how many TCA would 
receive, the routes on which they would be used, and whether or not the first batch would be 
pressurized was still up in the air. TCA needed something to sell in its advertising and vague 
promises that “the present unprecedented increase in demand for air travel did not come as a 
surprise...and that plans were drawn to provide for it” would not cut it.338 The form and function 
of TCA’s internal postwar public relations would hinge on the success of the DC-4Ms. English 
wanted to wait at least until all of the flight and safety tests had been completed before revealing 
to the public how hard TCA had been working, and even in early 1947 TCA’s employee 
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newsletter said that the airline would “wait until the North Stars get busy” before releasing 
“penetrating advertisements.”339 Second, there was some concern about TCA’s (and the CNR’s) 
relationship to the government. The CNR’s publicity department was under the impression that 
sustained “pretty girls”-style advertising required some sort of special dispensation from Howe. 
This reflected mid-century concerns with the connections between advertising, with all of its 
“pretty girls,” hucksterism, and manipulation, and the government. Although historian Reginald 
Whitaker has argued that mid-century political advertising was part of a larger “mass 
socialization” of Canadian politics, he points out that “old-fashioned politicians” were generally 
worried about political opinion being steered by “slick” advertising agencies.340  
When McGregor became TCA president in 1948, advertising (featuring plenty of pictures 
of “pretty girls”) became more of a priority, and TCA’s first independent Advertising 
department, working separately from the airline’s Public Relations department and the CNR, 
began operations in early 1949. This was partially because of McGregor’s prior interest in traffic 
and publicity, partially because the North Star fleet was no longer the conjecture it had been in 
the previous half-decade, and partially because TCA began engaging the firm of Cockfield, 
Brown & Company. Founded in Montreal in 1928 by prominent advertising executives Henry R. 
Cockfield and G. Warren Brown, the firm was one of the first in Canada to make use of 
emerging research practices, conducting market surveys through the early 1930s for Campbell’s 
Soup, Molson’s brewing company, and even the federal Department of Fisheries.341 It was easily 
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the largest advertising firm in the country, and by some accounts was the largest agency per 
capita in the world by the late 1950s, for the most part because of its government contracts.342 By 
the time TCA began working with it in the late 1940s, the agency had already begun its 
longstanding relationship with the Liberal Party of Canada. Because of its size, Cockfield, 
Brown was not dependent on the party’s fortunes, and therefore its work with the Liberal Party 
and its Crown corporations were what Whitaker called a “profitable dollop” of “icing” on the 
“largest advertising cake in the country.”343  
The official relationship between Cockfield, Brown and the Liberal Party of Canada 
remains rather secretive, which is standard for party-advertiser interactions. As historian 
Jonathan Rose has suggested, analysts know which agencies were popular with which parties, 
but little information regarding details is available.344 This is especially the case with Cockfield, 
Brown because a number of the agency’s records were lost when it became insolvent in the early 
1980s.345 Regardless, Cockfield, Brown emerged in the late 1940s as a power player in Canadian 
government advertising, engineering Louis St. Laurent’s memorable and enormously successful 
turn as the affable, non-threatening “Uncle Louis” in the 1949 and 1953 federal elections. More 
importantly for TCA, the agency had also started working with Crown corporations. Unlike the 
Liberal Party or other Crown corporations such as the CNR, TCA used Cockfield, Brown as its 
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only advertising agency for the Canadian market from the creation of its Advertising department 
to the defeat of the Liberal Party in the 1957 federal election.346 Rose has suggested elsewhere 
that unlike the United States, Canadian government advertising was used through the twentieth 
century to create and bolster national myths and symbols, especially “the values of what it means 
to be Canadian”: unity across geographic space, federalism, and belonging.347 Due to its 
monopoly status and enrolment of state advertisers, TCA’s campaigns made liberal use of those 
ideas and symbols. It was spared the urgency of competing with other airlines, as was the case in 
the United States, and could instead concentrate on articulating abstract ideas of nation, 
technology, and the environment as a part of building its customer base. 
 TCA’s new Advertising department was founded with a specific and pointed goal: getting 
Canadians flying during the winter. Since “one of Advertising’s biggest concerns is the ‘ironing 
out’ of” seasonality, Director of Advertising D. C. Bythell wrote in Between Ourselves, the 
majority of the new department’s funding was allocated to the winter months to combat: 
“the impression held by great masses of the general public that flying in the winter time is 
not so dependable as it is during the balmy summer months...The last few years, 
however, have seen such advances in all-weather operating that on-time performance of 
schedules has vastly improved and today, airline flying from an operational standpoint 
varies little between seasons. But the general public still take a quick look at the wintry 
blasts before flying. Consequently, TCA Advertising has as one of its major tasks the 
selling of the idea that ‘anytime is flying time.’” 348 
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As the airline’s newest and most advanced equipment, the North Star was at the forefront of 
these efforts. The problem of seasonality created an envirotechnical knot that TCA attempted to 
untangle using advertising and passenger education on the one hand, and introduction of the 
North Star as a vehicle for modern Canadian-ness on the other. The result was a multifaceted set 
of campaigns that worked to sell Canadians on the idea that “anytime” was flying time. 
 
“Anytime is Flying Time”: Air Travel and the Mundane 
“Anytime,” here operates on two different, but related, levels. First, as I will discuss in 
more detail below, the “anytime” was in reference to Canadian seasonality: anytime meant 
wintertime. Second, making anytime flying time carried the implicit suggestion that flying could 
be a regular, routine transportation choice for everyday Canadians. Aviation professionals—
pilots, airline executives, and the like—and sympathetic politicians such as Howe had been 
working to remove the romanticized status assigned to flying for decades. “For commercial 
flying to become commonplace,” aviation historian David Courtwright argues, “it had to become 
safe, predictable, uneventful—dull.”349 This is an echo of McGregor’s claim in 1950 that: 
“We work and hope for the time when we shall be regarded as an ordinary every-day 
means of public transport, without any romantic overtones whatsoever. We look with 
mild dismay upon the traveller who persists in regarding a flight as something of an 
adventure. We want the aircraft to seem a natural, normal and thoroughly sensible means 
of transport to everyone.”350 
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TCA’s attempts to make flying seem “thoroughly sensible” followed the set of common 
advertising tactics, highlighted by Courtwright, used by mid-century American airlines to calm 
fears of flying: emphasizing the experience of airlines and individual pilots, appealing to women 
and children, and outlining new technological developments.351 It was common in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s to profile pilots and crewmembers with wartime experience in promotional 
material. Even McGregor’s wartime and pre-war experience—he had thrice won the Webster 
Trophy for best amateur pilot in Canada and commanded one of the highest-scoring fighter wing 
squadrons after fighting in the Battle of Britain—became a talking point in interviews and 
profiles of himself and TCA.352  
The Canadian context had the added angle of what one 1949 profile-style advertisement 
called “Canada’s northland flying.”353 Bush flying remained a useful touchstone in these types of 
advertisements because TCA could extend the cold-weather wintertime mobility attributed to 
heroic, adventurous bush pilots to its crew and aircraft. As one winter 1950-1951 brochure 
pointed out, “TCA pilots are, as you might expect, among the most experienced winter fliers in 
the world.” 354 The phrase “among the most experienced winter fliers” appeared quite frequently 
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through the early 1950s. One 1951 newspaper advertisement, for example, highlighted TCA’s 
meteorological, flight dispatch, and piloting expertise: “because of these men, any time is good 
flying time for you.”355 The legacy of bush flying in Canada, despite its romanticization, 
provided the airline and its passengers with a source of confidence and a subtly Canadian bent to 
coverage of Canada’s newest transport.  
These strategies converged in a series of TCA educational films, each highlighting a 
different aspect of airline operations; “A Great Day For Flying,” for instance, featured “the 
fascinating ingenuity of LORAN” and how the Meteorological Service relayed up-to-the-minute 
weather information to pilots.356 Bythell was most excited about 1949’s pilot-themed “Mr. 
Barnaby Sleeps in the Sky,” starring “outstanding” New York television actor Vaughn Taylor, 
later known for his turns on The Twilight Zone. The purpose of this film, according to Bythell, 
was to show why TCA pilots “are the best skilled men in the air—and thus indirectly inspire 
confidence in TCA and flying generally.”357 The titular Mr. Barnaby, a “timid soul” who has 
never flown, has nightmares and hallucinations about his first flight, one of which features the 
conveniently-named “Edmonton Flyers” hockey team. Once he boards the North Star, he 
imagines that the crew are “Edmonton Flyers” players—a curious, but not entirely out-of-place, 
blending of Canadian winter sports and air travel.358 However, once he meets them, and they 
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“reassure him and explain the operation of the aircraft,” he is able to relax and sleep through his 
flight.359 This film, and the others in the series, were screened by TCA offices in major cities and 
were also available to “women’s organizations, service and businessmen’s clubs, special interest 
groups, youth organizations, church and educational groups, etc.” for private showings.360 
 It is worth noting that “women’s groups” was first on the list. As Courtwright has 
suggested above, targeting women and children—especially women—was an advertising 
strategy designed to make flying seem safe and mundane. As I have argued elsewhere, TCA 
officials assigned a great deal of travel-decision-making agency to female travelers, since, as 
Bythell suggested in a 1949 memo, “it is recognized that they play a major role in deciding 
where the family travels on holiday.”361 According to American advertising historian Daniel 
Delis Hill, targeting women consumers through advertising already had been recognized as an 
ideal way to isolate and control family spending by the turn of the century. By the time 
advertising was incorporating market research and demographic sciences in the 1920s, “the 
paean of advertisers was unquestionably that of woman and her preeminence as consumer.”362 
Although Hill focuses entirely on advertising consumer goods, TCA used a similar set of 
strategies when selling airline service and travel experiences to what they later called the 
“women’s market.” The first strategy to appeal to women in the late 1940s and early 1950s was 
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creating promotional material that large numbers of women would see. Advertisements were 
taken out in bridal magazines, special pamphlets were made detailing how to travel with young 
children, and information about TCA appeared in what today would be called “advertorials” on 
women’s newspaper pages, such as “Buys and Whys with Barbara Brent.”363 The second, and 
very much related, tactic was creating promotional copy that women would respond to. Women 
were pictured as the decision-makers; one popular set of 1949 advertisements depicted a young 
woman looking knowingly towards the reader and exclaiming, “I sold him on Bermuda!” while 
her husband smokes a pipe in the background. This advertisement, and the others in the 
campaign with taglines such as “Bermuda here we come!” and “This is us this winter,” implied 
in the copy that the wife was the traveler responsible for gathering information and presenting it 
to her family.364  
Children, especially girls, showed up quite frequently in early TCA promotions as well. 
Hill refers to these sorts of advertisements as “Little Homemaker” and “Little Mother” 
campaigns designed to “lead both mothers and daughters to brand awareness, product loyalty, 
and, ultimately mass-market consumption.”365 Two out of six advertisements in TCA’s first 
“case history” campaign, providing descriptive “ordinary people” testimonials to “interest a 
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broad mass of public,” featured girls (and another two featured older women).366 In the most 
striking, three-year-old Marilyn Lee Robinson of Lethbridge, Alberta is pictured clutching a doll 
while deplaning in Britain, where she is to meet her grandparents for the first time. Not only did 
these advertising strategies work to appeal to women consumers, but appealing to women 
consumers was a tactic in and of itself to make flying appear mundane, safe, and reliable. 
Historian Deborah Douglas has suggested, for instance, that hiring the first female flight 
attendants, known as air hostesses or stewardesses, by Boeing in 1930 was “the first formal 
attempt to use women to ‘sell aviation.’” American airlines that embraced the air hostess early 
were under the impression that putting women on airplanes and in images of airplanes “would 
provide psychological reassurance through the image of safety and caution.”367 Showing flight 
attendants, like female travelers and young girls, in TCA promotions evoked the “ploy of an 
earlier generation of women pilots—‘If I can fly, certainly you, a man, ought to be able to.’”368 
These strategies to make anytime seem like flying time, such as appealing to women and 
emphasizing the experience of pilots and crew, were relatively common across North American 
airlines and were an easy way to make air travel seem mundane. At TCA, however, there was an 
added emphasis on weather, climate, and the specific technological systems used to transcend 
them in order to create new seasonal patterns of mobility. TCA made “anytime” into “flying 
time” by advertising the all-weather flying suite of technologies and the North Star on which 
they were featured. This was one of the airline’s major concerns in creating and distributing 
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advertising campaigns and promotional materials both specific to the North Star and more 
generally. As suggested above, the bulk of the Advertising department’s attention and capital 
was devoted to the off-season, but so was the advertising copy. “Winter” as an analytic category 
appeared non-stop in early promotional material, whether it was explaining how the North Star 
operated during the winter, portraying wintertime scenes, or even juxtaposing Canadian winters 
with the “sun destinations” travelers could visit during the off-season. In this type of material, 
TCA used a rather specific set of strategies in its public-facing material to make wintertime into 
flying time. These promotional materials grappled with emerging difficulties in carrying earlier 
envirotechnical imaginaries into the postwar period; the popular narratives of triumph over 
distance and season begin to give way to a creeping ambivalence towards the place Canadian 
winters and Canadian climates held in the pantheon of national symbols. In so doing, TCA’s 
“all-weather” advertising material both supported and subverted pre-existing patterns of 
Canadian seasonal mobility by legitimizing them while at the same time suggesting they be 




Wintertime is Flying Time 
The earliest all-weather advertisements 
featuring the North Star could not afford to be implicit 
with their seasonality rhetoric. The Advertising 
department was founded on the very idea of evening 
out seasonal fluctuations, as seasonality was being 
presented as the guilty party in TCA’s financial 
struggles. The airline’s first major all-weather flying 
campaign is an excellent case study of the tactics that 
TCA’s, with the help of Cockfield, Brown, used to 
build what Rick Popp has called “a shared symbolic 
vocabulary” of seasons, technologies, and Canadian-
ness.369 The advertisement (Figure 5) featured a group 
of children tobogganing down a snow-covered hill 
while gesturing towards a passing North Star and 
exclaiming, “There’s the real way to get around in 
winter!” 370 The small-print copy trumpeted that TCA 
had carried over a million passengers “in wintertime,” 
which proved that “flying is a year-round operation.”371 Flying could only become year-round 
due to higher operational ceilings, meaning that TCA could go “over the weather” because 
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Figure 5: “The real way to get around 
in winter,” 1949.  
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“pressurized cabins (in TCA’s famous ‘North Star’ Skyliners) offset altitude.”372 Bythell saw this 
advertisement as a smashing success. It was one of the few specific campaigns profiled in the 
1949 Between Ourselves article introducing the Advertising department. It appeared in several 
versions in at least a dozen newspapers, as a direct-mail flyer with a circulation of over 100,000, 
and as a two-color magazine advertisement in 1950. More importantly, Bythell described it as 
key in the fight against seasonality since it was “designed to help dispel the widely held belief 
that winter flying is more hazardous, less reliable than travel at other seasons.”373 He repeated 
the same phrasings in his Advertising News memoranda throughout 1949 and 1950: “widely held 
belief,” “less reliable,” “more hazardous.” Not only would the copy featured in this toboggan 
series be repeated in all-weather flying advertisements for the following few years, but so would 
the Advertising department’s rationale for developing and printing them. 
There are two striking features of this advertisement that were not commonly used in all-
weather flying campaigns. The first is the use of children. Although children were used as 
symbols of safety and mundanity in airline advertising, I have not found another targeted all-
weather flying campaign at TCA that features them.374 Perhaps this was because the 
technological systems responsible for getting the North Star flying above the weather were 
considered too complex for children to understand; later advertisements, such as the “why 
doesn’t somebody do something” series discussed below, featured adults very much in-the-know 
about how and why the North Star was ideal for all-season travel. Perhaps also the childlike 
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wonder these children expressed towards the North Star was to be echoed by potential travelers; 
this is also reflected in early 1960s advertisements that pictured children staring at “TCA’s giant 
jets.”375 Regardless, the chaos of the children playing—the speed of the toboggan, their hair 
flying in the wind—mirrors the shapes prominent in the advertising copy. The main copy is 
designed to look like a torn piece of paper, the tagline is curved across the top of the page, and 
the trajectory of the North Star, toboggan, and main copy creates a dynamic “s” shape. The 
overall effect is one of freedom of movement and youthful joy in speeding across the snowy 
wintertime landscape. 
The toboggan itself is the other striking feature. It placed the North Star inside an 
already-popular timeline of travel technologies, such as those used for Atlantic crossings in early 
North Star and TCA decennial-era promotions, but with a distinctly Canadian angle: getting 
around in winter. TCA advertisements through the 1950s and 1960s used the juxtaposition of old 
and new technologies frequently, from picturing horse-drawn buggies in the Caribbean to using 
trains to evoke regularity in scheduling, but this is the only deployment of toboggans I could 
find. The toboggan also stands out in that it is an “old” technology used almost exclusively in 
winter and in Canada. Winter pastimes, especially tobogganing, became go-to symbols of 
Canadian-ness through the late nineteenth century and were useful ways for newly Confederated 
settlers to carve out an identity for themselves separate from Great Britain or the United 
States.376 In his book on nineteenth-century Canadian winter visuals, art historian Edward Cavell 
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 137 
argues that all Canadian “leisure activities have evolved from necessities developed for winter 
survival,” but tobogganing in particular gained traction with Euro-Canadians because it “was as 
fast as a person could go in the nineteenth century world.”377 Tobogganing clubs, involving men 
and women, were hugely popular in major southern Canadian cities such as Toronto and 
Montreal, and Governors General set up tobogganing courses on the grounds of their Rideau 
Hall residence in Ottawa through the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, even installing 
torches to allow nighttime sledding. Nineteenth century accounts of tobogganing parties often 
linger on how participants are dressed; one account from the early 1880s devotes an entire page 
to the “picturesque costumes, present[ing] a sight that the eye of an artist might delight to linger 
over.”378 Another account of winter sports, focusing on tobogganing and skiing, in Canada 
magazine in 1907, paraphrases Rudyard Kipling’s limerick: 
“There was a young man of Quebec 
Who stood in snow up to his neck 
 When they said, ‘Are you friz?’ 
 He replied, ‘Yes, I is, 
But we don’t call this cold in Quebec.”379 
 
There is no mistaking the children in the 1949 TCA advertisement, with their varied snow-
clothes, rosy cheeks, and joy at being outdoors in winter, for anything but Canadians. And there 
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is no mistaking their toboggan as anything but that most Canadian of transports since, as one 
1880s account suggested, “to the Canadian the toboggan is as familiar as a household word.”380 
 This juxtaposition technique is even more extreme if tobogganing is seen, as Gillian 
Poulter has argued, as “an indigenous activity that had been tamed, organized, and made more 
scientific.”381 This gestures towards the interwar trend of displaying images of aircraft bringing 
modern conveniences, such as catalog shopping, to Indigenous peoples in Canada’s North. These 
visuals, which took the forms of photographs, advertisements, and even airmail stamps, 
“frequently juxtaposed aircraft with older [Native] modes of transportation, like dogsleds.”382 In 
the case of the North Star and its new services, this technique moved beyond the visual; in a 
Saturday Night column, journalist Herbert McManus wrote that flying was at its easiest “today 
[because] swifter methods than dog sled are available to transport Canadians to [hub airports] 
Toronto or Montreal.”383 Indigenous technologies were used to represent primitiveness and 
backwardness, and were deliberately contrasted with aircraft. Not only was the toboggan an 
Indigenous technology, but it was also uniquely Canadian. This was more than a specific 
iteration of the general use of aviation to visually represent modernity, which historian Jonathan 
Vance traces back to the age of ballooning; the image of children tobogganing recalled both a 
colonial Euro-Canadian past and the future of travel as realized by the North Star.384 The 
toboggan, and the children bundled up for outdoor play, was a stereotypical Canadian wintertime 
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scene, and one that everyday Canadians might view with some level of comfort and even 
enjoyment. Despite all that, the North Star was the “real way to get around in winter,” usurping 
even toboggans in speed, comfort, and reliability. 
Not all of TCA’s early all-weather campaigns were so explicit with their wintertime 
discourse. Starting after the toboggan campaign, TCA advertisements took great pains to show 
that weather in general, but especially winter, no longer mattered to air travel. Pressurized cabins 
allowed the North Star to fly “above the weather,” and also provided a wider range of altitudes at 
which it could fly. Expanded meteorological forecasting, radio communication and 
instrumentation, and cooperation between “TCA and the Department of Transport have been 
able to take some of the sting out of Canadian weather,” Between Ourselves argued in 1948.385 
Finally, climate control inside the cabin (and also inside airport terminals) meant that flying was 
beginning to feel the same, regardless of season. “Spring or fall, summer or winter,” one 1951 
brochure suggested, “TCA takes off on regular, convenient, round-the-clock schedules.”386 
However, wintertime rhetoric and images were constantly evoked; winter might not appear to 
matter to the regular operations of aircraft, but winter still mattered to how everyday Canadians 
imagined themselves making leisure decisions, travelling, and understanding their relationships 
to technology and the environment. A series of 1950 advertisements featuring well-dressed 
couples claiming “we like flying all year ‘round!” suggested that passengers “leave winter far 
below” in the “warm, club-like atmosphere of a TCA Skyliner.” Winter was still the season to 
leave below, even though “your TCA Skyliner, specially developed for year ‘round operation, is 
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every day setting new records for on-time performance.”387 Despite the overwhelming message 
that every season was for flying—the passengers pictured are not as bundled up as the children in 
the toboggan series—Bythell pointed out in an Advertising News memo that:  
“This campaign is timed to have its major effect just prior to and during the earlier winter 
months when weather conditions automatically seem to deter many people from 
travelling. It has long been felt that a part of our winter decline in traffic is attributable to 
the widely held belief that wintertime travel is less reliable, [and] more hazardous.”388 
 
Making apprehension toward winter travel the result of some often-repeated “widely held 
belief,” a sort of national delusion, further nudged Canadian winters towards the imagined. 
Canadians needed to have some sort of attachment to winter for these advertisements to be 
effective, but winter also had to have no real consequences for flying.  
 Despite TCA’s repeated claims that seasons were meaningless to air travel, they did 
matter to the day-to-day operation of the North Star, even though passengers might not have 
noticed. In the summer, North Stars had to be cooled; in 1949 TCA invested in several “aircraft 
coolers” to keep the interiors of aircraft that had been sitting on the Montreal or Toronto runways 
for hours feeling “as cool and refreshing as a lakeshore breeze in the evening.”389 And winter 
mattered too. Snow had to be removed from runways in what Between Ourselves called a 
“perennial problem—a costly pain in the neck.”390 A 1948 article detailed the process of 
“winterizing” North Stars by positing that “if you think it’s cold waiting on a corner for a bus in 
the dead of a blustery Canadian winter’s night, try floating around for a while at 20,000 feet.” 
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The North Star’s reaction to these undesirable conditions was anthropomorphized; the thought of 
extreme cold might make it tremble and “the oil in its circulatory system take on the substance of 
jelly.” Once again, though, TCA’s cold-weather expertise came to the rescue; the airline’s 
engineers were so skilled that it would feel like “the North Stars are fitted with red flannels.”391 
The airline also struggled with choosing flooring for the North Star that would not freeze, get 
slippery, or collect so much snow from passengers’ shoes that it would create a tripping 
hazard.392 These issues were generally hidden from the travelling public; it took a lot of work to 
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Figure 6: “All-weather flying” advertisements from 1950 (L) and 1951 (R)  
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erase the materiality of the seasons, even though the seasonal imaginary remained. As one 1949 
seat-back brochure suggested: 
“The climatic extremes of the northern latitudes have long since begun their surrender to 
the aeronautical engineer. With anti-icing equipment, specialized heaters, and modern 
landing aids, the Skyliners are properly dressed for all weather. It is worth noting too, that 
the bleak winter landscape passes by a lot more quickly in a Skyliner.”393 
 
Once again, the North Star was anthropomorphized and assigned some winter clothing, but with 
a technological twist. In promotions such as these, winter had no effect on the properly equipped 
North Star, but the bleakness of winter landscapes had an effect on everyday passengers. 
 This is why, in advertisements like the “we like flying” series, it was increasingly 
common to use “weather” in place of “winter.” In one late 1951 campaign, which ran in 40 
newspapers in eight provinces, the tagline was that the easiest way to escape the weather was to 
“go over it, or go around it” using a pressurized North Star. In one advertisement in the series, a 
woman looks out the window and asks “why doesn’t somebody do something about this 
weather?” while her male companion suggests going over or around (Figure 6). In the other, a 
professor, complete with stylized mortar-board hat and bow-tie, informs his class that “there are 
only two ways to avoid bad weather”: go over or around. Advertising Manager Donald 
McLauchlin claimed that this campaign, despite its attempts at “selling the Canadian public on 
air travel all year round,” used a “cheerful approach” and “cartoon technique” to “combat an all 
too frequent attitude on the part of the public that winter increases the hazards of air 
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transportation.”394 What season the advertisements take place in was left ambiguous and the 
word “winter” only appeared once, but the bullet points highlighting the “smoothest routes,” 
“constant comfort,” “veteran pilots,” and the like were stylized snowflakes.395 Even when they 
were not explicitly about winter, advertisements such as these still needed to reference winter 
and the place it held in the Canadian envirotechnical consciousness. 
Another set of strategies, operating parallel to the arguments that seasons no longer 
mattered to air travel, was to suggest that winter flying was actually better for the airplanes and 
crew than summer flying. The contradictions between the two were often mitigated by claims 
that although passengers might not feel the difference between winter and summer flying, pilots, 
who, as suggested above, knew a great deal about winter due to their northland experience, 
preferred winter flying. Subsequently, these advertisements generally featured airline personnel 
instead of children or everyday passengers in order to sell the idea that wintertime is better flying 
time. One 1950 advertisement, released with the “we like flying” campaign, shows a smiling 
captain and co-pilot, who “know that wintertime is good flying time—because aircraft operate at 
their best in winter’s cold dense air.” Of course, those pilots “possess an unsurpassed skill and 
experience in winter flying,” so they certainly would know best.396 Brochures released 
specifically to promote off-season travel and distributed through travel agencies, in seat-back 
pockets, and via direct mail repeated this claim, often with more technical explanations of how 
and why winter was better for flying. Every explanation was a variation on the theme that TCA 
pilots preferred flying in winter because “they find that in winter the air is smoother, radio 
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reception clearer, and that aircraft perform better.”397 Brochures such as these had circulations of 
over 10,000 and deliberately included, according to Bythell, “special copy...to point out the 
advantages of winter flying.”398 These advantages were financial—off-season fares were often 
reduced—but also clearly technological 
and cultural. TCA pilots knew winter 
better than any others, and their airplanes 
performed more efficiently in winter. 
As a popular 1950 advertisement 
with the tagline “Snowbound or 
Skybound?” put it, “flying conditions are 
good in the cold, dense air of wintertime.” 
The matter-of-fact statement that flying in 
the winter is good, and not simply 
tolerable— just like “we like flying all 
year ‘round,” instead of just “we tolerate 
it”—is yet another example of using 
Canada’s apparently special winters to 
somehow make them less special (Figure 
7). The “Snowbound or Skybound” 
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campaign was designed to supplement the toboggan series, which had just started its color-print 
run, and also contrasted old and new. In this case, though, no people are present; instead, a sleek 
North Star soars above a pastoral road blanketed in fresh snow, which does not even appear to be 
paved. The 14 newspapers slated to run this advertisement in early 1950 were circulated through 
Canada’s largest urban centers and would be home to few landscapes like the one pictured.399 
Instead, the image depicted how Canadians imagined winter might look; rather than juxtaposing 
old and new technologies, “Snowbound or Skybound” compares an imagined, symbolic 
Canadian winter with one that has been transcended using technological systems made to seem 
especially Canadian. This particular advertisement is also chock-full of numbers: TCA carried 
over 690,000 passengers in 1949, flew over 84,000,000 air-ton miles, a North American airline 
has a take-off or landing every eight seconds, and most TCA flights are completed within 30 
minutes of schedule. According to Bythell, this was a method by which the advertisement 
“attacks the problem [of seasonality] directly, endeavouring to make clear the great 
improvements made in on-time performance and to bolster this with facts.”400 The language 
here—“beliefs,” as they were so often called, could be countered with “facts”—speaks directly 
to TCA’s attempts to divorce the material realities of winter from winter imaginaries. Canadians, 
as I will continue to show in Chapter 4, could remain “winter” people without being perpetually 
beholden to the everyday experience of living in wintertime. Even though “winter” language 
dominated these early “all-weather flying” campaigns, the takeaway was that winter conditions 
did not matter inside TCA’s infrastructure. The North Star had all-weather technological systems 
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that could remove any potential barrier to mobility wintertime conditions were believed to have. 
Yet contradictions were emerging. In the toboggan series, for instance, “Canadian Winters” is 
capitalized, indicating that “winter” and “Canadian Winter” might be two different things. If 
winter no longer had an effect on flying, why did “Snowbound or Skybound,” like the toboggan 
series, have as its final tagline, “TCA knows Canadian winters”?401  
 
Conclusion 
These confusing and even contradictory characterizations of Canadian winters and the 
North Star’s ability to handle them suggest that all-weather flying promotions appeared at a 
moment when two different sorts of winter—regular and Canadian, or perhaps material and 
symbolic—were beginning to separate. The symbols of winter, such as toboggans, hockey teams, 
pastoral landscapes, and red flannels, remained and continued to bolster Canadian postwar 
nationalisms.402 The everyday experiences of winter, however, were much less important to 
TCA’s envirotechnical imaginaries as the airline gradually re-shaped the seasonal rhythms of the 
year and subsequently the everyday Canadian relationship to time. This was not, as I have argued 
throughout, a deliberate choice. TCA’s advertising executives were responding to fluctuations in 
traffic, critiques from passengers and legislators, and themes and trends in advertising more 
generally, but the result was a re-construction of what it meant to live and travel in modern 
Canada. The advertisements discussed in Chapter 1 emphasized a new, modern version of 
Canadian geography and history, and those discussed here did the same thing for Canadian 
seasons, shifting seasonal mobility away from its material realities and towards modern 
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elasticity. Because of when and how it was constructed, the North Star became an ideal 
manifestation of these shifts, complete with a symbolic name, Canadian construction, and 
specialized military-to-civilian transfer technologies. Furthermore, as a state airline working with 
the official advertisers of the federal government of Canada, TCA’s promotions through the early 
1950s reflected a version of Canadian nationhood more-or-less beholden to the public interest. 
TCA was articulating what was essentially the only widespread narrative of aviation, 
environment, and nation, but that narrative was not received as positively as airline executives 
would have liked. The North Star was met with heel-dragging at every step of its development, 
from the choice of manufacturing facility to the decision to build a new airplane in the first place. 
And when it finally made its debut with the Canadian public, passengers were also reticent to 
accept it as the epitome of Canadian engineering prowess due to one major technological failure: 
the North Star was really, really loud. The following chapter will tease out a signal from all that 
noise, using the North Star’s failures as a way to explore the instabilities of TCA’s emerging 













3. North Star Failures and the State 
In the last chapter, I focused on the discursive and rhetorical “work” the North Star was 
designed to do at TCA. Billed as the brightest star in the Canadian heavens and the standard-
bearer for the future of transportation, it was supposed to get Canadians flying and get them 
confident in their state airline. Even when seasonal imbalances in passenger traffic threatened the 
North Star’s success, TCA’s public-facing material mobilized myths of seasonal mobility to 
combat what McGregor called the “fluctuation evil.” TCA self-fashioned as both part of and 
separate from older paradigms of Canadian mobility and used the North Star as a key to this self-
fashioning. However, for all the work TCA and its advertisers put in, these efforts were not 
entirely successful. In this chapter, I argue that the North Star was a failure. Although it 
remained a workhorse at TCA and the RCAF until the 1960s, the North Star did not fulfil its 
imagined role in national self-fashioning, nor was it embraced by passengers as the last word in 
comfort and service.  
Like other transportation industries through the middle decades of the twentieth century, 
TCA sought to make their flying experience smooth, streamlined, and aesthetically modern. As I 
have shown in Chapters 1 and 2, TCA advertisements made a point of reminding passengers that 
they would not feel the speed or altitude, especially with a pressurized cabin, and that the interior 
of the plane was highly modern and extremely comfortable, with all the latest in textiles and 
upholstery. Even the tricycle landing gear meant that passengers did not feel like they were on an 
airplane when on the ground. This was a visual, auditory, and embodied experience; the new 
paint job, for example, was supposed to make the nose of the airplane seem less short and 
stubby, and the italicized letters were supposed to create the illusion of speed. “All that is shiny, 
new, and aerodynamic is brushed with the gleam of aluminum,” Mimi Sheller writes in her work 
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on aluminum and modernity, and “fed into a consumer culture obsessed with modernity and 
visions of a promised future” of speed and mobility.403 In this chapter, I will show how the North 
Star did not live up this promise and defied the aesthetic its architects had worked so hard to 
cultivate. TCA boosters hoped its newest transport would be both a sublime experience of 
comfort and an easily recognizable symbol of Canadian envirotechnical ability, and attempted to 
black-box each of those inside “the great four-engined North Star Skyliner” as both a concept 
and a machine. However, the North Star rattled, droned, sparked, and spat fireballs. It was used 
by Howe’s and TCA’s political opponents as an example of wasteful government spending, and 
images of North Stars in disrepair and disassembly were printed on the front page of national 
newspapers. This made it impossible for TCA to close its black boxes—and even if the airline 
could, the sound of the Merlin engines would carry. 
This chapter will trace two related sets of failures. The first is political. From its 
inception, the choices TCA made in regards to the North Star were questioned by its political 
opponents, especially conservative politicians concerned with government expenditures, state 
enterprise, and Howe’s brand of liberalism. The loudest of these voices was Ontario Premier and 
eventual federal Leader of the Opposition George Drew, who had feuded with Howe for years. 
Drew used the North Star as a way to highlight TCA’s shortcomings as a state airline and what 
he saw as misuse of taxpayer money. Using the conservative newspaper the Globe and Mail, 
which would become increasingly partisan through the 1940s, he argued that TCA catered to the 
personal interests of its board members, took potential business away from Canadian enterprise, 
and purposefully offered subpar aircraft and services to the Canadian people. Drew and Howe 
clashed publicly throughout their respective political careers—Drew was also against the 
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Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, another one of Howe’s pet Crowns—but there were three 
major conflagrations between them involving the North Star and TCA. As Premier of Ontario in 
1944, Drew questioned the choice to build DC-4M aircraft in Cartierville, rather than at an 
already-established aeronautics manufacturing facility near Toronto. Several years later, he 
accused Howe of deliberately limiting immigration to Ontario due to TCA’s uncertain 
involvement in a provincial immigration scheme. Drew ran for Prime Minister as leader of the 
federal Progressive-Conservative party in 1949, and he made the North Star an election issue, 
especially its operational costs and loud, unpopular Merlin engines. If the North Star was a 
symbol of anything in the late 1940s at TCA, it was the airline’s political controversies. 
The North Star also was something of a technological failure. Passengers did not flock to 
it as TCA’s public relations executives hoped they might. Perhaps they were put off by its 
constantly being in the news as a political battleground. Perhaps they really were scared of 
wintertime flying. It was most likely, however, that they simply did not enjoy their trips on board 
the North Star. Those controversial Merlin engines were, by all accounts, a nightmare. Not only 
were they expensive to maintain, but they were extremely loud. In the late 1940s, when airlines 
were still working to make flying seem mundane and comfortable, exceptionally loud engines 
did not assuage new flyers’ fears and became the sort of failure that Edward Jones-Imhotep 
identifies as “a condition that machines experience.” The North Star was not simply a technology 
that did not live up to its potential, as the nineteenth century definition of “failure” suggests, but 
it was a technology that “in specific places, at specific times, in the presence of certain natural 
phenomena...failed to work as intended.”404 That is, North Stars carried plenty of passengers and 
got them safely to their destinations for a decade and a half, but did not fit into the 
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envirotechnical niche that TCA had carved out for them. TCA sought both technological and 
public-relations fixes for the noise, but was unable to quiet the drone of dissatisfaction with its 
newest air transport. The airplane’s inability to serve TCA’s public relations purposes shows the 
obstinacy of the technology itself in systems that are socially constructed. TCA’s attempts to use 
the North Star to represent modern envirotechnical Canadian-ness were met with resistance from 
both human and non-human actors, resulting in a failure to perform as a conduit for TCA’s 
vision of Canadian transportation paradigms. 
This chapter engages with the field of the history of technology concerned with “failure.” A 
recent area of inquiry for scholars interested especially in “big science” and large-scale projects, 
focusing on failure distances us from unproductive hagiographic progress narratives, but also 
prompts us to question the social and technological choices that lead to a technology being 
labeled “success” or “failure.” Can “commercial” successes, for example, such as the North Star, 
still be deemed failures? In his now-classic 1998 historiography of failure, Graeme Gooday 
argues that they can. He suggests that “failure” and “success” are not mutually exclusive and 
failure is subject to the same sort of interpretive flexibility as other social constructions of 
technology. Failure is “a perspectival and often contested attribution”; technological systems can 
be imagined as individual artifacts, ways of knowing, networks, or some combination thereof, 
and therefore failure can be assigned to one or more parts of these imaginaries and not others.405 
Technologies fail for reasons other than the intrinsic characteristics of their component parts and 
failures do not exist as a counterpoint to or prerequisite for success. Problems that may have 
been solvable in one context—Gooday uses the massive investment in time and resources used to 
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deal with the noise and volatility of James Watt’s condensing steam engines—may not be 
solvable in another—twentieth-century aero-diesel engines. There is also a temporal contingency 
to success and failure; despite its initial “success,” the transatlantic telegraph cable laid between 
Ireland and North America in 1858 became a “failure” when it stopped transmitting. It was, 
however, reconstructed as a “success” in the form of a learning experience in literature raising 
funds for a new cable.406 Not all parties who interact with a technological system even need to 
agree on whether or not it has been successful, as Patrick McCray has shown in his study of big 
telescopes.407 This is the perspective from which I am examining the North Star. By tracing two 
types of failures against the “successes” discussed in the previous chapter, the North Star 
emerges as more than a pure symbol of the value of aviation to modern Canada or representative 
of Canadian engineering ability and wintertime mobility. It instead becomes a “real” machine, 
subject to unreliability, breakdown, controversy, and criticism, and defying all attempts to be 
black-boxed. Furthermore, the North Star’s failure to perform also helped Canadians reckon with 
postwar debates about the liberal state, partisan media, and the role of the government in 
supporting technological enterprise.  
 
Political Failures I: North Stars and Provincial-Federal Relations, 1944-1948 
The first way in which the North Star was a failure was in its unintended role as a 
political lightning rod. TCA developed its own rhetoric of triumph over nature, new 
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technological systems, and unparalleled comfort in its public-facing material, but North Star 
discourse also was shaped by federal politics, electoral campaigns, and personal feuds. As 
mentioned in the last chapter, the North Star’s carefully crafted exciting newness was tempered 
by a long string of political controversies, essentially all of which were instigated by Premier of 
Ontario and later federal Leader of the Opposition George Drew. A lawyer and military colonel 
who had served in the first World War, Drew was active in municipal politics in southern 
Ontario in the 1920s before beginning his career in provincial politics in the following decade as 
leader of the Ontario Conservatives. By the time we won his second term as Premier in 1945, he 
had hung his hat on strong anti-Communist sentiment and used Ontario as what historian Penny 
Bryden calls a “pulpit” to affect national policy.408 Bryden argues that Drew, leading what would 
eventually come to be known as the “Big Blue Machine” (blue being the color of conservatism in 
Canada in contrast to Liberal “red”) designed provincial policy as an alternative to federal 
legislation. He also fought against the centralization of power by the federal government, 
especially over taxation, pensions, and labor, and attempted to ensure that the shape of postwar 
Canada would be influenced by intergovernmental discussion. This contest was not easily won; 
intergovernmental reconstruction talks were marred by “delay, obfuscation, blame casting, and 
general confusion.” Drew and Prime Minister Mackenzie King were cast as enemies by late 
1945, and Drew’s interests turned “distinctly provincial.”409 
What would eventually become known as the North Star provided the scaffolding for a 
half-decade of this public feuding between Drew and Liberal Ottawa, which continued even after 
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he made the move from provincial to federal politics in 1948. Because of Howe’s role as 
Minister of Munitions and Supply (which was changed to Reconstruction in late 1944), and his 
keeping TCA in his portfolio from his Ministry of Transport days, he was Drew’s prime target. 
In the spring of 1944, Drew claimed in the Ontario legislature—and subsequently on the front 
page of the nationally-circulated and increasingly conservative Globe and Mail—that Howe had 
initially promised the DC-4 contract to Victory Aircraft in Malton, but offered it to Canadian 
Vickers in Montreal at the last minute.410 At the time, Victory Aircraft was responsible for 
building Avro Lancaster heavy bombers, which, according to Drew, had a similar four-engined 
configuration but were faster, had a longer range, and were therefore better than the DC-4. This 
made Victory Aircraft the natural choice to build air transports in peacetime instead of putting 
the 9,000 employees out of work when the bomber contracts dried up.411 These critiques were 
only a small part of what an industry magazine called “considerable discussion in Canadian 
political circles on the choice of DC-4.”412 Conservative politicians in federal Parliament 
questioned, as Drew did, why the DC-4 was a better choice for Canada’s postwar needs than the 
modified Lancasters that TCA was then using for its transatlantic crossings. They generally cited 
cost and time, as modifying an existing aircraft would be faster and cheaper than building a new 
one from scratch, and also saw it as an overreach of state power by artificially throttling new 
aeronautics research. One MP called the DC-4 “obsolete” and suggested that “the government 
will waste a lot of money” in developing it that could be better spent fostering Canadian 
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aeronautical science, especially new engine development.413 As no facilities in Canada were 
building new aircraft engines, the government buying Merlins from Britain was taken to mean 
that the state was stifling aeronautical innovation in Canada. 
However, Drew took his attacks even further and suggested that the decision to build the 
DC-4 at Canadian Vickers might have been because Symington, then president of the airline, 
was “personally associated” with a securities firm that financed the plant, which Drew was quick 
to point out was not majority-owned by Canadians or Brits.414 Howe’s response in Parliament 
two days later was that Drew was grasping at straws by connecting Symington and Vickers and 
that Malton was never really an option for the DC-4 because it was building Lancasters, “the 
airplane that now has the highest priority in Canadian production.” This was not enough for 
conservative critics who called his “attack” on Drew “unprovoked” or for the Globe and Mail 
editors who wrote that Howe still “left a great deal to be explained.”415 Even before everyday 
Canadians could fly on TCA’s newest transports, they were already being unfavorably compared 
to older aircraft. Furthermore, despite emphasizing the Canadian-ness of the “compromise” 
between American fuselages and British engines, questions about the ownership of Canadair and 
the plant itself, both of which were purchased by an American company in 1946, actually 
detracted from the all-Canadian narrative TCA had worked so deliberately to build.416 
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Drew’s critiques of TCA and its North Stars also emerged in the context of postwar 
immigration. Drew had spearheaded what became known as the “Ontario Air Immigration Plan,” 
in which 7,000 immigrants from the British Isles were to be brought to the province by air. In 
spring 1947, Howe claimed that there would be enough TCA North Stars ready to transport the 
immigrants, but by midsummer it was clear that they would not be available in sufficient 
numbers. Subsequently, Ontario contracted California-based Transocean Air Lines “for the one 
very simple reason that it was the only air system at that time which was in a position to furnish 
us with machines to begin immediately with the plan,” Drew told the Ontario legislature in 
October, with the assumption that TCA would supplement Transocean with North Stars as they 
were ready.417 By that time, TCA was operating just under 30 per cent of the immigration flights. 
By most accounts the initiative was a rousing success. A correspondent for British Flight 
magazine followed the journey of a potential air immigrant and had nothing but praise for the 
Transocean aircraft—with a reminder that “Trans-Canada haven’t the necessary equipment to 
spare at the moment”—the delicious meals served at stopover points in Shannon, Ireland and 
Gander, Newfoundland, and how quickly immigrants found work in Canada, sometimes within 
36 hours of landing.418 The first load of immigrants arrived to much fanfare, including Scottish 
pipes and drums, in August 1947, and the last of the planned 7,000 arrived on March 14, 1948. 
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 The real friction between Drew and Howe on this matter began almost immediately after 
the last Brit stepped off the plane. Drew planned to extend the scheme, but Howe changed the 
terms. Because Transocean was not affiliated with the government, there were very strict limits 
on how, when, and were it could access Canadian airports. Because TCA did not have enough 
North Stars during the 1947 iteration of the plan, Transocean’s airliners would fly into Malton 
using Shannon and Gander as refuelling stops, but would then have to fly empty to New York for 
maintenance for the return trip. By the following Spring, however, TCA had enough North Stars 
to take most of the burden off of Transocean, and therefore did not renew the charter contract 
between the two airlines, effective April 15. Transocean, which still flew new immigrants across 
the Atlantic, could no longer land in Canada and any new arrivals would have to enter through 
the United States. Drew told the Ontario legislature that this was done “without satisfactory 
explanation of any kind,” and interpreted it as a slight against the government of Ontario and a 
sign that TCA was failing Canada. Because Howe “summarily cancelled” the contract, Drew 
claimed, the whole scheme had been thrown into disarray; potential immigrants were confused, 
ticketing agents did not know if they should continue booking new flights through April, and, of 
course, Ontario’s communities would suffer for lack of new Brits.419 Howe’s preventing 
Transocean from landing in Canada was an “arbitrary decision,” Drew claimed in a March 1948 
press conference, setting off a chain of “events which threaten to destroy the confidence we have 
built up” in air immigration and Canada’s role in world aviation.420  
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Inside his larger critique of Howe’s “colossal blunder,” Drew focused his attention on the 
North Star. Delays in production, the initial sharing of the RCAF’s models, and the fact that 
other world airlines were getting along with unmodified DC-4s just fine kept the North Star in 
Drew’s crosshairs throughout this ordeal. This was largely because Transocean was one of those 
airlines using DC-4s; if thousands of new immigrants could come to Canada on regular DC-4s, 
was it worth spending all this time and money on the North Star? Howe not only had to defend 
his legislative decision to end the successful charter contract with Transocean, but also defend 
the North Star itself. He did so by reminding Parliament and the press that Drew had a long 
history of acting as TCA’s “Monday morning quarterback,” criticizing every one of the airline’s 
decisions from the outside and after the fact.421 Howe also emphatically referred to Transocean’s 
DC-4s (and un-modified DC-4s in general), as “substandard.” In an attempt to discredit Howe 
and his aeronautical expertise, the Globe and Mail twisted this claim in a March 31 editorial 
accusing him of “hurl[ing] the first stone” against Drew by blocking his immigration scheme 
because of Transocean’s uses of “substandard” DC-4s: 
“Unlike the Minister we are not aeronautical experts. But we would point out what all air-
minded persons know—Douglas DC4 planes...form a large part of the operational 
equipment of major [American] airlines...It was to keep Canada’s nationally-owned air 
lines in the running that Mr. Howe persuaded the Government to undertake the North 
Star venture. For this purpose he decided early in 1944 to adapt the DC4 (which he now 
calls substandard) to this purpose, modifying it to accommodate the British Rolls-Royce 
engines...This being so why did Mr. Howe take so long to rescue the Ontario Government 
and the immigrants from the risks of ‘substandard’ equipment?” 422 
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In Drew’s critiques, the North Star was both obsolete because it was just a fancy DC-4 and 
overdeveloped because the rest of the world was getting along just fine without TCA’s expensive 
and time-consuming modifications. “North Star” as a discrete flying machine specially designed 
for Canadian conditions using Canadian expertise burst out of the black box TCA had designed 
for it using public-facing material such as John Fisher’s “Canadian compromise” reports. In early 
April an exasperated Canadair President Oliver West told the Montreal Gazette that the claims 
that “North Stars are just DC-4s,” and were therefore “substandard and ...outmoded,” were not 
only false but “derogatory to Canadair Limited and to the aircraft it is producing and 
promoting.”423 Producing and promoting is key here; critiques of the airplanes still in 
production—the pressurized M2s had not yet made their debut at TCA—meant that everyday 
Canadians might meet their first postwar airliner with prejudice. It also meant that the airplane 
was being judged by politicians who had not yet ridden on it in front of a public that had also not 
yet ridden on it, emphasizing the value of the aircraft to symbolic expressions of Canadian-ness. 
 
Political Failures II: Partisan Media and the 1949 Federal Election 
Drew remained mostly silent on the subject of North Stars for almost a year after Howe 
put the brakes on his immigration scheme, bringing it back into the public discourse as part of 
the 1949 federal election. It was Drew’s first run at Prime Minister—he had been elected to the 
House of Commons in 1948—and his focus on the North Star as an agent of federal-provincial 
relations when he was at Queen’s Park meant that the airplane was primed to be part of his 
campaign. Drew ran for Prime Minister on a platform on the now “stale Communist issue” which 
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had helped carry him to victory in Ontario, as well as favoring provincial-federal cooperation 
over centralization.424 These, of course, were linked; the “creeping socialism” of the past 15 
years of Liberal rule had seen the founding of all sorts of Crown corporations such as TCA and 
the CBC, which Drew called “abuses of capitalism.”425 Given this, the North Star seemed like 
the perfect state project for Drew to use as a case study on government mismanagement. This 
section will explore why and how the North Star became a federal election issue fueled by 
political and media actors in the form of hyper-partisan competing Toronto newspapers. 
Canadian elections have notoriously short campaign periods, especially compared to the 
contemporary United States, and therefore this story mainly takes place between the dissolution 
of Parliament over the Easter weekend in mid-April 1949 and the election ten weeks later. Using 
the Globe and Mail as his campaign mouthpiece, Drew approached the North Star from several 
angles. First, he focused on Minister of Defence Brooke Claxton, who he considered responsible 
for the military applications of the North Star. Although the military North Stars are not my 
primary focus here, I mention them briefly because the North Star was essentially custom-built 
for the government; faults in the plane therefore represented faults in state-sanctioned collective 
visions of Canadian aviation. In a debate in the House of Commons in early April about what 
Drew called the “pitifully inadequate” state of the Royal Canadian Air Force, he accused the 
government of “hiding its failure” by squirreling away military North Stars in storage facilities to 
rot. This was an especially dire issue, he claimed, because the inadequacy of the North Stars had 
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prevented Canada from taking part in the Berlin airlift.426 As a response to Claxton’s categorial 
denial of a warehouse full of “inhibited” North Stars, the Globe and Mail found it two days later. 
At Downsview, aviation reporter James Hornick wrote, was a warehouse with a “dusty floor,” 
“mothballs,” and most importantly “$4,000,000 of public funds”: North Stars in various states of 
disrepair strewn about and outside the facility, where they were at the mercy of the elements.427 
The article was accompanied by an impressive four images, which Drew used in Parliament that 
day as proof that Claxton had been deliberately deceiving the House. Claxton’s explanation was 
that it was a reserve hangar and that his vehement denial of the warehouse was only because of 
the “vehemence expressed by the leader of the Opposition,” but that did not satisfy Drew, who 
continually called for Claxton’s resignation through the campaign period.428  
By matching Drew’s tone and drawing attention once again to the North Stars, Claxton 
opened the door for a new debate about why Canada was using North Stars in the first place. 
Once Parliament was dissolved and an election loomed on the horizon, Drew revived his 
concerns about Canadair, its ownership by the American company Electric Boat, and its 
relationship to the government, TCA, and Howe. By the end of April, Drew had pivoted this into 
a full-blown branch of his election platform, echoing his interests as Premier of Ontario. Even 
the sympathetic Globe and Mail pointed out that that this was relatively opportunistic; Drew and 
Howe had had “intermittent skirmishes” about the North Star for years, but the two “gladiators” 
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had only infrequently crossed swords since Drew was elected to federal office.429 On his first 
campaign tour in the last week of April, Drew proved that his “pre-Easter attack was no flash in 
the pan” by again calling for Claxton’s resignation and challenging Howe to defend the Canadair 
arrangement and the choice to build North Stars in general.430 These attacks took on a new fervor 
mid-May, when the Globe and Mail discovered—by some accounts manufactured—a TCA plan 
to phase out and replace the Merlin engines after the election due to widespread failures. Globe 
and Mail newspaper reporters dug up a variety of “allegations,” “secret” reports, and engineers 
afraid to speak out for fear of losing their jobs to support this, and Drew pointed out in 
Parliament that he himself had the “common experience” of flying on a TCA North Star that had 
been delayed because of engine repairs.431 By the eve of the June 27 election, Drew had 
combined these concerns; because of their shoddy engines, he argued, North Stars were a poor 
choice for TCA, the RCAF, and Canada, and if Howe and Claxton would stop evading the issue 
and reveal the full details of the “Canadair deal,” he could get to the bottom of this rampant 
misuse of taxpayer funds. 
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These assorted North Star-related issues created a “situation which is of...vital concern to 
every Canadian taxpayer,” Drew told a campaign audience in Saskatchewan.432 But was it 
really? Not only had relatively few Canadians actually flown on North Stars—political reporter 
Tom Van Dusen wrote in his 1998 memoirs that “the number of Canadians who had flown on 
the aircraft could hardly fill a hall, much less carry an election”—but Drew’s main political 
opponent, newly elected Liberal leader Louis St. Laurent, infrequently discussed airplanes in his 
speeches.433 Despite St. Laurent’s penchant for flying, I can only find one instance of his 
comments on the North Star in reports of his campaign: that he had flown to the UK in late 1948 
and “did not have one moment’s anxiety about flying both ways in a North Star.”434 The burden 
of defending TCA and the North Star generally fell to Howe, who dwarfed St. Laurent in 
parliamentary experience and acted as his “heavy artillery.”435 By mid-June, Howe had zeroed in 
on what was becoming as much of a campaign issue as North Star safety: the partisan slant of the 
Globe and Mail, at the time (and today) among Canada’s most-read newspapers. He accused “the 
two Georges,” Drew and Globe and Mail editor McCullagh, of carrying on a “fully unfounded” 
and “sinister” campaign against the Canadian aircraft industry in a campaign speech.436 
McCullagh had been “the king of the Toronto newspaper world” since he had overseen the 
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merger of the Globe and Mail and Empire in 1936.437 McCullagh had been teamed up with Drew 
since the war, when the latter used the former’s platform to oppose Mackenzie King’s national 
policies. Once elected Premier, Drew allegedly only granted interviews and access to 
McCullagh-owned news media, shutting out the increasingly left-leaning Toronto Star.438 By the 
time Drew made the transition to national politics, McCullagh had purchased another Toronto 
newspaper—the Evening Telegram—and a battle of the Toronto newspapers was underway.  
The 1949 election represented a particularly high (or low) point in this battle; these 
Toronto newspapers, as well as to a lesser extent other newspapers in major cities such as the 
Winnipeg Free Press, provided biased coverage that went well beyond the “acceptable 
journalism” of general editorial slant.439 By this time, McCullagh’s two newspapers had a 
combined total circulation of over 400,000, approximately 50,000 more than the Star, and the 
Globe and Mail in particular had a significant readership outside Toronto, which meant that the 
whole of Canada was watching.440 By the end of the campaign, media historian Allan Levine 
argues, the “facts [had] been so distorted” that the newspapers resorted to going after each other. 
For example, the Star’s weekly edition was exempt from certain taxes on newsprint because it 
was classified as a magazine, which the Telegram reported on as a Liberal payoff in exchange 
for favorable reporting.441 
The North Star was only one small part of this larger picture of partisanship and the 
postwar media landscape, but it was still a part. First, it is an excellent case study of Toronto’s 
competing newspapers. While the Globe and Mail was accusing Howe of hiding secret North 
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Star deals and covering up TCA’s reports of engine failures, the Toronto Star came out with 
headlines such as “Pilots of North Star Laugh at Drew [’s] Charge [that the] Plane is Not 
Efficient” and brought out its own experts such as BOAC Chairman Whitney Straight, who 
claimed that “the North Star is an absolutely first-class and economical aircraft in every way.” 442 
Straight and McGregor corresponded frequently throughout the spring of 1949, and just before 
the election McGregor told him that “as a Canadian I feel it necessary to apologize for the fact 
that efforts were made to embroil you in the controversy. It is bad enough to have one 
government to contend with, as you and I well know!”443  
Second, it is exceptional because of its longevity in the press. Because of Drew’s early 
rabble-rousing about the North Star’s construction and its use in the Ontario Air Immigration 
scheme, Toronto’s (and Canada’s) media scene had been pitting Liberal-Conservative and 
federal-provincial approaches to aviation, industry, and the state against one another for years. At 
this point, however, the major players were growing tired of the fight. An increasingly frustrated 
West, still president of Canadair, accused a Globe and Mail reporter of conspiring with Drew “to 
destroy a perfectly good airplane for political purposes.” “I’m getting damned sick and tired of 
all this distortion,” he allegedly told the reporter. “I’ve been very patient up to now, but I can’t 
take much more of it.”444 An editor at the less partisan (although loyal to St. Laurent) Ottawa 
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Citizen wondered if “the merits of an aircraft engine have provided an election issue before,” 
because usually “the average person will bog down quickly” if faced with technical details: 
“Mr. Drew’s attack on the North Star fleet of Trans-Canada Airlines in the dying days of 
the recent session of Parliament has its echoes in the campaign now raging. This may 
mean an unusual interest on the part of the Canadian public in aeronautical engineering, a 
sign of air-mindedness. Or it may mean that...there is a scarcity of significant issues.”445 
 
Underhanded comments about the blandness of Canadian politics aside, this proves that on the 
national political stage, “North Star” had become a buzzword for a political controversy rather 
than the airplane itself. The special Canadian air-mindedness that TCA cultivated to get its 
potential passengers flying folded in on itself and became something of a negative; because they 
were so air-minded, Canadians might be more likely to dissect the choices made by their state 
airline, or they might be experiencing North Star fatigue that inured them to TCA’s advertising 
discourse. Technological, discursive, and political decisions were connected, since not only were 
Howe and Claxton held personally accountable for the North Star’s engine failures, but Howe 
complained loudly and often that keeping the North Star in the news had caused the airline to 
lose business.446 For some time too after the election, which Drew lost, he became associated 
with anti-North Star sentiment. For example, after a long speech in Parliament in late 1949 in 
which Drew argued that the CBC and state-funded National Film Board were propaganda 
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machines, a Liberal MP dismissed him by interjecting: “talk about North Stars; you know more 
about them.”447  
In this context, the North Star was a mixed blessing for TCA. Its constantly being in the 
news certainly helped name recognition but it did not reflect particularly well on the aircraft 
itself. The North Star’s alleged technological problems were magnified on the national stage and 
its military and civilian applications were conflated. Even though Drew and the Globe and 
Mail’s attacks were relatively transparent and easy to deflect—“rarely was a smear campaign so 
ill conceived,” Milberry writes in his biography of the North Star—it still meant that Howe and 
McGregor had to constantly defend TCA in the public sphere.448 The North Star, therefore, was a 
political failure. It did not reflect a state endorsement of nature, technology, and nation because 
the “state” did not unequivocally accept it. It also did not have the same symbolic longevity that 
other airliners, or even other Canadian-built airplanes have had in the public air travel memory. 
This may be because there were fewer North Stars in the air than, say, DC-3s or Boeing 747s, 
but they simply did not capture the public’s imagination in the way that bush planes such as the 
De Havilland Canada Beaver or fighters such as the Avro CF-105 Arrow did. McCray suggests 
that whether or not a technology is remembered—by users, by the industry, in popular or 
scientific culture—is one of the factors in determining “success” and “failure,” and by this 
analytic, the North Star certainly failed.449 There is only one extant North Star, a military version 
currently under restoration by a non-profit called “Project North Star” at the Canada Aviation 
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and Space Museum in Ottawa, and when the Vancouver International Airport blog featured the 
North Star as their “Airplane of the Month” in 2016, there was only one reader comment: 
“wonderful but noisy aircraft.”450 
 
Technological Failures 
The other perspective from which the North Star was a failure was in its passenger 
experience. Passengers complained about two major aspects of North Star service: the food, 
which was too hot, too cold, too salty, too bland, and served too early, too late, and in too small 
or too big of a portion, and the noise. Aside from being what McGregor diplomatically called “a 
racehorse called upon to pull a heavy cart” in his memoirs, the Merlins were extremely loud.451 
Not only were there four of them on the North Star, a number rarely seen on military aircraft 
excepting the famous Lancaster bombers, but military personnel usually wore sound-muffling 
communications headphones. Furthermore, the exhaust stacks pointed inwards, focusing the 
noise in the direction of the fuselage. This arrangement had the added detriment of showing 
passengers the exhaust flame, a fiery burst that was normal on engine start-up but proved 
alarming to passengers who were already wary of air travel. A regular transcontinental flight that 
had a stopover in Winnipeg at dusk was a special problem, since the bright orange flame was 
only visible in the dark; after its half-hour stop, during which many transcontinental passengers 
would remain on board, “it would then start up, taxi out, and take off at full throttle, with all four 
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engines apparently enveloped in flame.”452 These failures were seen by passengers as 
technological and considered faults with both TCA’s service and the North Star itself. 
What technological noise meant had changed over the course of the twentieth century. At 
once a symbol of civilization advancing through industry and a source of anxiety and 
neurasthenia, the noises made by technologies came to be a defining feature of modern life. 
“New kinds of noises began to offend” in industrializing cities, argues historian Emily 
Thompson, and by mid-century, “urban dwellers were forced to retreat into private solutions to 
the problem of noise.”453 Personal automobiles, for example, were produced in the closed 
“sedan” type in large numbers in North America and Europe by the 1930s and were 
accompanied by new use patterns and a “new sonic ideal for the car: that of ‘silence.’”454 
Mechanical silence was connected not only to the comfort of the driver and their trust in the 
automobile, but also “a new landmark in engineering excellence.”455 That is, quiet cars were 
trustworthy, efficient, reliable, and exceptionally modern cars.  
Noise had been a problem on the North Star from the start. In a very early test flight with 
a handful of CNR personnel on board including Chief Medical Officer Kenneth Dowd, nearly 
everyone considered the plane “too noisy.”456 In these early stages, TCA and Canadair had a 
clause in their contract that they would take joint responsibility for engine noise reduction, but 
this detail disappeared after Electric Boat took over in late 1946. Canadair officials decided the 
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blame lay exclusively with Rolls-Royce.457 It was also always delicately addressed by TCA 
executives in their public-facing addresses; in an election-season press conference defending 
Howe, McGregor pointed out that instead of the crippling engine failures that Drew and the 
Globe and Mail had been citing, the most pressing problem with the North Star was that it “has a 
higher noise level than we think desirable.”458 These problems gave the aircraft the unfortunate 
nickname of “Noisy Stars” and kept the already-problematic Merlin engines at the forefront of 
TCA’s public discourse. Even though the Montreal Star reported in an anti-Drew, pro-North Star 
editorial that “the question of noise is relatively unimportant,” passengers complained constantly 
about the noise.459 “The noise is practically deafening,” claimed MP Gordon Higgins in the 
middle of an unrelated parliamentary debate on the federal budget. He hoped that eventually the 
“flaming exhausts would not be stuck up in the passengers’ faces.” Higgins spoke “in the spirit 
merely of constructive criticism,” but other passengers were not so cordial.460 Their critiques 
ranged from curt—“less noise, less noise, less noise”—to irate: “Shall I complain? I shall. These 
goddam model ‘T’ engines you use are just dandy for passenger comfort and conversation. Have 
you heard of the newer arrangements[?]”461 One even wrote to TCA to say that they had chosen 
to fly with another airline for their return trip to get away from the noise. For the most part, any 
“constructive criticism” left by passengers on their comment cards was in the form of 
technological fixes for the noise. Some hinted at TCA’s eventual solution in the form of the 
crossover exhausts to be discussed below with suggestions such as redesigning the “exhaust 
                                               
457 Milberry, The Canadair North Star, 53. 
458 Canadian Press, “G. R. McGregor, President of Trans-Canada Air Lines...” The Globe and 
Mail, 9 April 1949, 3. 
459 “Attack on the North Star,” Montreal Daily Star, May 17, 1949. 
460 Canada, House of Commons Debates, April 29, 1952 (Gordon Higgins), 
http://parl.canadiana.ca/view/oop.debates_HOC2106_02/568?r=0&s=1. 
461 “What Others Think of Us: Model ‘A’s’ Soon,” Between Ourselves, May 1953, 8. 
 
 171 
manifolds” to “terminate below the wing,” a minor sacrifice in power that would nevertheless 
“give passengers the measure of cabin quietness they are entitled to.”462 Many ideas were more 
fanciful than that, such as individual earplugs through which personalized music could be played 
and the suggestion that the airline “increase wing span to one mile [and] install engines at wing 
tips and pad with cotton wool to subdue this hellish racket.”463  
Drew also zeroed in on the “psychological hazards” of the Merlin in his critiques of the 
North Star’s appropriateness for TCA and Canada.464 In a heated press conference in early April 
1949, he announced that “this type of motor was designed for military and not commercial 
flights” and was therefore an unsuitable choice. Not only were they subject to long warm-up 
times and frequent repairs, but the North Star’s Merlins “caused too much vibration and loosened 
connections, wires, and equipment,” and “the high speed at which they run made it too noisy for 
the comfort of passengers.” This was part of his larger demand that Ottawa created a special 
investigative committee into government spending—a committee of which he would be a 
member, of course—and made clear that he would use his influence there to interrogate Claxton 
especially about this issue.465 He brought up engines so frequently and so stridently in Parliament 
through April 1949 that George McIlraith, Howe’s Parliamentary Assistant who would become 
Minister of Transport in the 1960s, glibly asked “Do you want to sell Pratt and Whitney [an 
American competitor to Rolls-Royce] engines? Is that it?”466 The Merlins were all that anyone 
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was talking about, from federal politicians in nationally-circulated newspapers to everyday 
passengers seeking a comfortable ride. TCA was losing control of its carefully crafted narrative 
of technology, mobility, and Canadian-ness because of an unpopular aircraft engine. 
 
Technological Solutions 
This “slight defect” in the North Star’s design, as Bothwell, Drummond, and English 
called it in their work on Canada’s postwar politics, was a sign to passengers, politicians, and 
other “perceptive observers” that “Canada had not quite reached technological maturity.” As the 
North Star “lumbered across Canadian skies,” it was not a beacon of guiding light for the future 
of Canadian transportation, nor was it proof positive of Canada’s natural affinity for air travel.467 
Instead, every rattle, every reciprocating part, and every decibel was a blemish on the image of 
postwar Canadian envirotechnicality that TCA and its supporters were trying to build. In her 
history of public problems of noise, Karin Bijsterveld argues that it was this sort of expansion of 
scale that made engine noise—in cars, jets, or trains—difficult to quantify and control. Noise 
was seen as a symbol of “inefficiently working machines [and]...something that might threaten 
progress,” especially as various noisy machines were becoming part of everyday lifeways.468 
Passengers placed responsibility for North Star noise abatement on TCA—turning what might be 
considered a mechanical failure into a service one—and it was therefore of an utmost importance 
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to remedy the Merlin’s noise problem through some combination of technological fixes and 
pointed advertising campaigns. 
There is evidence that the Engineering department at TCA began working on noise-
dampening solutions almost immediately. The solution that the airline eventually implemented 
was designed by the ironically-named Merlin McLeod, who had been with TCA since 1937.469 
“Mac,” as he was known, led the “Job Methods and Development” group inside the Engineering 
department and had been responsible for a number of other aircraft modifications through the 
1930s and 1940s, including a system to test radio tubes and a cowling that regulated engine 
temperature. The June 1952 issue of Between Ourselves featured a fawning six-page profile of 
MacLeod as well as a cover image of him standing in front of a North Star with modified 
engines—an honor usually reserved for pretty stewardesses or eye-catching cartoons. It is worth 
examining the profile for a moment, as it covers every one of the basic tropes of Canadian 
aviation nationalism. “When ‘Mac’ was born in 1896 the machine age was just dawning,” the 
profile claims. After a youth spent building “ingenious gadgets” and “modifying—and driving—
souped-up racing cars,” he settled down with his young wife and “turned his eyes northward to 
the adventurous life offered by the rugged terrain ringing the Arctic Circle.” As all great 
Canadian aviation innovators apparently do, he found his true calling as a flight engineer for 
Canadian Airways when it was still mostly a bush flying operation. This was, the profile says, “a 
period when the sky over Canada was being conquered by the bush pilot. It was a hardy, lusty 
era...When tales are told—and whether tall or true—‘Mac’ MacLeod’s name is usually linked 
with some aspect of the adventure.” The profile describes a number of “legends” from 
                                               




MacLeod’s bush flying days, such as an instance of improvised bush surgery (which explains 
why he had a limp), and a repair that involved carving a propeller out of a tree “or in some 
versions of the tale, out of a fence post.” MacLeod appeared to have the all-Canadian aviation 
origin story, which made him uniquely attuned to the major problem facing early airlines in 
Canada: “taking the adventure out of air travel and replacing thrills with a high standard of 
reliability and comfort.” Although it does not say so explicitly, this profile suggested that 
MacLeod was the perfect representative for the North Star and its engines, which in turn were 
meant to be representative of Canadian air-mindedness and modern envirotechnicality. Because 
of his adventures in the bush, MacLeod knew flying, knew Canadian conditions, and therefore 
knew how to engineer solutions that fit this national style. In fact, although ostensibly about 
MacLeod’s contributions to the new cross-over system designed to decrease noise, the 
description of the system is relegated to the last page of the newsletter.470  
The mechanism itself was quite simple: a flexible manifold that directed both sets of 
exhaust outlets towards the outboard side of the engines and would therefore dump the gases and 
noise away from the fuselage into the slipstream. However, the heat and pressure from the 
combined output caused early iterations of the system to break down as the charged gases 
slammed against the walls of the manifold. MacLeod and his team moved the exhaust dump to 
where the two streams of gas converged, reducing stress on the system while still releasing the 
exhaust away from passengers. This redirection reduced noise by approximately 50 per cent: six 
decibels overall and speech frequency levels by about 15 decibels. This meant that the North Star 
was only slightly quieter, but the noise it did produce was at a lower frequency, which was 
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deemed more comfortable for passengers. Once it was determined that the MacLeod system did 
not hamper engine thrust, it was slowly implemented on TCA’s North Stars and by the end of 
1953 TCA’s entire fleet was equipped with MacLeod’s cross-over exhausts.471 
Although TCA had been teasing noise reduction systems for years, MacLeod’s cross-over 
exhausts were officially announced at a demonstration flight and press conference by Director of 
Engineering Jack Dyment in mid-April 1952. Unfortunately for Dyment, the reduction was not 
the “vast improvement” TCA had expected, and he had to shout to be heard above the din of the 
engines. In an interview with Milberry, test pilot Ron Baker remembers that he flew with as little 
speed and power as possible at that demonstration “to keep the noise to a minimum, bearing in 
mind that the press had already made up its mind that the flight would be noisy.”472 Of course, it 
depended on the press. The Montreal Gazette’s coverage of the event featured a cartoon of an 
anthropomorphized North Star sleeping and the lede that “the lion’s roar has been tamed 
and...now a contented purr will lullaby passengers.”473 The Globe and Mail was still owned by 
McCullagh and led their coverage of the demonstration with the following: 
“Trans-Canada Air Lines today demonstrated its ‘noiseless’ North Star, the result of three 
years’ research and nearly $3,500,000 in public money. 
 
It was noisy.”474 
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It really was. Passengers might not even have noticed the difference—clearly the media weren’t 
terribly impressed—and so TCA had to work to show that their engineers had come up with a 
solution that was not a waste of taxpayer money and had produced tangible results. In order to 
remind passengers flying on the new North Stars how much the noise had been reduced, for 
example, they were handed a small informational card as they boarded. Designed in partnership 
with the Engineering department 
and kept “factual” on purpose “in 
order to inform the recipients...of 
the reduced noise level [and] how 
it is accomplished,” the cards were 
designed to prime the flying public 
for a quieter flight.475 They 
showed a close-up of a Merlin 
engine with a red arrow directing 
the flow of exhaust over the 
cowling towards the outside of the 
wing and explained how “TCA’s 
successful solution takes the gases 
from the ‘fuselage-side’ row of 
cylinders, and dumps them into the 
slipstream away from the 
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passenger.”476 The “50%” noise reduction claim was repeated alongside the claim that engine 
power and efficiency had not been reduced, which gave TCA advertisers the difficult task of 
publicizing a barely discernable lack of noise.  
The subtlety required to sell something so imperceptible is obvious in the newspaper 
advertisement developed to announce the new system in March 1954 (Figure 8) which was 
dominated by white space to give a feeling of serenity. The top of the ad showed the now-iconic 
four-engined image of the North Star, with the word “s-h-h-h” appearing to come from its 
exhaust manifolds. Below, a stewardess holds her finger to her lips and shares information about 
the “added measure of restful comfort” now available on North Stars.477 The copy is almost 
identical to that printed on the informational cards the previous winter, but the “unusual layout,” 
as McGee called it, made the “highly technical” subject palatable by “dramatizing our message.” 
Most importantly, McGee claimed in a memo, “the final result is not only eye-catching, but does 
a good job of making a negative subject seem positive.”478 Neither the advertising campaign nor 
the cross-over system were perfect solutions; the North Stars were still loud compared to other 
aircraft. One passenger flying in a plane with the new exhausts in 1953 still called it a “boiler 
factory” and suggested that even “second hand units from Lower Slobovia” would be more 
comfortable, but in general the response was positive.479 The noise was audibly lower and 
pointing the exhausts away from the cabin also reduced the need for stewardesses to calm 
passengers convinced the engines were on fire. I have found a small handful of passenger 
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comments relaying their relief that the noise level in the cabin no longer created what one 
passenger called “noise fatigue.”480 Another was pleasantly surprised that “for the first time in 
seven flights in these aircraft I arrived in Winnipeg relatively refreshed.”481 “Relatively 
refreshed” might seem like faint praise, but it reflected that TCA had more-or-less regained 
control over their constructions of the North Star and its place inside the Canadian travel 
imaginary in the half-decade since it and its engines had become political tools. 
 
Conclusion  
By then, however, it was a case of too little, too late. By the time the fleet was fully 
equipped with cross-over exhausts, TCA’s next new airplane was already on the horizon: the 
turboprop Vickers Viscount. The Viscount arrived at TCA with what Globe and Mail aviation 
reporter James Hornick called a “metallic whine” in late 1954.482 Its industry-leading quietness, 
which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, was a far cry from the “Noisy Stars.” With 
the hindsight of history, writes aviation historian Peter Pigott, “it was clear that the North Star 
was a stable aircraft with the wrong engines,” the main benefit of which was getting “TCA out of 
its Lancaster bombers on the Atlantic service.”483 Without the North Star, he argues, the airline 
would have been stuck either purchasing older aircraft that would not have made the transatlantic 
crossing, or waiting to develop an entirely new design, putting the it at a financial disadvantage. 
Because of this right airplane/wrong engine pairing and associated public scrutiny, airline 
officials felt pressured to justify the choices they made in developing the North Star. Pigott 
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suggests that because of these concerns, “time and again, the airline’s press office pointed out 
that the North Star had not been ‘foisted’ on TCA.”484 In a TCA press release on the North Star’s 
first unveiling in 1946, for instance, “exhaustive investigations” were necessary to choose the 
engines “that have become household words for ‘tops in combat.’”485 They were not, however, 
tops for transport. Not only did the political currency TCA public relations officials expected 
from the Merlin’s wartime service fail to deliver, but due to the noise, vibration, and fireballs, it 
did not deliver on performance either. The Merlin’s performance on the North Star, the North 
Star’s performance at TCA, and TCA’s performance as a state enterprise and public service were 
interlocking concerns for parliamentarians and everyday passengers.  
Because of its technological and political obstinacy, I have argued here that the North 
Star was a failure. Although it was in service at TCA and the RCAF until the 1960s and therefore 
“worked” in a rather traditional sense, the social construction of this artifact took place in a way 
its designers, builders, and image-makers did not anticipate. The North Star was not a symbol of 
the great “Canadian heavens” discussed in the previous chapter, but was instead a rather hellish 
experience for passengers who were subjected on occasion to literal fire and brimstone. It was 
not accepted unequivocally as a natural part of the Canadian transportation teleology, as 
suggested by George Drew’s myopic interest in discrediting TCA, Howe, and Claxton by 
proving that North Stars were being secretly phased out. Once it made its public debut—and 
even before, since the choice of Canadian Vickers was controversial—the North Star was clearly 
out of the Public Relations and Advertising department’s control. The vision of itself, of 
Canadian transportation, and of the past and future of homegrown innovation that TCA’s public-
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facing material attempted to cultivate using the North Star did not go over as planned and 
initiated some serious self-reflection at the airline. Howe told Parliament in July 1948 that “no 
other new aircraft has taken the punishment in its initial operations that the North Star has been 
subjected to.” 486 Although Howe was referring to the physical conditions of multiple Atlantic 
crossings with quick turn-around times, he could have very well been discussing the discursive 
beating to which the North Star had been subjected since 1944. 
As I have already shown, TCA responded to all of these public relations hiccups by going 
on the defensive. McGregor’s speaking engagements through 1949 and 1950 were themed 
around defending TCA and its choices: developing the same transport plane for both civilian and 
military use, for example, or “making haste slowly” instead of latching on to the latest trends.487 
“What we have in the North Star is an efficient, economical aircraft admirably suited to the air 
transportation industry in Canada,” he claimed in a May 1949 speech about the airplane’s 
“controversy” stirred up by “those who obviously are not in a position to comment on the aircraft 
or the engines with any degree of authority.”488 Of course, when pressed by reporters earlier that 
spring as to whether or not TCA made money, McGregor had no choice to claim “definitely 
not.” This was not because of the Merlins, the bad publicity, or even because of the poor decision 
to split the airline’s Atlantic travel into its own subsidiary, but because of the “most 
troublesome...wide disparity between summer and winter traffic.”489 Seasonality, as I discussed 
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in Chapter 2, was an excellent scapegoat. It pulled focus away from larger political and 
technological issues and instead placed the blame on the passenger and their relationship with the 
Canadian envirotechnical landscape. This, in turn, made it seem easier to solve through two sets 
of advertising and publicity strategies. The first was emphasizing the North Star’s Canadian-ness 
through its all-weather technologies. The second, introducing new routes to even out seasonal 


















4. Time, Space, and Sun Destinations (1948-1960) 
Deliberately positioning the North Star as a specialized Canadian technology for 
specialized Canadian conditions was only one of McGregor’s correctives to the “seasonal 
fluctuation evil” discussed in Chapter 2. The second was the establishment of “southern routes” 
which produced “traffic peaks when the [Canadian] routes are in their winter doldrums.”490 By 
the end of 1950, TCA was flying to Bermuda, Nassau, Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad, and 
Tampa/St. Petersburg, Florida.491 These destinations were casually known—and still sometimes 
are inside the airline industry—as “sun destinations.” They originally served a number of 
purposes, including extending Dominion economic influence to British colonies through the 
construction of airfields and injection of tourism dollars, but these underlying concerns were less 
publicly visible than the discourse of sun and sand.492 The eventual popularity and ubiquity of 
“sun destination” travel made advertisements for these destinations a staging ground for 
emerging anxieties about how to best preserve the modern envirotechnical nation in the face of 
new everyday experiences of space and time. “Sun destinations” became something of an 
exercise in how comfortable Canadians were with dismantling and rearranging new modern 
relationships between environment and technology, since the environmental and technological 
nationalisms that made airplanes appear to be a natural fit for Canadian geographic conditions, 
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and made Canadians appear naturally air-minded, was turned on its ear. “Sun destination” travel 
had the potential to be an extreme version of the airplane’s ability to transcend geography and 
climate, transcending them so much that passengers could end up in another place with another 
climate, completely overturning TCA’s previously constructed version of the envirotechnical 
nation. Even the name is telling in that it presupposed the main motivation for Canadian travel to 
this region, especially since “sun destinations” were meant to attract more travelers in the winter 
than in the summer. The sun shining on a cold January day in Toronto is, after all, still sun.  
Selling these specific destinations was fraught with challenges, and in responding to 
them, TCA created a set of contradictory symbols in their “sun destination” material. Unlike the 
“system” advertisements at the heart of Chapters 1 and 2, TCA had to sell places that were not 
Canada in this material without disrupting Canadian envirotechnical tropes. TCA had to build a 
narrative that made the inescapable reality of Canadian climate escapable through their 
technological systems without displacing that reality entirely and without making leaving 
Canada the natural conclusion to the nation’s apparently illustrious transportation history. In this 
chapter, I will show that TCA’s southern advertising engaged heavily with time-based discourse 
in order to construct those destinations as places that had a unique relationship with short-scale 
time and longer-scale history, which rhetorically sidestepped concerns with Canadians building 
loyalty to new places with different climates. The airline’s new, fast, ultra-modern machines 
whisked passengers away to places that were “slow” and separated from modernity. Leaving 
Canada to visit a “sun destination” made passengers seem more Canadian by engaging in 
wintertime mobility and using communications technologies to transcend climatic obstacles. As I 
have already shown, using time as a stand-in for travel and mobility was a symptom of the 
modern experience, but because the Caribbean in particular had a deeply textured relationship 
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with time, these connections are even more telling. Using the North Star as a time machine in 
this way shows how the success of the technological systems carrying Canadians south depended 
on how willing passengers were to accept a specific relationship to winter and its associated 
seasonal mobility patterns and then how willing they were to accept its discursive flexibility.  
It also opens up a larger story about postwar spaces, places, and times. The high-modern 
transformations of everyday life in terms of speed and scale were frightening and disorienting to 
everyday consumers; place was becoming increasingly more difficult to define, even as nation-
states deployed high-modern megaprojects meant to stand in for belonging.493 The “speed-up” 
affected not only production and consumption, but also labor and leisure; vacations were 
incorporated into annual work patterns and were imagined in terms of “efficiency,” 
paradoxically packing as much vacationing as possible into time set aside for leisure. Time 
stretched and shrunk to accommodate new lifeways, and therefore so did understandings of what 
time was for. TCA’s “sun destination” advertising featured all sorts of juxtapositions and 
inversions—of time and space, of slow and fast, of work and play, of winter and summer, of past 
and present—that provide insight into how it mitigated the contradictions between technological 
and environmental nationalisms that emerged through the modern disruption of place. Rather 
than “spaces of flows,” as sociologist Manuel Castells has called simultaneous social practices 
communicated across distance using technological networks, Bermuda, the Caribbean, and 
                                               
493 Marc Augé has pointed to the modern experience of travel specifically as part of the creation 
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experience. Marc Augé, Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity 
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Florida were turned into “spaces of seasons,” where conspicuous summertime performances 
could be enacted at a distance while still keeping winter in view.494  
 TCA’s public-facing material on Bermuda, Caribbean, and Florida travel manipulated 
time in three distinct ways, all of which reflected the airline’s need to maintain Canadian 
envirotechnicality inside modern travel, tourism and leisure as well as the unique relationship of 
“sun destinations” to time. First, TCA extended its decennial rhetoric of condensing travel 
distances and times to mere hours to an international scale. This played into emerging postwar 
North American and European concerns with leisure, labor, and consumption by suggesting that 
travelers could exercise more control over their leisure time if they chose to fly in general, and to 
fly to “sun destinations” more specifically. Second, TCA’s public-facing material played into an 
earlier place-based visual culture of Caribbean-ness in order to project the idea of “island time,” 
where the Caribbean represented a co-mingling of past and present. Time literally appeared to 
move slower in the Caribbean and TCA evoked a quaint colonial past, which was especially 
appealing to Euro-Canadians concerned with the accelerations of the modern world. These first 
two strategies were not unique to TCA, nor were they unique to Canada or air travel. However, 
Canada’s positioning inside the British Commonwealth and North American postwar tourism 
culture made the intersection of these two sets of well-worn tropes especially resonant, and 
amplified transportation’s role in the modern destabilization of space and time into the air age. 
The third way that TCA’s public-facing material sold “sun destinations” in terms of time 
was connected to that perennial blemish on the airline’s public image: seasonality. Although 
there were many reasons for introducing “sun destinations,” especially those in the British 
                                               




Caribbean, TCA publicly framed them as ways to even out seasonal imbalances in passenger 
traffic. In order to do so, the airline emphasized the pleasantness of tropical climates, but in such 
a way that still maintained the climatic aspects of Canadian environmental identity. Early “sun 
destination” advertisements stretched perceptions of Canadian seasons by turning these places 
into “summer destinations.” Passengers could choose when, and for how long, they experienced 
their nation’s character-building winters, but they could never eliminate them entirely because 
the airline projected Canadian climatic conditions onto its tropical destinations. Using the 
seasons of familiar places as metrics to measure the climates of new places, especially the 
Caribbean, has its roots in nineteenth century constructions of climate and place, and even early 
modern travel narratives. At TCA it had the added benefit of allowing the airline to sell seasons 
rather than selling places, which further helped to sidestep any concerns about the discursive 
erosion of Canadian environments by modern technological systems and make sense of their 
powerful disorienting effects. These time-manipulation tactics were not applied to all 
destinations in all advertisements at all times, as TCA could not, for example, sell Florida as 
colonial, but these strategies worked together to build a set of time displacements that reflected 
anxieties about modernity’s threat to Canadian place-based nationalism. TCA’s promotional 
strategies through the mid-1950s represent an attempt to mitigate the ways in which modern 
time-space compression might destabilize Canadian seasonal identity. However, as I will show in 
the next chapter, these rhetorical gymnastics could not compete with the jet power’s brute 




Services and Promotions 
TCA’s first foray into “sun destinations,” to Bermuda in May 1948, hints at the themes 
that would play a major part in the airline’s southern discourse over the next two decades.495 The 
service was a result of a multivalent tripartite agreement between Canada, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. Canadian carriers had held the rights to land in Bermuda since 1947 as a 
result of the United Kingdom and Canada Air Services Agreement Act, but Kindley Field 
military base, the only airfield able to handle TCA’s aircraft and services, had been leased to the 
United States during the war. The United States agreed to open the military base to select United 
Kingdom civilian operators in what became known as the “Basefields Agreement” in February 
1948, with the stipulation that they use only the existing facilities. Kindley Field was already 
operating near capacity, according to TCA executives assigned to the transition, and they 
worried that even counter space would be difficult to come by, let alone adequate 
communications infrastructure. In a cautionary memo to the Privy Council in late February, 
McGregor explained how the timing of the Basefields Agreement, the rush for space, and the 
technological challenges in Canada and on the island made for a potentially rocky start to TCA’s 
southern services. He noted that if the Basefields Agreement was to be signed within the 
month—which it was, four days later—then the lengthy process of installing TCA offices and 
radio equipment would mean that the airline would not be “physically capable” of inaugurating 
flights until April. A usually straightforward and clear writer, McGregor reverted to diplomatic 
passive voice to suggest that “serious doubt arises as to the advisability of commencing the 
service prior to the early fall” because of the “severe summer lull” in travel between Canada and 
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Bermuda. TCA’s Atlantic services, consisting then of daily North Star flights to the United 
Kingdom, were already suffering financially—“due principally to mechanical difficulties”—and 
McGregor wanted to wait for an “alleviation of the equipment situation” in the form of 
pressurized M2s before inaugurating Bermuda flights. This, he argued, would give the airline 
plenty of time to advertise its new service and give passengers time for advance accommodation 
bookings. Operating prior to autumn would have “multiple adverse effects on the company,” the 
least of which was a $25,000 out-of-pocket monthly expense.496 
Clearly, seasonality was already on the minds of TCA’s executives. Flying south was to 
be a winter pastime, and the perceived imbalances between summer and winter travel were 
enough to call into question the date of inaugurating passenger services. Vice President of 
Operations Bill English extrapolated from pre-war figures an approximate 70 passengers weekly 
on winter flights—near-capacity for two North Stars—but “our anticipations of summer business 
are not too bright.”497 Another important aspect of TCA’s southern discourse established in these 
early stages was the value placed on advertising and promotions, which was closely linked to the 
assumption of lopsided seasonal travel. Howe, for instance, believed a 1946 survey of potential 
traffic to the Caribbean to be “unduly pessimistic.” The only reason, he thought, that projected 
traffic numbers were low was that “there has been no service between Canada and the Caribbean 
for some years, and therefore travel habits of our people are not in that direction”; all it would 
take to build “very satisfactory traffic during the winter” would be pointed “promotional 
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work.”498 Although Howe remained a cheerleader for TCA and its services throughout his career, 
this was no blind optimism. Promotional material appeared to be necessary, as I argued in 
Chapters 1 and 2, to get Canadians comfortable flying anywhere, but sun destinations featured 
images and imagery that drew on Canadian envirotechnical nationalism in new ways and was 
therefore vital to reconfiguring both Canada and its southern destinations inside modern 
paradigms of technology and travel. 
At their core, TCA’s all-weather flying advertisements and its “sun destination” material 
from the late 1940s and early 1950s had the same goal: to get Canadians to fly TCA during the 
winter. However, rather than emphasizing Canadian technological prowess and control over 
geography, the North Star, which was used almost exclusively on TCA’s “sun destination” 
routes, was black-boxed as a sort of “magic carpet” whisking passengers away to new exotic 
places. The image and name of the “famous 4-engined ‘North Star’ Skyliner” appeared 
frequently, but comparatively little space was devoted to explaining its technological features. 
The way it was characterized reflected earlier system promotions where airplanes worked as if 
by magic to make the nation seem smaller and create pride-building aerial views, but in the case 
of “sun destinations,” the geographic, climatic, and cultural differences between the point of 
origin and the destination created the magic effect. TCA promotional material positioned this 
“magic” as the height of modern living, in which inexplicable (but proprietary to TCA!) 
technologies could bring faraway fantasies closer than ever before. As one 1951 brochure 
claimed, “this is the magic of our time—wherever you are now—you can, in but a little while, be 
                                               




in another land...lovely...exciting...distant—yet just ‘next-door’ by air...Your magic wand is your 
TCA ticket. Your magic carpet is your great TCA ‘North Star’ Skyliner.”499  
Rather than homogenizing Canada by shrinking it, as the North Star did in system 
promotions, “sun destination” advertisements collapsed space by emphasizing the differences 
between the origin and destination. This often took the form of exchanging the landscapes and 
trappings of one place for another. TCA’s employee newsletter introduced flights to Bermuda, 
for instance, by explaining that travelers could board “a big North Star at Dorval, leave the snow-
covered Laurentians far behind and look down on Bermuda’s green hills and blue inlets” four 
hours later.500 Bermuda and TCA’s other southern destinations were represented by their 
physical environments, including hills, beaches, oceans, and especially the sun. Historian Mimi 
Sheller has shown that this “familiar sun-sea-and-sand imagery used in Caribbean tourism 
promotion” has its roots in early modern imperial botany, in which tropical islands were 
constructed as lush Edens and compared in popular and scientific discourse with the more 
familiar landscapes in Europe.501 The Caribbean landscape, in both early modern travel 
narratives and twentieth-century tourist brochures, depended “heavily on the branding and 
marketing of Paradise, to such an extent that the myths have seeped into everyday perceptions 
and understandings.”502 At TCA, the branding and marketing of Paradise was centered around 
the ideas of “sun” and summer in order to further contrast the destination with the origin and 
keep the focus on Canadian environmental identity. In December 1949, the Advertising 
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department distributed palm-tree-adorned “Bermuda Temperature Gauges,” to travel agencies 
and ticket offices; displaying the daily temperature in Bermuda to passers-by on cold, windy 
Winnipeg or Hamilton streets made them “especially useful” in selling sun destinations.503 Even 
when Howe could not attend a publicity trip to Nassau, Jamaica, and Trinidad in November 1948 
and asked for a “rain check,” McGregor kindly suggested he use “some other name, in the case 
of the Caribbean.”504 The “magic setting,” as one 1950 magazine advertisement claimed, “of sun, 
sand and sea, of palm trees and gorgeous tropical foliage” was made all the more magic by the 
hyper-modern technology bringing it closer to Canada, and Canadians appeared comfortable 
with this modern form of mobility.505 The Globe and Mail reported in 1949 that Canadians had 
the habit of calling travel agents to book “last-minute” trips to the West Indies on particularly 
cold days; one TCA travel agent said that “we’ve been getting calls at midnight—people 
finishing up a bridge party—and they want a booking for Bermuda or Kingston in three days’ 
time...I thought at first it was just a gag, but I checked up, and each time the people went.”506 
Landscape and “sun” were what made these places worth visiting. 
This was not to say that the themes of system advertisements were not present in southern 
discourse. Aerial views remained a touchpoint, and journalists carried on a spring 1948 pre-
inaugural flight commented on how aerial views of the “spectacle of the turquoise waters and 
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green vegetation of the pink and white islands” of Bermuda were a “reward” for flying there.507 
Passengers would bring their cameras on board regardless of where they were flying, but 
widespread constructions of the Caribbean as especially picturesque led TCA to provide detailed 
information on how to properly take photographs from the air in their southern excursion mailers 
and memos to travel agents. I will explore Caribbean visual culture in more depth below, but in 
general, Bermuda, Florida, and the Caribbean were meant to be photographed more than TCA’s 
other destinations. The rhetoric of modern technological views was maintained in these 
promotions, but with an emphasis on a certain type of view as experienced through a camera lens 
both in the air and on the ground.508 
Like their passengers, TCA made practical use of the latest technological changes in print 
media and advertising in their “sun destination” promotions. New methods of color printing and 
photographic reproductions “led to greater emphasis on people and settings” in advertising, 
rather than use, the act of consumption, or hard-sales information such as prices.509 Both 
photography and color printing were used far more in “sun destination” promotions than any 
other type at TCA in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and advertising executives hoped these 
innovative techniques would evoke some of the tropes of tropicality.510 Photography, as 
advertising historian Roland Marchand has suggested, was associated with authenticity and 
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“sincerity,” as it appeared to the consumer to portray things as they really were compared to “the 
exaggerated and emotion-laden abstractions” of illustrations. However, photographs could “tell 
any one of a thousand truths,” through staging and techniques such as forced perspective, 
composites, and post-production light and color retouching. Their value, then, lay in the 
perception of “literal and objective reproduction,” as photographs “encouraged the viewer to 
remain unconscious of any intervening, manipulative creator and to experience the voyeur’s 
sense of directly glimpsing the world’s reality.” 511 As a purveyor of settings and experiences, 
TCA embraced the immersive power of the photograph relatively early in this context, which 
gave promotions for its southern services a much more immediate and lifelike quality than those 
for other destinations and further implied that taking photographs was to be part of the “sun 
destination” experience. 
Advertisements for sun destinations also made much more strategic use of color than 
promotions for other markets. A series of blotters for Nassau and Bermuda developed for travel 
agents in 1949 were “produced in four colours to help promote the colourful nature of the two 
vacation lands.”512 Generally, fewer “sun destination” mailers were produced than those related 
to all-weather flying or European travel, almost certainly because high-color printing was more 
expensive. Bythell often reminded the Traffic offices that “care should be taken” with the 
distribution of these promotions because of “the use of quadri-colour plates.”513 The fact that 
four-color advertisements were still produced despite the expense shows how valuable the visual 
effects of the Caribbean were to TCA’s selling tactics. Even in advertisements that were printed 
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in black-and-white, such as those destined for newspapers, the term “colourful” appears 
frequently, as do the names of colors: “silver beaches,” “coral beauty,” “the blue Caribbean,”514 
One early 1950s brochure distributed by direct mail, in seat-back pockets, and to travel agencies, 
claimed that TCA travel agents will “help you plan your holiday [and] give you colourful 
literature.”515 Advertising Manager Donald McLauchlin often referred to the “tremendous 
pulling power of full colour advertisements, particularly appropriate in depicting the appeal of 
southern vacation lands” in his Advertising News supplements.516 He also made the connections 
between the color yellow and the sun, which would “connote warmth and sunshine,” and built a 
1952 campaign around the color in collaboration with the Nassau-Bahamas Development 
Board.517 One destination brochure for Bermuda, Barbados, and Trinidad produced in 1954 used 
florid prose to tie as many colors as possible to those places: 
“Here—where the rainbow’s end is within your reach, you’ll discover a holiday land 
filled with that richest of vagabond’s gold—sunshine. In the lazy curves of island 
beachlines, where turquoise waters meet with pink coral and fine gold sand, your zest for 
living can be reflected or renewed...Gay confetti brilliance in a thousand tropic flowers, 
dark rhythm of native Calypso music, the silver-blue of flying fish...all here for you in a 
vivid kaleidoscope of holiday island colour.”518 
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The brochure itself is printed in saturated pinks, oranges, yellows, and blues, and Advertising 
Manager Jack McGee considered it “amongst the most colourful, interesting and effective 
destination folders ever put out by TCA.”519 Using color was a rather elegant way, in the eyes of 
TCA advertising executives, to recall the visual tropes of the tropics while making 
advertisements for those destinations stand out from their other campaigns, as well as those 
produced by steamship lines, rail lines, and airlines in the USA and Britain. Furthermore, when 
published in the dead of winter, as “sun destination” advertisements often were, those vibrant 
colors were just as evocative of other times—that is, summer—as they were of other places. 
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Figure 9: “Have the summertime of your life this winter,” 1951.  
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 No single campaign encapsulates TCA’s push to use innovative techniques such as 
photography and color than a series from late 1951 with the tagline “Have the Summertime of 
your Life this Winter.” The two advertisements in the series were spun off into direct mailers and 
window displays (Figure 9). One was a stylized cartoon beach scene, including sunbathers, 
golfers, and animated women in tiny bathing suits, in saturated yellows and oranges. At the 
center sat a North Star haloed by a bright yellow sun. McLauchlin wrote that this advertisement 
would tap into the “public’s undoubted interest in the glamour of the tropics” through its 
“‘cartoon’ treatment depicting in a colourful manner assorted attractions of sunny Florida, 
Bermuda, and the Caribbean.” “Colourful,” “glamour,” and “the sunny south” were often 
repeated in both the advertisements themselves and the Advertising department’s descriptions of 
them.520 The other advertisement in the series, which the Advertising department considered 
much more successful, combined four-color plates with mixed-media photographic techniques. 
In it, a black-and-white photographed couple steps through a doorway, dark except for falling 
white snowflakes, and onto a colorful beach of welcoming illustrated sunbathers. The copy was 
boilerplate, highlighting that TCA could “carry you smoothly in a few delightful hours to the 
holiday of your dreams,” placing most of the selling work on the images.521 McLauchlin claimed 
that contrasting a black and white “couple stepping out of winter” with “the colourful sun 
drenched charm of a southern beach scene” effectively “portrayed the superior advantages of air 
travel via TCA to this winter paradise.”522  
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In this campaign, color, photography, and different illustration styles converged to make 
TCA’s “sun destination” promotions stand out from its other advertising material, adding to the 
rhetoric that these destinations were, as one 1952 promotional tagline suggested, “different...and 
just hours away by TCA.”523 Furthermore, the fact that the couple was stepping out of winter, 
and not necessarily out of Canada, also helped TCA avoid the contradictions between Canadian 
climatic identity and the technological erasure of that climate by replacing a place with a time. 
Photographic tricks and the use of color made these advertisements appear to be a comparison 
between summer and winter, not one place and another by using visual representations to 
connect place, climate, and time.  
 
“Only Hours Away By TCA”: Two-Week Vacations and Control over Time 
Claiming that extraordinarily “different” places were “just hours away” was how TCA 
capitalized on the particular rhetoric of the postwar “travel boom” that framed leisure and 
vacations in terms of control over time. A growing and increasingly mobilized middle-class labor 
force through the first half of the twentieth century saw the implementation of the paid vacation 
as what Rick Popp has called a “folkway of modern American life.”524 Popp argues that postwar 
American prosperity as expressed though travel, tourism, and mobility positioned leisure as a 
fundamental American right. In so doing, control over time, rather than control over money or 
goods directly, became the hallmark of modern consumer capitalism in the United States. These 
trends reached Canada as well, albeit on a smaller scale; most workers in Ontario achieved one-
week paid vacation leave in 1944, with similar legislation in nearly every other province by the 
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end of the decade.525 Pan-North American prosperity coupled with new transportation 
technologies that increased travel speed and comfort meant that “mass travel came to represent 
almost everything that was good about North American culture.”526 Because passengers could go 
further by airplane than they could by rail, steam, or car, the “romantic lands of your holiday 
dreams are now so near by air”; destinations that were so distant as to be only aspirational 
appeared to move closer to home, and the time saved by flying made even short trips seem 
possible.527 TCA’s early “sun destination” material amplified the value of time to modern North 
American consumption, using the newly standardized rhetoric of paid vacations to show how 
flying to a warm place would be the best use of a traveler’s time, the most valuable commodity 
in the postwar tourism landscape.  
Around the turn of the twentieth century “a variety of voices” in North America, 
including “reformers, businessmen, social scientists, and journalists” began to argue that 
vacations, previously the purview of the wealthy and middle classes, could benefit the working 
class, as Cindy Aron has shown in her history of American vacations.528 This was an extension 
of the nineteenth-century culture of popular amusements as growing urban populations availed 
themselves of movie and vaudeville theatres, dime museums, baseball games, and day trips to 
beaches, amusement parks, and wilderness centres. In Canada, winter carnivals, organized 
tobogganing clubs, and other seasonal outings continued to cement the value of the winter 
experience in Canadian constructions of self and nation. A trickle of employers in both nations 
also began organizing and sponsoring day excursions, renting “company cottages,” and engaging 
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in other forms of corporate welfare to capitalize on the latest organizational science that 
suggested that breaks from labor could increase productivity and reduce fatigue.529 Starting 
around the 1920s, labor researchers, social reformers, and large employers began to frame yearly 
paid vacations as a reward for industriousness and a way to secure loyalty. Still often limited to 
white-collar or management workers, these vacations, which included camping trips and car or 
train rides to neighboring towns, added further syncopation to the weekly rhythms of urban 
labor. Vacations also emerged as an issue in unionization and labor disputes through the interwar 
years. Although a peripheral issue at first—Aron suggests that “union interest in leisure for 
American workers manifested itself not in a struggle for paid vacations but in a movement for 
shorter hours”—paid vacations became a standard part of labor negotiations by war’s end.530  
This process, and its associated travel and vacationing habits, has received comparatively 
more attention from historians of the United States than Canada; Patricia Jasen’s 1995 complaint 
that the field is “virtually silent” still largely stands, especially in terms of how Canadians were 
awarded and spent their vacation time.531 In general, the paid vacation came to Canada later than 
the United States. Fewer than one-third of blue-collar workers in Canada received paid vacations 
in the interwar period. A 1937 national survey found that just over 21 per cent of the firms 
surveyed granted paid vacations to their wage earners.532 This was a pittance compared to the 
“fully half of the American industrial workers” who Aron claims “came to enjoy the privilege of 
paid vacations during the 1930s.”533 Despite this disparity, Canadians and Americans were 
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working with a shared vocabulary of vacations and time, especially once postwar prosperity 
further centered leisure and mobility as aspects of the modern vacation experience. 
The elevation of leisure in the form of paid vacations was a relative constant throughout 
the western world; historian Gary Cross has argued that “one of the ironies of the 1930s and 
1940s” was how “the paid vacation became an ideal nearly everywhere...Fascists, communists, 
and liberals all agreed that modern work required compensatory leisure.”534 Control over time in 
the form of a vacation was more-or-less universally regarded as a right of modern citizenship and 
mid-century tourism, with its pre-packaged consumer experiences and invocations to modern 
technologies of mobility, emphasized the democratization of this right. The North American 
tourism industry grew exponentially at the end of the Second World War—travel magazine 
Holiday referred to it as “Exodus, 1946”—and with it emerged a new, increasingly standardized 
discourse of how to make use of this vital modern leisure time using modern transportation 
networks.535 The “two-weeks” paid vacation became a colloquialism for the experience of time-
off from work, for properly managed leisure, and for autonomy and mobility, especially as the 
infrastructures of the “travel boom” became part of conversations about a joyous postwar return 
to normalcy. Mobility and control over time were seen as expressions of unbridled American-
ness, and “were manifestations of American economic and technological power.”536 
In the United States especially, the postwar “travel boom” was woven tightly with 
communication and transportation infrastructures. Travel-and-tourism-related publications, travel 
features in local newspapers, and even popular films about vacations to exotic locales supported 
a cultural imaginary of getaways, family road trips, and American wanderlust. Roadside motels, 
                                               
534 Cross, Time and Money, 99. 
535 Popp, The Holiday Makers, 28. 
536 Popp, The Holiday Makers, 144. 
 
 201 
highway rest stops, fast food chains, and other now-typical features of the American automotive 
landscape also found their footing in this period as a way to cater to increasingly mobile groups 
of everyday travellers.537 The American experience was somewhat different from the Canadian; 
Canada’s national highway system, despite being announced at the heart of this movement, was 
not completed until the 1970s and Americans were twice as likely to own vehicles in this period 
than Canadians.538 Canada’s “travel boom” vocabulary, although linked by culture and proximity 
with the United States, relied much more on other modes of transportation, especially rail, water, 
and air travel. It also meant that tourism stakeholders in Canada thought critically about how to 
construct Canada’s tourist narratives in a way that would both be separate from and appeal to the 
unique American style of automobility. Historian Karen Dubinsky has argued that “the rapid 
growth of the tourist industry had startling implications for national identity, especially in 
Canada,” since the core of Canadian tourism boosterism was building a public-facing identity 
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that made the country as appealing as possible to American visitors who might make use of their 
leisure time by traveling to Canada by car.539  
 Neither air travel nor the Caribbean have been considered a central part of this postwar 
tourism imaginary in North America, mostly because of the prohibitive costs.540 Compared to a 
weekend at the lake or a drive to a nearby city, an air travel vacation, especially one that 
involved crossing an ocean, was out of reach for the majority of North American travellers. 
However, air travel should be included in the study of postwar “travel boom” discourse. First, air 
travel was becoming increasingly accessible and affordable, thanks to military-to-civilian 
transfer technologies, strengthened airport networks, and postwar economic prosperity more 
generally. TCA, for instance, carried approximately 185,000 passengers in 1945, 540,000 in 
1948, and just under 1 million in 1951, outstripping general population growth. TCA, like its 
counterparts in the United States and Europe, also introduced “Fly Now Pay Later” installment 
plans and family fare discounts through this period. McGregor may have referred to these special 
fares as a “plague” in his memoirs, but they at least provided the illusion of increased access.541 
Next, Popp has argued that advertising, rather than actual travel, was the “primary ingredient” of 
the tourist trade; the postwar travel imaginary was built on aspirations.542 Trips were sold as 
fantasies, and air travel was especially fantastic as new dynamic forms of leisure were 
incorporated inside postwar paradigms of control over time. Airline advertising promoted a 
future of travel, where the time-based control and mobility first manifested in urban amusements 
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could be pushed to the extreme by bringing exotic locations inside the realm of possibility.543 
Finally, as I have argued here and elsewhere, tickets might have been expensive, but seeing TCA 
advertising cost only a subscription to a newspaper or magazine, and potential passengers could 
send away for brochures and information packets for the price of postage. Canadians were 
exposed to the airline whether they could afford tickets or not. The language of Canadian air 
travel was widely proliferated, and TCA was essentially the only source of that language. Air 
travel in general, and TCA in Canada in particular, was clearly a part of imagining leisure, 
mobility, and the post-war “travel boom,” and the extra-fantastical nature of traveling by air to 
the Caribbean made that imaginary especially potent. Because so few everyday Canadians could 
actually make the trip, the value of studying this type advertising lies in the discursive value of 
how it represented the ultimate control over time.  
As was the case in postwar airline advertising in general, promotions for sun destinations 
reflected an aspirational leisure, working with a shared vocabulary of vacations to show their 
compatibility with everyday patterns of leisure consumption. TCA’s promotions alluded to how 
steamships, the other viable option for travel to the Caribbean, were not compatible, since the 
long travel times would prevent them from fitting inside “two-weeks” of vacation. With air 
travel, as one French-language advertisement claimed, “vous ne perdez plus—comme autrefois 
en mer ou en chemin de fer—le temps précieux de vacances toujours trop brèves.”544 Through a 
series of catchy rhyming slogans through the early 1950s, such as “you get more time there when 
you go by air” and “waste no time on the way when you fly TCA,” the airline placed control 
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over time at the center of its promotions and suggested that time-dilation was the unique feature 
on which it could capitalize.  
Although TCA’s public-facing material manipulated time in a number of ways, these 
taglines served two purposes unique to the scale of hours or days, rather than months or years. 
First, they made the “two-weeks” vacation seem longer by making the travel peripheral to the 
destination experience. Air travel was still a source of anxiety for travelers, and focusing on the 
sailing, golf, beach lounging, and other activities that could fill “two-weeks” had the potential to 
assuage some of that anxiety. Second, it reflected the modern tendency to conflate distance with 
travel time by hinting at how much farther vacationers could go if they chose TCA. The trip to 
Florida or the Caribbean took only hours—compared to days by rail, car, steamship, or some 
combination of the three—which extended the reach of the everyday traveler and made sun 
destinations seem like an effective use of vacation time. The activities that could be squeezed 
into the “extra” time afforded by air travel were easy to represent visually in promotional 
material and therefore became pictorial cues for both control over time and the exoticism of “sun 
destinations.” TCA’s public-facing material subsequently painted its southern destinations as 
materially different than Canada, falling back on visual tropes of tropicality.  
Manipulating time on this slightly smaller scale helped TCA turn its aircraft into time 
machines operated by the choices made by individual passengers, decentralizing the 
technological act of flying and focusing on the sensory perceptions of modern mobility. The 
North Star was described in early public-facing material in a fairly standard way: complimentary 
meals, “club-like atmosphere,” attentive service, and “pressurized cabins...powered by 4 Rolls-
Royce engines.”545 These rote descriptions appeared across campaigns, media, and time and 
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were consistently overshadowed by the superlative language of the destination, creating an 
atmosphere of what the advertising department frequently referred to as “destination appeal.” In 
his Advertising News memos, McLauchlin argued that the Canadian public had an almost 
universal interest in the tropics, and emphasizing the destination capitalized on this interest while 
making the act of flying—perhaps the greatest source of anxiety for potential vacationers—
peripheral. “The real desire,” as he called it, “to visit those sunny isles” was piqued by saturated 
colors, eye-catching images, and copy that drew the reader’s attention inevitably southward.546  
Sun destinations, more than any other, seemed to attract passengers with a sort of 
geographic magnetism, binding how they got there with the initial choice to travel, since TCA 
self-fashioned as the only way to succumb to the draw of the tropics within the available “two-
weeks.”547 Compared to system advertisements and material selling the USA or Europe, 
promotions for TCA’s southern services made generous use of the second person singular, which 
emphasized both the intimacy and immediacy of the tropical vacation. Rather than highlighting 
TCA’s achievements in the air age—what “we” have accomplished—sun destination material 
focused on the agency of the traveller. The activities and experiences “you” could find in the 
Caribbean, such as “swimming in those wonderful blue waters, resting in the sunshine, bicycling 
between the tall hedges of Oleander, with plenty of golf and tennis, boating and deep sea fishing, 
too,” took center stage and linked the act of travel to “destination appeal” through the implicit 
theme of choice and control over time.548  
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Vacationers seemed to be spoiled for choice, and that choice was deeply embedded in the 
act of simply existing in the tropics. Going to and being in Bermuda, the Caribbean, or Florida 
provided travellers with extra hours to pack their limited two-week vacations with all these 
exciting activities. Some of this discourse was tied to how fast the North Star flew—the first 
Bermuda campaign worked with the tagline “...it’s less than 5 hours away!”—but it was also 
folded into characterizations of the destinations themselves.549 There was something about the 
tropics, TCA promotions suggested, that caused time to behave differently and added more 
activity-filled hours to the day, speeding up the speed-up of labor and leisure even further.550 In 
the next section I will show how this 
played into the idea of the tropics as a neo-
colonial paradise, but it also amplified the 
time-stretching abilities of TCA’s North 
Star services as the only available method 
of reaching these destinations. One 
magazine advertisement from the “pre-
winter” 1949 season provided a pictorial 
version of this relationship (Figure 10).551 
The silhouette of a North Star sits at the 
lower third of the advertisement, with its 
flight path marked vertically up the center 
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Figure 10: "The Caribbean!" 1949. 
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in a soft green. Once past the headline—“The Caribbean!”—and a horizontal border of coral, it 
branches out into six distinct paths, pointing to illustrations of features such as “coral seas!” “the 
tropic beauty of Barbados!” and “fun in Florida!”552 Once it entered “the Caribbean!” the North 
Star’s one flight path becomes many, disrupting the fly-over lines of more traditional air route 
maps. The idea of collapsing many potential activities into one trip appears in other campaigns as 
well, such as a 1950 advertisement that positioned horseback riders, golfers, cyclists, water-
skiers, sailboats, fishermen, and sunbathers on a single airline ticket.553 It suggested that flying to 
Bermuda, the Caribbean, or Florida was the most effective use of a traveller’s tourism dollars, 
and subsequently their leisure time. 
Campaigns such as these made air travel a technological method by which time could 
stretch to include many activities, but also characterized the Caribbean as a special place where 
that time-stretching was most noticeable. Other sun destination tourism stakeholders also 
forwarded the rhetoric that time behaved differently in the Caribbean. TCA collaborated with the 
Bermuda Trade Development Board on several specialized excursion fares and related 
advertising campaigns through this period, using “the magic of air travel” to open “up exciting 
new opportunities for Canadians to enjoy this famed...paradise.”554 They made use of many of 
the abovementioned time distortions and advertising techniques. Color, for example, especially 
the repeated use of a pink called “Bermuda Coral” to link Bermuda and TCA branding, gave the 
illustrations “an air of authenticity.”555 In a series of four advertisements scheduled for both 
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magazines and newspapers between 1952 and 1954, time, space, color, and technology are 
conflated in such a way as to render them almost interchangeable: 
“The first thing you notice in Bermuda is the tempo—easy-going and unhurried...Where 
days are coloured with blue sky, blue sea, pink sandy beaches. Where hours are busy 
picnicking, shopping, sightseeing...or loafed away under a kindly sun...[S]peed to these 
Islands in a few hours in a sleek modern airliner.”556 
 
Hours and days are constructed here as Bermuda’s most desirable exports, only accessible to 
Canadians inside their “two-weeks” with the help of TCA. As the earliest Bermuda Trade 
Development Board collaboration claimed, “here in these lovely Islands are sunny hours for 
tennis, golf, fishing, swimming[;] lazy hours for loafing on soft sandy beaches[;] laughing hours 
for sightseeing, shopping, bicycling [and] starry hours for music and moonlit dancing.”557 These 
rhetorical strategies made the south an ideal place to exercise control over the relatively new paid 
vacations afforded to Canadians. Airplanes could collapse distance, but the particular places they 
brought closer to Canada could respond almost anthropomorphically to the postwar need for 
more time to engage with these new forms of leisure. As one 1953 photography-based campaign 
suggested, “you choose your pleasure, set the tempo. The ‘lands of sunshine’ meet your wishes 
and match your mood.”558 
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 “Sun Destinations” and the Women’s Market 
TCA advertising executives were under the impression that many of these techniques 
would appeal to a specific type of passenger: women. Advertising historians have long argued 
that by the early twentieth century, 
advertisers envisioned the average 
consumer as female; their status as 
household experts was further elevated by 
the popular “home front” image of women 
during the second World War.559 A series 
of 1949 advertisements featuring 
confessional-style copy such as “I sold 
him on Bermuda!” “Bermuda here we 
come!” and “This is us this winter!” 
portrayed women as the leisure decision-
makers, slyly showing their audience how 
they managed to, with the help of TCA’s 
educational material, convince their 
husbands to travel TCA to the tropics. As “soon as he realized those beautiful pink beaches were 
only hours away by air, it was easy. We’ve always dreamt of going. It never seemed possible 
within a time limit of one or two weeks. But now we know, we’re all set to go!”560 Bythell 
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claimed that the “copy theme” of this campaign, which ran in 10 newspapers in central Canada 
and later in magazines and as a direct-mail promotion, was “directed in a large degree to 
women.” In a clever bit of meta-advertising, the women in this campaign brandished real TCA 
brochures in which tropical vacation scenes, including men and women frolicking on a beach, 
are clearly visible. These advertisements were designed to “stimulate early interest and planning 
of winter holidays...[and] to secure more direct action in the markets offering greatest potential 
for this travel,” which included ordering brochures and contacting TCA agents.561  
Consumer historian Lizabeth Cohen has shown that by the late 1940s, advertisers began 
to focus on family spending units as “men gained more influence over consumption...exerting 
more control with the expansion of credit.”562 Expensive purchases such as airline tickets, which 
could drain both financial resources and precious vacation time and often required the use of 
credit, fell solidly inside the realm of influence of male consumption. Therefore, the “direct 
action” of woman consumers was generally considered to be showing TCA literature to the men 
in their lives instead of booking tickets directly.563 This allowed TCA advertisers to walk a thin 
line between propping up women as leisure decision-makers and men as the actual purchasers. 
Advertisements for honeymoon travel to the Caribbean in bridal magazines, for instance, claimed 
that “the enchantment of tropic dreamlands” were “all yours in a few hours of pleasant travel,” 
but only after you “talk it over with ‘The Man.’ Then let your Travel Agent or nearest TCA 
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office help you plan your honeymoon travel.”564 This campaign was printed in both the Spring 
and Fall 1950 issues of Brides Book magazine (circulation 10,000) and was paired with “local, 
highly personalized” direct-mail campaigns featuring the “This is us this winter!” and “I sold 
him on Bermuda!” promotions.565 TCA’s southern services were also featured in a “commercial 
‘editorial’ column” called “Barbara Brent’s Buys and Whys,” that appeared on the family pages 
of 62 weekly newspapers with a total circulation of over 600,000 and “exceptionally high 
readership by women.”566 The column asked women to “say ‘Pooh!’ to Father Time...” and get 
“more time there when you go by air.” Its call to action was not to contact a TCA travel agent to 
purchase a ticket, but rather to order “a wonderful 12-page, full-colour booklet on Bermuda and 
the Caribbean Islands—it’s FREE!”567 
These techniques of selling to families, women, and honeymooners reflects what Cohen 
refers to as “segmenting the mass,” in which mid-century advertisers engaged differently with 
different potential markets.568 TCA’s response to the “women’s market” varied throughout the 
1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, but, as I have argued elsewhere, the airline assigned a great deal of 
agency to its female consumers by showing women in positions of power as savvy purchasers, 
family educators, and airline employees.569 TCA certainly segmented its marketing in other ways 
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as well, producing geographically-specific advertisements and separate campaigns for 
Americans, developing specialized material for travel trade magazines, and timing its advertising 
in farming publications around the harvest.570 However, unlike consumer goods, or even air 
travel in the United States, TCA had no major competitors. Instead, the airline had to sell places 
in competition with other places, and anxiety-producing methods of travel against more familiar 
ones. In the case of “sun destinations,” the place had to appeal to a broad mass of potential 
travellers. TCA capitalized on this concern by constructing its southern destinations as places 
where time behaved differently and where two weeks of paid vacation could be parlayed into 
endless choices of enjoyable pastimes in unimaginably colorful, exotic settings. 
Like air travel in general, sun destinations represented an imagined aspirational future of 
choice, mobility and leisure, especially because of the associated touristic activities and what 
geographer Rob Shields calls “place-images” that “come to be held as signifiers of [a place’s] 
essential character.”571 These reductionist, stereotypical, over-simplified discursive tropes made 
tropical destinations appear to be polar opposites to Canada, further evoking the region’s 
exoticism and the language of modern technological control over time.572 The North Star might 
have made Bermuda and its promise of endless golfing, sunbathing, and bicycling seem closer to 
Canada, but promotions reminded travellers that its climate, wildlife, and culture were still miles 
away. TCA frequently used the word “different” in its early advertisements to stand in for 
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general feelings of displacement and distance in this confusing stretching and shrinking of time. 
One national 1949 campaign with a circulation of over 180,000 mimicked a handwritten letter 
from a woman named “Peggy” to her friend “Helen,” claiming, “Bermuda is certainly 
different.”573 Another from 1952 featured the simple headline, “Nassau is different.” with no 
explanation for what that meant except that Nassau could provide “a vacation that’s different.”574 
Of course, these “different” places were only accessible via TCA’s aircraft and services, and they 
positioned themselves as a purveyor of technologically-driven time-travel experiences. 
 
“The Isles of Fabulous History”: Tropicality and Time Distortion 
Using images of sunbathers and golfers in promotions for TCA’s southern services 
combined with claims that “you get more time there when you go by air” emphasized individual 
agency, choice, and time management on a scale that everyday travellers could understand. 
Control over the “two-weeks” vacation was a type of time travel that helped TCA situate itself 
inside postwar paradigms of mobility, travel, and consumption. The way the destinations 
themselves were pictured and described, however, also invoked time travel on a much larger 
scale. The images and claims about Bermuda and the Caribbean that appeared in TCA’s public-
facing material relied on earlier Caribbean place-images in order to suggest that travelling to a 
sun destination felt like travelling to an earlier era, the rather nebulous and ill-defined “colonial” 
or “old-world” times. The “tempo” of the tropics appeared to be so slow that they became an 
“anachronistic space” stuck in a pre-modern past, especially when directly compared to the 
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modern technologies and amenities on board the North Star.575 The comparison was not always 
negative, though, as “island time” was constructed as a respite from the dizzying pace of the 
modern world despite being almost exclusively accessible by time-compressing airplanes. 
Taking a tropical vacation would cause time to accelerate, as the speed of the North Star could 
transport passengers to a “different” place “almost before you realize it can be true,” and 
decelerate, as the “old-world atmosphere of these romantic isles” could stretch to include endless 
vacation activities as well as a variety of historical eras.576 It therefore became possible for sun 
destination travel to include what McGee referred to as both “quick and leisurely vacations.”577 
Turning these islands into “old-world” destinations steeped in colonial British-ness repositioned 
Canada inside the British Dominion, and repositioned the Caribbean inside history and space as 
it related to Canada. Furthermore, these larger-scale time manipulations had a different intended 
effect on the traveller, separating them from the modern experience of time. 
Constructing the Caribbean as a place stuck in time was accomplished in a number of 
ways. Pictorially, destination brochures borrowed from the decennial promotions by using old-
looking maps and images of early modern compass roses and caravels. Horse-drawn 
transportation was especially popular in these sorts of promotions, as it did the double work of 
highlighting the modernity of air travel and the “backwardness” of the Caribbean, as will be 
                                               
575 In Europe and the People Without History (Berkeley: University of California Press, revised 
edition 2010), Eric Wolf deliberately challenges longstanding historical and anthropological 
trends that suggest that only Europeans were capable of making history, so to speak. Assuming 
that indigenous people in colonial settings are “without history” (or, in this case, without present, 
since they exist exclusively in the past,) erases centuries of “confrontation, killing, resurrection, 
and accommodation.” (18) It also suggests that their only historical value is inside European 
matrices of expansion, production, and “society” as a concept. 
576 Brochure A-545, 1951 and advertisement M-50-4-AW, 1950, Air Canada Collection, CASM. 
577 Memorandum by J. A. McGee, “Bermuda/Caribbean Advertising—Canadian Newspapers,” 
November 4, 1953, Air Canada Collection, CASM. 
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discussed in more detail below. In early advertising copy, the Caribbean was assigned a great 
deal of “old-world charm,” whatever that means. Which “old” world the airline was referring to, 
and the particular age of the “old” world was not constant, and TCA material mobilized 
whichever images best fit the individual promotions. The “old world” therefore became a purely 
constructed assemblage of references that reflected mid-century North American concerns rather 
than engaging with history in any meaningful way.  
For example, the callouts to the region’s pirate past—“the historic haunts of the 
buccaneers”—referenced frontier myths of early modern empire’s tenuous grip on the liminal 
spaces of the Indies.578 “Buccaneers of old who made the Caribbean their headquarters,” as one 
southern brochure referred to them, were an evocative image.579 Literary scholar Erin Mackie 
has commented on how “the trope of piracy has always been highly mobile,” especially in the 
imaginary of commerce, law, and empire.580 Pirates and the tropical-island-adventure myths 
associated with them were particularly popular in mid-century North America, as Walt Disney’s 
Swiss Family Robinson (1960) and “Pirates of the Caribbean” amusement park ride (1967), and 
Errol Flynn’s various swashbuckling pirate films of the 1940s and 1950s capitalized on 
constructed comparisons between their alleged lawlessness and emerging forms of postwar 
                                               
578 Advertisement M-50-2-ABW, 1950, Air Canada Collection, CASM. 
579 Brochure A-545, 1951. Air Canada Collection, CASM. This brochure mentions the “pirate 
leaders...of the gentle (?) sex—for example Anne Bonney and Mary Read—damsels with hearts 
of flint and ready dirks.” Historian Carolyn Eastman has analyzed masculinity in popular images 
of pirates; she might suggest that this was an appeal to male readers, especially since this 
description was accompanied by an illustration of a female pirate wearing gold bangles and bare 
legs. Carolyn Eastman, “Blood and Lust: Masculinity and Sexuality in Illustrated Print Portrayals 
of Early Pirates of the Caribbean,” in New Men: Manliness in Early America edited by Thomas 
A. Foster (New York: New York University Press, 2011): 95-115. 
580 Erin Mackie, “Welcome the Outlaw: Pirates, Maroons, and Caribbean Countercultures,” 
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global order.581 Pirates, cowboys, Robin Hood, and other popular “outlaw” characters also 
represented individuality, masculinity, and adventure inside increasingly consolidated North 
American popular culture. Although only part of TCA’s sun destination advertising strategy, 
referring to the Caribbean as the “romantic ports of the buccaneers” referenced a similar spirit of 
adventure and frontiersmanship, which reinforced both the historicity of the tropics and the still-
novel thrills of traveling by air. More than the sophisticated cities of Europe or the familiar-
feeling destinations elsewhere in Canada or the United States, TCA’s southern destinations were 
easy fits for popular fictions of freedom such as pirates and outlaws. 
Lest the Caribbean appear too wild for the sensibilities of Canadian tourists, these 
promotions often also referenced the superficially ordered past of British imperial control. One 
set of bifold brochures, co-produced by the Bermuda Trade Development Board, claimed that St. 
George “retains its unspoiled, seventeenth century heritage” and suggests that “if old buildings 
interest you, you’ll want to see” a church built in 1619 and the Sessions House in Hamilton, “the 
second oldest Parliament in the British Empire.”582 Here the imperial legacy in the Caribbean 
existed “unspoiled” in its “seventeenth century” form, unpolluted by modern technological 
systems and urbanization, and perhaps also by the decolonization and civil rights conflicts 
brewing elsewhere in the world.583 The infrastructures of pre-twentieth century empire such as 
                                               
581 On global order, law, and the “pirate spectres,” see Amedeo Policante, The Pirate Myth: 
Genealogies of an Imperial Concept (New York: Routledge, 2015), 185-189. “Pirates of the 
Caribbean” in particular has received some recent attention from scholars due to the popular 
movie franchise. See Anne Petersen, “‘You believe in Pirates, of Course...’: Disney’s 
Commodification and ‘Closure’ vs. Johnny Depp’s Aesthetic Piracy of Pirates of the 
Caribbean,” Studies in Popular Culture 29:2 (2007): 63-81, who is especially interested in the 
consumptive aspects of Disney’s marketing of the franchise. 
582 Brochures Adv. 576B and 576C, July 1950, Air Canada Collection 005.005 Box 1, CASM. 
583 It goes without saying, but it was seventeenth-century Europeans and their descendants who 
did most of the “spoiling.” 
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roads, churches, government buildings, and mills factored heavily in TCA’s “old world” 
descriptions and depictions of the Caribbean. For example, Barbados was assigned “the 
loveliness of the almost-English landscape” and “good roads.”584 Juxtaposing the order of roads 
and churches with the disorder of lawless pirates and the exoticism of the tropics with familiar 
symbols of the “old world” and its empires created a discursive Caribbean that swung about 
wildly through history but still existed squarely in a specific past rooted in colonial order. 
Manipulating time on the scale of historical eras connects to the broader idea of “island 
time”: the idea that time behaves differently on islands, especially those relatively isolated from 
the mainland. Although there has not been any major academic study of this phenomenon in 
general, scholars interested in place, space, and mobility occasionally engage with it in its place-
based contexts. Architectural scholar Karla Caser has argued, for instance, that the idea of 
“living on island time” has been used as both a temporal and spatial strategy by residents of Port 
Aransas, Texas, to build a shared sense of place and belonging. She argues that “island time” is 
perceived on the island as a balm for the “temporal flux” inherent in modern living, and that 
residents who chose to move there believed themselves to have made a conscious choice to 
“slow down.”585 She also suggests that living on island time is a sensory experience; sight, touch, 
smell, and especially sound (such as “ocean breezes”) are all necessary parts of the island time 
experience. They represent and create a scaffolding for—in the case of TCA’s southern 
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585 Karla Caser, “The Design of the Built Environment and Social Capital: Case Study of a 
Coastal Town Facing Rapid Changes,” in Sustainability and Communities of Place edited by 
Carl A. Maida (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 207. For the Canadian context, see Graeme 
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services—the physical and cultural tourism infrastructure separate from “a modern built 
environment that lacks sensory stimuli other than the visual.”586 TCA’s sun-seekers were not 
living in these island places, but only visiting them, which made their forays into the change of 
tempo produced by “island time” all the more dramatic.  
It also matters here which island places TCA was selling. It, after all, flew to Vancouver, 
Montreal, Toronto, and Manhattan islands and to the United Kingdom, but did not engage with 
island discourse in advertisements for these destinations.587 The Caribbean, more than any other 
islands, have historically been perceived as having a uniquely nuanced relationship with time. In 
his work on Latin American and Caribbean literature, Rudyard Alcocer argues that this is largely 
due to how the region was constructed inside imperial discourse. “Progress,” he suggests, was a 
phenomenon that appeared to only occur elsewhere, and Latin America and the Caribbean were 
framed as “existing for the benefit of the metropolis.” Because of the region’s reputation as a 
backwater, apparently stuck in the past, time travel in Latin American literature was a way to get 
history moving again in an attempt to “rewind the clock and undo” the aftereffects of 
imperialism.588 Alcocer argues that the Caribbean “seems to flout the linear ‘clock time’ 
associated with modernity, thereby allowing the past and the present to commingle.”589 The 
overlapping diasporas, including the legacy of slavery, and the “get away from it all” tourism 
                                               
586 Caser, “The Design of the Built Environment,” 208. 
587 British Columbia’s island culture has received some attention from scholars. See J. I. Little, 
“Views from the Deck: Union Steamship Cruises on Canada’s Pacific Coast, 1890-1958” in 
Bradley et. al., eds., Moving Natures, 203-228 and Phillip Vannini’s ethnographic work on ferry 
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588 Rudyard J. Alcocer, Time Travel in the Latin American and Caribbean Imagination: Re-
Reading History (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), 8. Alcocer is working with the Spanish 
parts of Latin America and the Caribbean, so he is particularly interested in the Conquest, but 
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589 Alcocer, Time Travel, 68. 
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literature still popular in the 21st century all contribute to the Caribbean’s “highly charged and 
sometimes peculiar relationship with temporality.”590 Although Alcocer examines this 
relationship through late-twentieth-century literature from and about the region, his arguments 
about authors using time travel to grapple with and/or reverse the effects of empire can be 
flipped in tourism discourse from the British world. Instead of time traveling in order to erase the 
legacy of empire, perhaps tourists from Britain or Canada might time travel in order to 
experience that legacy firsthand. This built on imperial nostalgia in general, but also on nostalgia 
for a pre-modern pace and a pre-modern place, where the speed of mid-century technological 
systems had not yet corrupted the relationships between space, place, and time.  
One of the implications of framing the Caribbean in this way in Canada is that it rode the 
wave of mid-century nostalgia for a colonial past responsible for the establishment of what might 
be called “Canadian values.”591 Nostalgia is a key part of the modern industrial experience, 
allowing, as historian Alla Myzelev has recently claimed, “individuals to mitigate the modern 
condition of loss of individuality, rigidity, and increasing mechanization” through a “longing for 
stability, for certainty of opinions and conditions of life that modernity refuses because of...large-
scale industrial development, rapid changes in technology and the need or desire to relocate.”592 
Canada’s relationship with its colonial past and its continued legacy of settler colonialism give 
texture to this nostalgia, as it occupies a liminal space between center and periphery. In his recent 
book on Canadian living history museums, Alan Gordon argues that the proliferation of “pioneer 
                                               
590 Alcocer, Time Travel, 67. 
591 In 2016, candidate for the federal Conservative Party leadership Kellie Leitch proposed 
screening potential immigrants for what she called “Canadian values.” Leitch and her proposal 
were widely criticized as anti-multicultural and pandering to the extremist tendencies of 
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592 Alla Myzelev, Architecture, Design, and Craft in Toronto 1900-1940: Creating Modern 
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village museums” through the mid-twentieth century was driven by “a need to cope with the 
onslaught of modernity through nostalgia” while building a rooted genesis “associating the 
prosperity of the present with the actions and values of those imagined to be the first” settlers.593 
Museums such as the Fortress of Louisbourg in Nova Scotia and Upper Canada Village in 
Ontario recreated performative settler colonialism in a way that emphasized material culture—
industry, handicraft, energy—and the perceived hardships and ingenuities of settler life.594 
Starting in the 1920s, the “Arts and Crafts” architectural movement found its footing in large 
cities such as Toronto, referencing an architectural and artistic style that skipped right over 
Canada’s colonial past and tied it to “the Gothic and vernacular traditions of Old England.”595 
This version of nostalgia conflated time and space, since there is no analogous “Old Canada” to 
provide architectural inspiration. 
Referencing Barbados’ “good roads,” or the fact that it was “known as ‘little England’ 
because of its scenery and traditions” took this even further, suggesting that going to another 
place could feel like going to another time that progressed through history at a slower pace, if it 
progressed at all. Time in the Caribbean moved in a different way than it did elsewhere, and 
therefore TCA’s southern destinations had yet to burst into the modern world. On the air route 
map the airline distributed to its passengers through the mid-1950s, TCA claimed that “the story-
book villages [of Bermuda] dating back to Elizabethan times contrast pleasantly with the bustle 
                                               
593 Gordon, Time Travel, 111, 114. For more on the “genesis complex,” see Paul Litt, “Pliant 
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of the mainland.”596 TCA was clearly working inside established place-images and time travel 
tropes, and it had no qualms with contrasting the modern world with the British colonial-ness of 
its southern destinations. The combination of these features turned TCA’s southern destinations 
into what Anne McClintock has called “anachronistic space.” Tied to the Victorian-era 
compulsion to collect, reproduce, and display the historical and archeological record, high 
imperial powers imagined traveling through their holdings as traveling through time. 
“Geographical difference across space is figured as a historical difference across time,” building 
physical journeys between center and periphery into colonial progress narratives. McClintock 
uses this analytic largely in its Victorian context, as she is concerned with how this construction 
of time figured into race, gender, and the project of empire, but TCA building the Caribbean into 
a quasi-colonial respite from the stresses of modern living proves the flexibility of this concept. 
Rather than claiming that Africa, for example, was “abandoned in prehistory at the precise 
moment before the...Reason manifested itself in history,” spaces in the Caribbean existed at a 
point in history that Euro-Canadians might actually want to revisit.597 The North Star became a 
magic carpet, transporting passengers across time and space to a place that existed outside the 
accelerating pace of history quickly becoming part of the modern experience. As one 
promotional brochure for Bermuda, distributed by direct mail, travel agents, and the seat-back 
pockets of North Stars starting in late 1948 asked: 
“Tired? Jaded? Weary of the treadmill? Jangled by the turmoil of the world? 
Come, escape from it all! Step aboard a T.C.A. plane and fly to sanctuary in 
                                               
596 Brochure Adv. 555, November 1954, Air Canada Collection 005.005. Box 5, CASM. 
597 Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest 
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Bermuda. In a few hours you’ll be a new person in a new land...Life moves at an easy 
pace in Bermuda...Explore the islands...by boat or bicycle, by horse and carriage, or by 
the small motor cars now admitted to paradise but not allowed to spoil it by speed.”598 
 
The choppy opening interjections here are onomatopoeic, jangling the reader until they are 
soothed by Bermuda’s “easy pace.” More notably, though, the enemy of paradise was 
constructed as technological speed, the grand harbinger of modernity. Technological modernity 
made daily life appear to speed up, and therefore Bermuda, “although not completely 
unmechanized,” as one newspaper columnist claimed in 1953, “still retains the spirit of the long-
dead past. Life on these...islands is still as easy and uncomplicated as it was in our father’s 
time.”599 The irony was, of course, that the North Star was the only way for most everyday 
Canadians to vacation in “paradise.” Only the most modern of transportations could act as a time 
machine on such an extreme scale. This was especially noticeable when the North Star appeared 
pictorially in advertisements, as it often did in those designed for newspapers of magazines 
(rather than standalone brochures, where it was usually featured on its own page or panel). It was 
frequently contrasted with pre-modern transportations such as the horse and buggy, creating a 
visual language of technological time travel.  
 TCA’s Caribbean destinations were made anachronistic not only by the descriptions of 
their landscape and architecture, but also by widespread use of long-established stereotypical 
place-images that homogenized the Caribbean and flattened its history. Thus far, I have 
deliberately treated all of TCA’s southern destinations as homogenous in keeping with my 
sources. Although TCA did frequently deal with Bermuda, Nassau, Barbados, Jamaica, and 
                                               
598 Brochure “TCA to Bermuda,” November 1948, Air Canada Collection 005.003, CASM. 
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Trinidad separately in its literature, the language and images associated with each were only 
marginally different. Barbados was tied to the pastoral British countryside more than other 
destinations. Descriptions of Jamaica more frequently referenced pirates, and Trinidad’s mixed 
diasporas—“East Indian bazaars, Hindu temples and Moslem mosques”—were its main selling 
point, but the general rhetoric of sun, sand, and color carried across each destination.600  
This was because TCA relied heavily on the same Caribbean tropes that had been in use 
since the late nineteenth century. Historian Krista Thompson has shown that island elites who 
had a stake in tourism, such as merchants and hoteliers, deliberately established a set of stock 
images, including donkeys, women wearing baskets on their heads, and native islanders dressed 
in British clothing, that was universally used to define the British Caribbean. They reduced the 
complexity and diversity of the islands to a set of common visual tropes which represented 
Caribbean-ness to a wide audience. Even then, those images “were only realistic inasmuch as 
they were consistent with travelers’ dreams of the tropics” and represented an imagined 
Caribbean picturesque.601 Although Thompson is concerned with the last two decades of the 
nineteenth century and the first few of the twentieth, every place-image she mentions appeared 
often in TCA’s promotional material. In a random selection of 35 TCA newspaper 
advertisements for the Caribbean between 1949 and 1953, for example, horse-drawn vehicles 
(including pack donkeys) appear in nine and smiling natives, one of which is dressed like a 
British bobbie and six of which are women holding baskets on their heads, appear at least 11 
times. Even the beach, which is probably TCA’s most repeated visual cue that travelers were 
going to the tropics, is described by Thompson as “another tamed aspect of nature,” on par with 
                                               
600 Despite all that mixing, Trinidad remained “paradoxically British in character.” Brochure 
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plantations or paved roads as representative of colonial order and power over nature.602 Travel 
posters and brochures, in which copy and hard-sell information were often secondary to eye-
catching visuals, made use of these images even more heavily. Not only was TCA evoking a 
Caribbean picturesque in its promotions, but it was evoking a historical picturesque that further 
served to keep the Caribbean mired in time.  
 If women carrying baskets and donkeys carrying saddlebags were the place-images of the 
tropics, the North Star was the mobility-image, so to speak, that flattened the experience of 
travel. The North Star was often drawn more photo-realistically than the destination, and was 
sometimes the photographic element of mixed-media style advertisements, making it appear 
even more modern and “new” than the stylized beach scenes and colorful flowers below. 
Photographs or photo-realistic illustrations of the North Star were meant to create brand 
recognition and develop immediate associations between the destination and the only method by 
which Canadians could reasonably get there inside their two-week vacations. “Quick 
identification with TCA,” claimed McLauchlin about the 1951 campaign featured in Figure 9, “is 
attained through the use of a line drawing of a ‘North Star’ which leads the reader from the 
headline...directly to the invitation to ‘Fly TCA.’”603 Advertising campaigns for European 
destinations in the same period tended to show the North Star flying by itself without any 
scenery below, or parked on the taxiway where stylish passengers could embark and debark. This 
normalized the North Star; McLauchlin argued in one 1951 memo that showing the North Star in 
flight or on the runway would “suggest that flying to Europe is a normal method of 
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603 Memorandum by Donald S. McLauchlin, “Bermuda/Caribbean/Florida—Fall 1951,” 28 
November 1951, Air Canada Collection, CASM. 
 
 225 
transportation.”604 When selling sun destinations, though, the North Star had to remain magical, 
easily accomplished by mixing illustration styles and contrasting the sleek, modern aircraft with 
the backwards-seeming transportations and people on the islands. “So conventional was the 
association of the photograph with a sense of the ‘new’” advertising historian Roland Marchand 
has suggested, “that ‘before and after’ parables of historical progress—in product improvement 
or in ways of doing things—typically contrasted a pen drawing of the ‘old’ with a photograph of 
the ‘new.’”605 Like the “toboggan” series of advertisements featured in FIGURE# and the 
transatlantic timelines of Chapter 1, the North Star lorded over technologies of the past, 
especially horse- or donkey-drawn vehicles.  
Two newspaper advertisements from TCA’ first Caribbean campaign in 1949 make this 
connection obvious. In one, with the tagline “Find Summer Again in Beautiful Bermuda,” a 
North Star flies over a typical-looking street scene. Tourists heading to a sailboat marina and a 
bicycle leaning against a building provide the background for a pair of tourists lounging in a 
horse-drawn carriage piloted by a dark-skinned man in a top hat. A wrought-iron lamppost with a 
colonial-era cannon at its base draw the eye to the claim of “LOW FARES from Montreal. 
$153.00 Round Trip (plus tax).”606 The melange of transportations—sailboat, carriage, bicycle—
and of eras—the cannon, electric light, clearly visible Bermudan flag, and female tourist in her 
modern hairdo and two-piece bathing suit—only makes sense when under the gaze of the time-
traveling North Star. The other, which implores the reader to “Fly TCA to the blue Caribbean’s 
Winter Holiday Havens,” features no tourists, but instead shows three Caribbean natives. The 
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specific setting of the image is unclear, since Nassau, Jamaica, and Trinidad were all advertised 
destinations. A donkey-drawn cart sits immediately under the “Air Lines” part of TCA’s 
signature, as if to show the superiority of one over the other, and the dominant image in front is 
of a woman wearing a full skirt and 
balancing a basket on her head, haloed 
by a lush palm tree (Figure 12).607 The 
position of the donkey cart as what 
Thompson calls “a ‘primitive’ sort of 
locomotive,” or in this case, aircraft 
engine, and the woman’s broad smile 
point “further to the island’s premodern 
status and stasis”; the same techniques 
used in turn-of-the-century postcards to 
keep the Caribbean stuck in the past 
seeped into advertisements for southern 
vacations half a century later.608  
In constructing its southern 
destinations as places where both time 
and history moved more slowly, TCA 
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Figure 12: “Fly TCA to the blue Caribbean’s 
Winter Holiday Havens,” 1949. 
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created a contradictory set of associations between history, technology, time, and mobility. 
“Island time” meant that the Caribbean remained stuck in the past, where the British colonial 
legacy was felt more acutely than in Canada, where primitive-seeming “Eastern” customs 
prevailed, and where technological modernity had not yet taken root. On one hand, the 
Caribbean became even more “backwards,” existing permanently in the past like a living history 
museum. On the other, that backward-ness was sought out by “jangled” Canadians as a respite 
from the pace of the modern world. Nostalgia mixed with the Caribbean’s status as a place-out-
of-time to support TCA’s self-fashioning as a purveyor of time travel and time travel machines. 
Time travel could both bolster the modern experience, since TCA’s aircraft did an excellent job 
of shrinking the nation and bringing exotic faraway places inside the range of the two-week 
vacation, but could also help passengers get away from modernity should they so choose. The 
most widespread type of time travel in TCA’s public-facing material, however, engaged with 
choice and control over time in yet another way by disconnecting seasons from months and 
making it possible to delay or skip over the experience of Canadian winters, however necessary 
they may have been to Canadian national identity. 
 
“Step into Summer This Winter”: Climate, Mobility, and Seasonality 
In the Canadian context, the Caribbean was both a respite from the pace of the modern 
world and a break from climatic extremes back home. In order to be comfortably constructed as 
such, the region had to undergo a radical discursive transformation from what historian Philip 
Curtin describes as “death by migration” to a healthful, healing picturesque.609 Early modern 
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science and medicine painted hot climates as inherently dangerous to European constitutions and 
bodies, which were believed to survive best in in climates like those of Britain or France. This 
“fear of hot climates,” as historian Karen Kupperman called it in her 1984 survey article of this 
phenomenon, was revived in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as part of the neo-
Hippocratic climatic imperialism that inspired the Canada First Party and other climate 
nationalists in North America.610 Eighteenth and nineteenth-century European settlers in places 
such as the Caribbean, India, and Africa were prescribed a variety of correctives to effects of 
climate, including climatic furlough in Europe and healing “hill stations” and spas in the 
colonies.611 Those spas eventually became destinations in their own right, and a burgeoning 
tourism industry based around health pilgrimages took root. The West Indies especially were 
reframed as such in the nineteenth century through images that showed colonial power over 
nature and subsequently power over the potentially deleterious effects of the climate. These 
images focused on an ordered exotic, such as banana plantations, coconut groves, and “civilized” 
natives, and framed the tropics as a domesticated, naturalised, tropical, colonial space, allowing 
tourism stakeholders, including large corporations such as the United Fruit Company, to shift the 
narrative towards pleasure travel.612 As tourism historian Frank Fonda Taylor has shown, regions 
known for their detrimental health conditions, such as malarial-swamp-adjacent “Hellshire Hills” 
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in Jamaica, were being re-interpreted as “Healthshire Hills,” or “playgrounds for itinerant 
Caucasians in search of health and enjoyment” by the turn of the twentieth century.613  
Historian Mark Carey has recently lamented that analysts have largely ignored the 
climatic aspects of the transformation from Hell to health, which is surprising given that “the 
region has become one of the world’s most iconic destinations for climate-related tourism.”614 
He ties the shift to four major developments through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: 
geographic nuancing of climatic conditions by those living in the Caribbean instead of scientific 
elites in Europe, the “Europeanization” of living conditions and quotidian lives of settlers, new 
understandings of tropical medicine, and increased steamship access, which boosted the tourism 
industry and “helped turn the Caribbean climate into a commodity.”615 Despite taking place long 
before TCA flew its first North Star to Bermuda, the process by which Bermuda and the 
Caribbean became salubrious vacation spots is important here for two major reasons. First, like 
Canada, the climate of the Caribbean has been culturally constructed by settlers, and second, this 
commodification took place as modern communications technologies were driving a wedge 
between place and time. At the same time that the Canada First Party was discursively 
transforming the racial heritage of settler Canadians to fit their climates, tourism boosters in the 
Caribbean were re-framing the climates there to fit the needs of pleasure-seeking visitors. This 
shows both the malleability and the fragility of envirotechnical constructions, especially as 
modern technologies—in their first wave at the end of the nineteenth century and in their 
postwar iteration—threatened to rob place of its meaning. 
                                               
613 Frank Fonda Taylor, To Hell with Paradise: A History of the Jamaican Tourist Industry 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), 4.  
614 Mark Carey, “Inventing Caribbean Climates: How Science, Medicine, and Tourism Changed 
Tropical Weather from Deadly to Healthy,” Osiris 26:1 (2011): 131. 
615 Carey, “Inventing Caribbean Climates,” 138. 
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TCA’s response to this threat in its public-facing sun destination material was to replace a 
place-based foundation for climate with a time-based one. Canada became a “winter” place and 
Bermuda, Florida, and the Caribbean became “summer” places. This was not a new treatment. 
Early modern settler accounts of the region occasionally compared European seasonal 
temperatures with those they found elsewhere. Christopher Columbus, for example, allegedly 
originated calling the Bahamas the “isles of June,” connecting place with time. The Bermuda 
island groups too had long been referred to as the “summer islands,” and one early seventeenth-
century account claims of the climate that “noe cold ther is beyonde an English Aprill, nor heate 
much greater than a hott July in France.”616 Similar accounts from Barbados claimed it to be “as 
Coole, and temperate, as in Hollande in Summer time,” and “not so hot as Spain in the dog 
days.”617 European seasons were the metric by which the climates of the Caribbean, as well as 
other imperial holdings, were measured.618 These comparisons performed a variety of discursive 
jobs in European and Euro-American travel narratives, as they were measurements audiences 
                                               
616 It is also likely that “Summer” here is a bastardization of “Somers,” the name of the British 
admiral tasked with building the Bermudian colony in the early seventeenth century. Still, 
though, the seasonal meaning of the name has not gone unnoticed by tourism boosters. J. H. 
Lefroy and Nathaniel Boteler, The Historye of the Bermudaes or Summer Islands (London: 
Haklyut Society, 1882), 9. 
617 Quoted in Larry Dale Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted: The English Colonization of 
Barbados, 1627-1660 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 16. Gragg calls the 
contradiction between scientific theory and lived experience “intriguing” and suggests that it was 
because settlers were keen to attract more settlers. However, as Joyce Chaplin has shown in her 
accounts of early American settlement and science, the everyday experiences of settlers often 
contradicted what scientific elites in Europe expected to take place. See Joyce Chaplin, “Natural 
Philosophy and an Early Racial Idiom in North America: Comparing English and Indian 
Bodies,” The William and Mary Quarterly 54:1 (1997): 229-252. 
618 Of course, “April,” “July,” “June,” and even “summer” are European constructs. 
Anthropologists have shown that there is no innate need to divide the year into four seasons or 
twelve months. Ben Orlove, “How People Name Seasons,” in Weather, Climate, Culture, edited 
by Sarah Strauss and Ben Orlove (New York: Berg, 2003), 121-140. 
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would recognize and could also help fold exotic places into European grids of reason.619 In the 
Enlightenment context, this was a subtle way of claiming these territories for Europe by placing 
them inside European ways of understanding and measuring the natural world. 
In the age of steam, however, connecting places to seasons became an expression of the 
modern experience. The Caribbean’s climatic constructions owe much to the ability of 
steamships to compress time and space, since they facilitated tourism by European and Euro-
American visitors. Tourism to the Caribbean has been tightly tied to British and American 
imperialism, since steamships transported both tourists and freight. Just as aviation would 
through the twentieth century, historical geographer Barney Warf has shown how “the steamship 
ushered forth a variety of cultural and ideological discourses centered on how small the world 
was becoming” in terms of both the movement of human beings and freight.620 Steam made 
spaces shrink and time accelerate. Physical distances were increasingly seen as synonymous with 
travel times as oceans—those great separators of Old World and New—appeared to dwindle 
down to nothing. At the same time, those distances were becoming too large for travelers to 
comprehend, as people, mail, and freight moved across seemingly unmanageable space at 
unimaginable speeds. Time, as I have already shown, subsequently became a readily available 
and easily understandable stand-in for distance. Attaching months and seasons to specific places 
could be seen as a natural outgrowth of this phenomenon whereby faraway exotic places were 
both months and miles away. Popular turn-of-the-century travel narratives, such as Charles 
                                               
619 James Duncan and Derek Gregory go so far as to suggest that arbitrarily dividing the world 
into continents is part of this projection. James Duncan and Derek Gregory, editors, Writes of 
Passage: Reading Travel Writing (London: Routledge, 1999), 5. See also Sheller, Consuming the 
Caribbean, 107-109. 




Stoddard’s Cruising Among the Caribbees, claimed that steamships allowed for “the wonderful 
transition from winter to late spring” after a week at sea, transforming February into “a moist 
June morning.”621 American writer Hezekiah Butterworth’s description of the Bahamas in his 
Zig-Zag Journeys series for youth employed a jumble of the Caribbean picturesque, Columbian 
discourse, conflating distance and time, and the miracle of steam:  
“The Isle of June,—an island where every month of the year is June, and where January 
is the June of the North!...The passengers who leave New York in the Ward line of 
steamers on Thursday afternoon for the Isle of June may dine on Sunday amid the groves 
of cocoanuts and farms of pineapples...The distance from midwinter to midsummer is 
very short on such an excursion to the Isle of June.”622 
 
The disorienting effect of the ocean liner’s speed, at least compared to previous transportations, 
made the journey from north to south feel like a journey from one season to the next, suggesting 
that travel times, especially to tropical places, could be measured in months as well as hours.  
By the postwar period, tropical vacations were being re-imagined through this lens of 
modernity, time, and space, with the added time-based framework of the “two-weeks” vacation. 
The restorative health benefits of these places did not entirely disappear—one of TCA’s first 
Bermuda brochures claimed that “there is health in the bright sun and the clear air and the salt 
sea is a tonic”—but they were sublimated inside the larger North American rhetoric of leisure 
and control over time.623 What emerged in the Canadian context was a new type of control over 
time that pulled some of the more stubborn elements of tropical healing into constructions of 
                                               
621 Sheller, Consuming the Caribbean, 60. Charles Stoddard, Cruising Among the Caribbees, 
(New York: Scribner, 1903), 14-19. 
622 Hezekiah Butterworth, Zig-Zag Journeys in the Sunny South: Vacation Rambles in Southern 
Lands (Boston: Estes and Lauriat, 1887), 255-256. 




Canadian geographic and climatic identity by suggesting that travellers could choose which 
seasons out of the year they might experience at a particular time. There was an inherent 
contradiction between celebrating Canada’s constructed climate, especially its apparently harsh 
character-building winters, and eagerly boarding an airplane to spend those winters elsewhere, 
and that contradiction was further elevated by TCA’s deliberate deployment of its southern 
routes to balance low wintertime traffic. The airline, then, had to carefully build a discourse of 
winter vacations that did not disparage Canadian winters too much. They had to seem 
uncomfortable enough to want to escape for a while, but not so miserable that they could be 
abandoned entirely without remorse. TCA’s solution to this problem was to continue discussing 
travel to its southern destinations in terms of time, but on a scale separate from the two-weeks 
vacation or the historical break from modernity. Sun destinations became “summer destinations,” 
where Canadian winters could be replaced at will with conditions that felt like Canadian 
summers. By exchanging January for June, instead of one type of January for another, 
passengers might be able to retain the special status of their Canadian Januaries and also keep 
aviation as a source of technological nationalism. 
The substitution of seasons for places performed a variety of important tasks at TCA. For 
example, the airline occasionally got into the Columbian spirit, equating the explorer’s “precious 
landfall in 1494” at Jamaica with what “you will discover” when you travel there by TCA; the 
fact that those discoveries included “a charming and hospitable British colonial environment” 
tied this to the time travel described above.624 Furthermore, assigning “eternal June” to the 
Caribbean was another subtle way to keep the region stagnant in time, preventing it from moving 
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through the seasons and subsequently preventing history from moving forward.625 More 
obviously, the airline used the discourse of months and seasons to remind passengers that the 
Caribbean was a summer place in much the same way Canada was a winter place, implying 
complementarity. Coverage of early flights to the Caribbean described going “from pines to 
palms,” and “leaving galoshes and mufflers in Montreal or Toronto” in favor of “silver beaches,” 
drawing connections between clothing and landscapes as well as seasons and places more 
generally.626 One 1950 magazine advertisement suggested that “a swim, a sail, or a seaside 
siesta—you name your holiday pleasure—it’s yours in hours when you take a TCA North Star 
Skyliner south were miles of sunlit beaches beckon and it’s always ‘June in January.’”627 
However, it was January in Bermuda or Florida, just the same as it was in Toronto or Montreal. 
Turning Florida, Bermuda, and the Caribbean into the “lands of eternal summer” drew on a long 
tradition of travel narratives that transformed the space-shrinking abilities of modern 
transportation into seasonal time travel filtered through European and Euro-American lenses.628  
This rhetoric was especially resonant in the Canadian postwar air travel context for two 
reasons. First, seasons, or at least culturally homogenized versions of them, were part of 
                                               
625 Alcocer suggests that time displacement in Latin American and Caribbean literature serves to 
jump-start history without the influence of conquest. European discourses keeping the islands in 
“eternal June” deliberately preserved a more desirable colonial past. Alcocer, Time Travel in 
Latin American and Caribbean Imagination, 7-10. 
626 “TCA Goes to the Caribbean,” Between Ourselves, January 1949, 4. Catherine Cocks has 
written extensively on the performative aspects of changing clothes when traveling south in the 
early twentieth century. Cocks, Tropical Whites, 96-124. 
627 Advertisement 12072, 1950, Air Canada Collection, CASM. It is possible that the “June in 
January” in quotes was a reference to the 1934 Bing Crosby song of the same name. I cannot 
find any other popular culture references that might warrant that phrase being in separate quotes. 
628 Pun absolutely intended, since the “picturesque” continued—and continues—to operate inside 
the tourism imaginary. Derek Gregory, for instance, argues that nineteenth-century British 
travelers were “shocked by the uncanny familiarity,” insofar as it fit their perceptions of the 
picturesque, of the Kandyan Highlands in “Dis-Orientation: On the Shock of the Familiar in a 
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environmental nationalism. Canadian winters—or, rather, Januaries—had a special cultural 
significance. Second, the airplane could do much more damage, so to speak, to the construction 
of Canada as a winter nation than steamships could. Because they were faster and increasingly 
more accessible, especially after the rise of the two-week vacation, more Canadians, especially 
those far distant from the ocean, could imagine themselves using airliners to leave Canadian 
winters behind. By bringing Florida, Bermuda, and the Caribbean closer to Canada, TCA’s 
aircraft had the potential to take everyday Canadians away from their season-based identity.  
Unlike the much subtler construction of Bermuda and the Caribbean as a place out of 
history, the airline made obvious attempts to remind its passengers that sun destinations could 
whisk them away from winter. Rather than being hinted at by place-image, or rhyming slogan, 
time travel on the level of seasons was displayed in bold uppercase letters as part of advertising 
headlines or as the titles of brochures and was woven explicitly throughout advertising copy. I 
have already discussed a number of such campaigns, such as the “Have the Summertime of your 
Life this Winter” series (Figure 9). That particular headline “conjures up a picture and invites 
action,” wrote McLauchlin, and that action was for the reader “to identify himself or herself with 
the common urge to escape winter by holidaying—via TCA—in the sunny south.”629 The desire 
here was not to get away from Canada, but to get away from winter. Seasons, not places, were 
what the airline was in the business of selling; the relationships between seasons, calendar time, 
and place were rearranged in new ways with the help of TCA’s North Stars without entirely 
displaces earlier envirotechnical visions. Take, for example, the 1949 newspaper advertisement 
selling the “blue Caribbean’s Winter Holiday Havens” pictured in Figure 12, which mixed up 
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and repeated the names of seasons in its opening claim that passengers could “wing your way 
from Winter into Summer on a luxurious TCA ‘North Star’ Skyliner to the storied West Indies 
offering endless winter holiday attractions with swimming, sunning, sailing, golf and other 
summertime activities.”630 Winter and summer each appeared twice, and somehow swimming, 
sunning, sailing, and golf could be both “winter holiday attractions” and “summertime 
activities.” It clearly was less about places and more about times, as these varied destinations 
become the singular “storied West Indies” and a single season: summer. Turning all of Florida, 
Bermuda, and the Caribbean into “summer islands” was the most prevalent seasonal time-travel 
strategy at TCA because it could support time travel on the other two scales.631 Other newspaper 
advertisements, for example, suggested that TCA sold “your ticket to summer,” or that 
“summer’s only hours away”; again, the North Star became a time machine able to stretch and 
shrink hours, transport travellers to a colonial past, and allow them to jump seasons at will.632  
Florida gradually became the central piece of this program. First, unlike Bermuda and the 
Caribbean, it could not be constructed as a place out of time on the scale of years and was 
therefore exclusively a place of eternal summers. Second, Florida was eventually by far the most 
popular “sun destination” for Canadians traveling by air or by automobile; Florida came to 
dominate warm-weather-winter-vacation discourse in general by the 1970s. TCA did not begin 
flying to Florida until April 1950, two years after its inaugural flight to Bermuda, and airline 
executives therefore had a clearer picture of how Canadians would take to this new destination. 
As was the case with Bermuda, however, a springtime start date was cause for concern at the 
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Advertising department as well as the airline at large. The introductory campaign for the new 
twice-weekly flights to Tampa/St. Petersburg was purposefully “minor,” as Bythell claimed in 
late March 1950, concentrating mostly on “‘announcement’ type of advertising” and limiting its 
markets to Toronto, Montreal, and Ottawa newspapers.633 The Advertising department was not 
terribly interested in selling Florida to springtime and summer travellers, especially when 
compared to the equivalent campaign from the winter of that year. The two 500-line newspaper 
advertisements use the exact same illustration of a woman wearing a polka-dot bikini and 
holding a beach ball with a North Star flying nearby, and they both refer to Tampa/St. Petersburg 
as the “heart of Florida’s winter vacation land.” However, the two advertisements clearly reflect 
the airline’s priorities and the ways in which Florida fit inside the rhetoric of sun destinations and 
time travel (Figure 13). The “announcement” advertisement ran three times in Montreal and 
Toronto newspapers and twice in Ottawa, with the simple headline: “Announcing Direct Flights 
to Florida by TCA.” The winter advertisement, on the other hand, ran twice in Toronto, Ottawa, 
Hamilton, London, Windsor, and Montreal newspapers with the much more evocative “Follow 
the Summer Sun[:] Fly TCA to Florida.”634 In this version of the advertisement, the woman’s 
beach ball almost becomes the sun with an illustration of the North Star, the word “Florida” in 
the headline, and her shirtless male companion all caught up in its orbit. Florida might be a 
“winter holiday land” in the winter advertisement, but it was also a place where Canadians could 
                                               
633 Because those twice-weekly flights were from Toronto and Montreal, as were all “sun 
destination” flights in this period, promotional efforts were largely limited to southern Ontario 
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“enjoy the warm sun, the summer fun.”635 Like the airline’s first Bermuda campaigns promising 
both summer pleasures and winter attractions, the seasons were re-configured here so that they 
were connected with places in ways that reflected mid-century Canadian concerns with time, 
technology and self-fashioning; following the summer sun—that is, traveling across time—
meant that winter was not being replaced in Canadian cultural consciousness. 
 
                                               
635 Advertisement M-50-32-S, 1950, Air Canada Collection 001.002, CASM. 




Only the most modern travel technologies could allow Canadians to literally follow stars 
across the sky. The North Star was already constructed as a time machine capable of collapsing 
travel times, extending vacation weeks, and recreating the colonial experience, but in this context 
the airplane could completely rearrange the ways time and place might interact with one another. 
This meant that even though Canadians could access Florida by car and Bermuda and the 
Caribbean by ship, only the North Star could create an authentic time travel experience. 
Subsequently, the handful of campaigns co-produced by the Bermuda Trade Development Board 
have comparatively little of this rhetoric, almost exclusively referring to the “semi-tropical,” 
rather than “summer,” islands made accessible by “the magic of air travel.”636 “Semi-tropical,” 
despite evoking a certain climate, is actually a geographic designation, whereas TCA’s insistence 
on referring to these same places as “summer” is explicitly temporal. The airline had a stake in 
these new relationships between time and place, since sun destinations needed to have a seasonal 
appeal to Canadian travelers already accustomed to certain types of winter mobility. 
This also meant that those Canadian winters could remain discursively intact because 
passengers were travelling through time, not space. Instead of replacing Canadian winters with 
some other place’s winters, the airline’s promotions suggested that Canadian winters were being 
replaced with Canadian summers, or at least conditions that felt like Canadian summers. Keeping 
Canadian winters as the yardstick was vital here, since traveling to the Caribbean or Florida had 
the potential to destabilize the climatic aspects of the Canadian envirotechnical nation. Although 
this did not crystallize until the jet age, when travel to Florida especially became a part of mass 
tourism, the strategy of turning sun destinations into “summer destinations” pointed to some of 
the early anxieties about what might happen to Canadian identity if geography and climate were 
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displaced by modern technologies. By projecting Canadian climatic conditions onto decidedly 
non-Canadian places, TCA made it clear that no matter how “magic” their airplanes or services 
might be, they could never entirely erase Canadian winters. They could not remove the lived 
experience of winter, nor could they allow Canadians to forget the cultural value of winter 
because winter was attached to the land itself. Although Carey argues in his work on nineteenth-
century models of Caribbean climates that climate “was never conceptualized in simplistic or 
monolithic terms” since it was bound up so closely with place, TCA turned climates into 
seasons, and subsequently into times in its Caribbean promotions.637 The eighteenth and 
nineteenth-century concept of “micro-climates” such as “hill stations” and the healing waters of 
mountain spas was replaced in this material with the broadest possible categories of “summer” 
and “winter” in keeping with modernity’s disruption of space, place, and time. By associating 
climates with times, TCA could reorder the seasons so that Canadian winters were never entirely 
replaced despite the “sun, sea, and sand” appeal of its southern destinations.  
Although the airline did not reorder the seasons deliberately, the scarcity of this rhetoric 
in Trade Development Bureau collaborations and its ubiquity elsewhere in TCA’s public-facing 
material shows that this strategy was central to how TCA sold itself and its services. This 
strategy may have worked too well; TCA’s large-scale attempt to use their southern destinations 
as a way to balance winter with summer traffic meant that passengers were deliberately not 
choosing to fly south in the summer. Overall traffic may have appeared more balanced, but TCA 
Atlantic turned out to be the victim of this overcompensation. The airline began offering special 
excursion fares over the summer months and advised travel agents in 1951 that “many people are 
under the impression that the Caribbean experiences extremes of tropical temperatures in the 
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Summertime. It does not. The climate...permits vacationists to enjoy all their favorite outdoor 
sports and recreations every month of the year. Heat waves of 100 degrees or more, such as are 
experienced in Canada, are practically unknown in the Caribbean.” As part of its “all-out 
promotion” of summer travel to the Caribbean, the Advertising department targeted workers who 
had reduced hours in the summer, such as teachers, and even released a series of “Temperature 
of the Week” charts to show that conditions were cooler than potential passengers might 
expect.638 This was an odd counterpoint to the successful “Bermuda Temperature Gauges” and 
palm tree displays discussed earlier in this chapter, and it reveals the delicate nature of these 
climatic constructions. Advertisements for Bermuda, Florida, and the Caribbean released for the 
wintertime were meant to attract Canadians “away from the snow and cold of winter, to a land of 
warm sunshine, sparkling water, and soft beaches,” as McGee wrote in an October 1953 
memo.639 Summertime promotions, however, were built around the much more utilitarian low 
fares and package rates.640 Like the introduction of Florida flights, TCA advertising executives 
were at a loss as to how to best sell sun destinations in the spring and summer months, but had 
no shortage of flowery ways to describe the same destinations in the winter. The seasons clearly 
mattered to the selling of these destinations because the destinations were seasons. Whether 
passengers were following the summer sun to Florida, or experiencing summer activities and 
winter attractions in Bermuda, they were maintaining the currency of Canadian winters by 
turning their “sun destination” vacations into a seasonal time-travel story. 
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Manipulating hours, weeks, seasons, and years created a jumble of mixed messages at 
TCA that situated Florida, Bermuda, and the Caribbean as a set of places with a different 
relationship to time than Canada, but also as a set of places that threatened Canadian 
envirotechnical national identity if passengers were to take too much advantage of that 
relationship. Passengers could, in one trip, shrink travel times, stretch their two-weeks to include 
more activities and “time there,” rewind or fast-forward their way past Canadian winters, and 
visit an “old world.” These juxtapositions of fast and slow, inversions of winters and summers 
and times and places, and contradictory scales of time travel indicate that discursively 
manipulating time was not a deliberate strategy at TCA. Instead, the airline built on existing 
anxieties about what it felt like to live in the modern postwar world, especially the disruption of 
history and geography. Everyday life had changed in impossible ways, and so advertisements for 
sun destinations in the postwar pre-jet era of the late 1940s and early 1950s turned the elasticity 
of time inherent in modernity on its ear and used that elasticity to help Canadians escape modern 
living, if only for two weeks. They also revealed the consequences of that escape, as rejecting 
modern living could mean the rejection of the lived experiences of winter. TCA’s sun 
destinations therefore became both places and times, allowing time travel by airplane to maintain 
Canadian climatic identity without sacrificing the decidedly enjoyable practice of taking a break 
from Canadian winter conditions.  
In the 1940s and 1950s, air travel was still a novel experience, and TCA built on the 
rhetoric of safety and reliability established in its system advertisements to capitalize on the 
exciting feeling of traveling through time. As one newspaper columnist opined in 1949, “how I 
long to be like those who can quickly rise above the ordinary daily grind and fly like the birds to 
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a distant land...I want to enjoy the thrill of going from winter to summer just like that.”641 Air 
travel, with whatever mystique it still had, was as magical as time travel, whisking passengers 
away to both exotic places and exotic times. However, by the time turbine-powered airliners 
roared on to the scene (or perhaps whispered, as I will show in the next chapter), air travel had 
become part of “postmodern ways of thinking, feeling, and doing.” The act of vacationing and 
the methods by which Canadians took their vacations were no longer magical, but instead one of 
the many “entertainments, spectacles, happenings, and distractions” of postmodern industrial 
capitalism.642 They no longer needed to be made sense of inside the disorienting effects of 
























                                               
641 T. W. Pue, “Here and There,” St. Albert Gazette, February 5, 1949, 7. 
642 Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, 285. 
 
 244 
5. Four Short Stories About Jets 
Karen’s eyes were wide with anticipation. She and her mother had flown from Canada all 
the way to Britain on one of “TCA’s giant jets” to meet her grandmother for the first time, and 
she was feeling 
overwhelmed by the whole 
experience. As she 
disembarked from the plane 
and saw her grandmother 
waiting, Karen struggled 
with what to call her. She 
had heard her “mummy” talk 
about “her own mummy,” 
and “the place that was home 
before she came to Canada,” 
so she haltingly stammered 
her way through the word 
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Figure 14: “Karen” and her “giant jets,” December 1960. 
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“Karen” and her “Grandmummy” appeared in a series of TCA advertisements through early 
1961, using what McGee called “emotional appeal” to encourage family travel overseas.644 
Although this appeal was deliberately focused on women and families—“Karen” appeared in 
national magazines such as Maclean's as well as women’s pages in major newspapers—her 
“quiet little story from the big and noisy world” was a way for TCA advertisers to separate the 
everyday experience of air travel from the potentially disorienting modern collapse of space and 
time that it could bring.645 Jets were considered among the greatest threats to Canadian place-
based envirotechnical self-fashioning and introducing Karen was a way to remind everyday 
travelers of the intimate connections air travel could create. In this chapter, I will explore how 
this happened. How did jets at TCA, and the infrastructure and travelways necessary to support 
them, change TCA’s relationship to the modern Canadian envirotechnical nation?  
Jet-age modernity, I argue, was different from piston-powered modernity. First, there was 
the issue of “speed-up”: the jet was even more time-space compressive than its older 
counterparts. The North Star could go from Toronto to Vancouver in about a half day in 1950, 
but a DC-8 a decade later could do it in five hours. The speed and power of jets shocked even a 
seasoned pilot like McGregor; on one of his first full-jet-powered transatlantic flights in 1960, he 
expressed concern that the setting sun would blind the pilot, only to be reminded “that the sun 
was never going to get into our eyes, as we would be landing at Montreal only an hour later than 
our Prestwick take-off.” He thought of a quote from Rudyard Kipling, master of stories about 
technology transcending space and time, in which he claimed that “some day...we shall hold the 
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Sun level in his full stride.” 646 From TCA’s point of view, this wasn’t always a good thing. As a 
state airline, it was responsible for supporting, maintaining, and shaping the discursive role of 
commercial aviation inside Canadian national mythmaking, but the North Star was the last 
airplane that TCA could truly claim was made in Canada for Canada. Furthermore, as the speed 
of the transports themselves increased, so did the pace of aircraft acquisitions; TCA added four 
new types of passenger transport to its fleet between 1954 and 1965, all of which were British or 
American in origin.647 Without a Canadian pedigree to rely on, TCA’s publicity materials could 
not connect time-space compression with Canadian technological prowess as enthusiastically as 
during the North Star years. The airline was left to reckon with the consequences of jet travel 
stripped of technological nationalism as increasingly accessible high-speed air transport 
continued to “shrink” Canada and extend passengers’ geographic reach.  
The first two “short stories” in this chapter engage in particular with the jets themselves 
as the machines responsible for this process: the Vickers Viscount, TCA’s first turbine-powered 
aircraft, and the Douglas DC-8, TCA’s first “full jet.”648 Publicity for the Viscount, introduced in 
1955, did not stray too far from the airline’s postwar system advertisements, especially in its 
                                               
646 McGregor, The Adolescence of an Airline, 118. For more on Kipling, technology, and 
modernity see Marian Aguiar, Tracking Modernity: India’s Railway and the Culture of Mobility 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), 37-48; Nicholas Daly, Literature, 
Technology, and Modernity, 1860-2000 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004), 56-75. 
647 Those were the British Vickers Viscount and Vickers Vanguard, and the American Lockheed 
Superconstellation and Douglas DC-8. 
648 In his memoirs, McGregor considered the introduction of the DC-8 in 1960 as when “we had 
taken Canada into the jet age.” Although I am loath to question McGregor’s authority on the 
subject, I will consider all of TCA’s turbine-powered aircraft in this chapter, including the 
turboprop Vickers Viscount, introduced in 1955, and other turboprop airliners such as the 
Vickers Vanguard. The press certainly had no qualms about calling them “jets,” and McGregor 
lamented in his memoirs that the word “jet” is fuzzy at best and was not a “happy choice” to 
describe how turbine engines actually work. McGregor, The Adolescence of an Airline, 117, 50-




frequent mention of the “flight-seeing” that could take place out of the plane’s windows, at the 
time the industry’s largest. However, as TCA prepared to enter the jet age in earnest with the 
introduction of the DC-8 in 1960, its publicity began to take on a different tone. Instead of 
looking to the past for inspiration, TCA used its fleet—which would be all-turbine by the early 
1960s—as a way to look to the future of travel and of Canadian technological achievement. This 
is the subject of the second story. TCA referred to its DC-8s as “giant jets,” but airplanes were 
not the only thing that was “giant”; this story will also reflect on airports, the new modern 
megaprojects of the jet age, which geographically shaped how Canadians would come to interact 
with and move through the experience of air travel. 
Another way in which jet-age modernity was different from earlier mid-century versions 
was that it was more accessible and the entire process of air travel was scaled-up. Jets in general 
were larger and faster than piston-powered airliners, and therefore more routes were introduced, 
fares went down (at least until the 1970s), and capacities went up. For example, 1958 was the 
last year in which more Atlantic crossings were made by sea than by air. Like the speed-up, this 
scaling-up was felt at TCA in a number of places and, much like in the first few years after the 
war, the airline found itself scrambling to anticipate what its passengers and the government 
would expect of it. The third “short story” is about one instance of this anticipation: “ReserVec 
I,” the world’s first real-time electronic airline reservations system and one of the earliest 
Canadian-built general-purpose computers. Commissioned by TCA and built by a Canadian 
computer firm through the mid-1950s, it was used by TCA as proof that it was predicting the 
future of air travel, as well as proof that its federally-supported status was still fruitful and that it 
was still capable of creating “magic.” The fourth “short story” explores another aspect of the 
scaling-up by continuing the discussion of sun destination promotions that began in Chapter 4. 
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They underwent a major transformation in terms of both volume of passengers and volume of 
publicity in the jet age, and the delicate attempts to turn snowbirding into time travel evolved 
into the wholesale rejection of Canadian winters. By the 1970s, Canadian intelligentsia began to 
question the role of snowbirding in destabilizing a Canadian sense of national belonging and 
occasionally equated leaving Canadian winters behind with leaving Canada behind. 
As TCA began its first turbine service in 1955, it was already becoming difficult to 
maintain the delicate balance between the celebration of Canadian geographies and their 
annihilation by technologies of modernity; by the late 1960s, flying was a form of mass transit, 
and it was virtually impossible for everyday passengers to imagine travel with Air Canada as 
something particularly Canadian. These short stories cover those fifteen years and set up the 
ironic outcome of carrying TCA’s mandate and national self-fashioning into the jet age: 
“shrinking” geography by air had become so mundane that it was no longer easily connected to 
Canadian-ness. Perhaps TCA had done too good a job of convincing Canadians to fly. Perhaps, 
too, the entire suite of high-modern technological systems used by urban Canadians in the 1960s 
and 1970s—snowplows, covered garages, hockey arenas with central heating—had distanced 
them too far from their character-building geography and climate. Regardless, the airline was 
unable to continue its national envirotechnical self-fashioning; even the airline’s change of name 
to Air Canada in 1964, the subject of the Conclusion, points to the meaninglessness of 
transcontinentality in the jet age.649 By the mid-1980s, Air Canada fully divorced from Canadian 
self-fashioning through deregulation; as Air Canada celebrates the 80th anniversary of its first 
transcontinental flight in 2019, it is no longer supported by the federal government. 
                                               
649 For clarity’s sake, I will use “Trans-Canada Air Lines” when referring to anything that takes 
place before 1965 or covers a time span that crosses 1965 and Air Canada for anything that takes 
place exclusively after 1965. 
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Each short story touches on at least one of the publicity strategies, internal tensions, or 
public debates that shaped TCA’s public-facing material in the postwar pre-jet age. Framing 
them this way serves two important purposes for this work. First, at the height of the jet age, 
TCA’s public-facing material was far too fragmented and numerous to effectively summarize. 
By the mid-1960s, TCA was advertising to multiple demographics and in multiple media, 
working with other advertising agencies besides Cockfield, Brown, and printing certain material 
in multiple languages for use in its European and Asian markets, not to mention introducing the 
dizzying array of fare plans, loyalty clubs, and vacation packages designed to attract as many 
new types of passengers as possible. These short stories therefore act as historical anecdotes, 
providing case studies to illuminate the larger trends in TCA’s public-facing material through the 
jet age and highlighting important turning points in the eventual disintegration of air travel and 
Canadian nationalisms. Second, they each act as epilogues for the analytic threads that carry 
through the earlier chapters: TCA’s discursive uses of Canadian history and geography, its 
tenuous relationship to the state, the public relations of introducing and developing new aircraft, 
and the selling of specific destinations. The stories are arranged roughly chronologically and may 
be read in that order, but they can also be rearranged and read in conjunction with relevant parts 
of Chapters 1 - 4.650 
 
                                               
650 Here I am following the “choose-your-own-adventure” model featured in Ben Bradley’s 
British Columbia by the Road, 13. He suggests that the two parts of his book can be read in any 




The Vickers Viscount, Aerial Views, and Turbo-Prop Flight 
Trans-Canada Air Lines became the first airline in North America to enter the jet age on 
April 1, 1955, debuting the British-built turboprop Vickers Viscount only a few weeks before 
American regional airline Capital Airlines. McGregor later claimed that the Viscount was an 
“instant success” when it entered service at TCA for two major reasons: “the virtual elimination 
of the tremendous vibration of the piston engines,” and “the huge windows.”651 These two 
features especially are the subject of this short story and make the Viscount a sort of ideal high-
modernity enacted and embodied. Not only was the Viscount unequivocally accepted by 
everyone who set foot on one—no one missed the North Stars as the jets gradually replaced 
them—but the sleek, modern lines, parallel engine slipstreams, and oversized windows meant 
that passengers would literally have the perfect “top-down” view of their nation.  
Essentially a halfway point between a piston engine and a turbine engine, turboprop 
engines—in the case of the Viscount the Rolls-Royce “Dart” model—use turbine power to drive 
a propeller, rather than supplying the thrust directly. British aeronautical magazine Flight 
reported that TCA’s adopting turbine technology “completely alters” the North American airline 
landscape because an operator providing turboprop service “really has something new to offer.” 
The Viscount had the potential to make TCA stand out because unlike in Europe, “public 
consciousness of technical aspects of airline operations...is more highly developed” in Canada, 
and emphasizing the new type of propulsion would guarantee increased interest and “a wide 
desire to experience Viscount travel.” 652 TCA did it all that it could to stimulate that desire by 
highlighting the Viscount’s engines and windows, both of which reflect TCA’s earlier publicity. 
                                               
651 McGregor, The Adolescence of an Airline, 73. 
652 R. J. B., “T. C. A. and the Viscount,” Flight, April 15, 1955, 502. 
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Emphasizing the smooth, quiet ride was at least peripherally an attempt to sidestep some of the 
pitfalls the airline had encountered with the North Star, and the Viscount’s large “Panorama” 
windows engaged with the same aerial views discourse discussed in Chapter 1, suggesting that at 
first, TCA believed its jet-age passengers’ priorities would carry over from the piston age. 
 The decision to add Viscounts to TCA’s fleet was a relatively easy one, at least compared 
to the later jets. The handful of full-jet airliners that were available in the early 1950s, such as the 
British-built De Havilland Comet and the Avro Canada C-102 Jetliner, were voracious 
consumers of fuel and were not efficient or safe enough for airline use.653 McGregor first 
encountered the Viscount, the first commercial aircraft to be equipped with turboprop engines, 
during a visit to British aviation manufacturers in 1949. Fêted for its smooth ride because the 
slipstreams generated by the propellers did not overlap—which historian Philip Smith attributes 
to either “pure luck or genius”—the Viscount so impressed McGregor that “he was like a boy 
confronted with a train set in a store’s Christmas display: he just had to have it.”654 Like other 
airline executives, McGregor knew even then that jets were coming, but by the time TCA was 
preparing to replace and supplement its North Stars several years later, the aviation landscape 
looked different. Much like how the Second World War had delayed the development of cabin 
pressurization for the civilian market, military production for the Korean War had made airliner 
development a lower priority; TCA’s first new aircraft purchase in the 1950s was the piston-
powered Lockheed Super Constellation. Even then, those 63-seaters were not considered enough 
for the growing demand for air travel and TCA continued its search for supplementary aircraft.655 
                                               
653 The Comet, for example, had a series of very public crashes through the early 1950s and 
despite interest from airline executives such as Howard Hughes, never entered into full 
production. 
654 Smith, It Seems Like Only Yesterday, 156. 
655 Smith, It Seems Like Only Yesterday, 158. 
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TCA began looking seriously at turbine-powered aircraft again in 1952, and by that time 
some of the Viscount’s systems, such as the climate control, pressurization, and fuel relays, were 
considered outdated and poorly designed. At TCA’s request, those systems were revamped and 
underwent specialized cold-weather trials in Churchill, Manitoba, in which the Viscount 
performed “brilliantly” and “excellently,” according to various TCA publicity materials. After 
some more modifications, including replacing door seals that froze at low temperatures and 
prevented pressurization, TCA took delivery of the first of its 15 Viscounts in late 1954.656 
TCA’s first Viscount fleet worked along the central part of its transcontinental route, from 
Montreal to Edmonton, and by mid-April 1955 it was flying the Montreal-Toronto-New York 
corridor as well. In a June 1955 press statement, McGregor claimed that TCA’s decision to move 
into turbine power before any other airline in North America was a result of thinking “10 years 
ahead.” 657 Being first pointed to Canadian air-mindedness, but also to Canada’s willingness to 
co-operate with international industry. In its own public-facing material, Vickers-Armstrong 
made a great deal of the fact that the first Viscount that flew to Canada in February 1954 for its 
winterizing tests was the first transatlantic crossing by turbine-powered airplane.658 Vickers 
advertisements printed in both British and Canadian newspapers showed the Viscount flying 
across a maple leaf and suggested that TCA’s purchase was proof of both “TCA enterprise” and 
that “as well as being able to design the world’s finest aircraft, Britain can also produce them.”659  
                                               
656 Smith, It Seems Like Only Yesterday, 160. 
657 Charles Thoraben, “Viscount Opens New Era in Commercial Aviation,” Chronicle (Alberta), 
June 16, 1955. 
658 This was especially resonant because Vickers had manufactured the Vimy that made the first 
transatlantic crossing by air in 1919. 
659 Advertisement, “TCA Enterprise Brings the Viscount to Canada,” The Globe and Mail, 
February 18, 1953, 3. Advertisement, “The Viscount Earns $11,500,000 For Britain,” The 
Observer (London, UK), November 23, 1952, 3. 
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The Viscount’s genesis story, from McGregor’s love-at-first-flight introduction—he 
literally claimed in his memoirs to have “fallen for the charms of the Viscount”—to their cold-
weather tests, became canon at TCA and appeared frequently in the airline’s publicity 
material.660 A 1954 pamphlet introducing passengers to the “‘Inside Story’ of the Viscount 
Propeller-Turbine Skyliner” began with a note from McGregor for “our air-minded friends” who 
“would like to know more about the Viscount.” The note ends with McGregor’s signature, a 
tactic that TCA used occasionally to lend intimacy and personality to its advertising material.661 
The tests at Churchill in particular were a coded way to inject some Canadian-ness into the 
Viscount. Lacking the Canadian manufacture, evocative name, or even the British-American 
“compromise” pedigree of the North Star, the Viscount could not as easily be folded into 
Canadian envirotechnical rhetoric. The solution was for TCA’s publicity to lean heavily on what 
was necessary to make it Canadian: the “rigorous winter testing” that gave the Viscount both 
literal and figurative license to operate in Canada.662 There was something special, apparently, 
about what one reporter called “Canadian conditions and flying customs” that required Canadian 
ingenuity to overcome.663 In these frequent mentions of the Churchill tests, TCA relied on older 
tropes of Canadian geographic and climatic barriers to mobility; in one brochure, in fact, an 
illustration of the Viscount at Churchill is accompanied by an Indigenous Canadian on a dogsled 
gesturing broadly towards the airplane.664 Pairing references to cold-weather performance with 
                                               
660 McGregor, The Adolescence of an Airline, 41. 
661 Adv. 42405-11-54-150M, 1954, Air Canada Collection 005.003, CASM. 
TCA used the signature of Vice President, Traffic W. G. “Gordie” Wood in a 1955 campaign 
that focused on how much cabin crew were enjoying the Viscounts that will be discussed in more 
detail below. Ad. No. 5-78S, 1955, Air Canada Collection, CASM. 
662 Adv. 42406-12-54-150M, 1954, Air Canada Fonds RG70, vol. 113, LAC. 
663 Charles Thoraben, “Viscount Opens New Era in Commercial Aviation,” Chronicle (Alberta), 
June 16, 1955. 
664 Adv. 42405-11-54-150M, 1954, Air Canada Collection 005.003, CASM. 
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its various “firsts” made the Viscount as Canadian as possible, despite there being much less 
Canadian about it than the North Star. 
Of course, the part of the Viscount that made all these “firsts” noteworthy was the Rolls-
Royce turboprop “Dart” engines. TCA made a point in its publicity material of emphasizing the 
ground-breaking nature of those engines in terms of both technology and passenger comfort. 
Passengers flying in Viscounts in 1955 would have received in their seat-back folders a small 
brochure titled “How the DART Propeller-Turbine Works: Power heart of the Viscount 
Introduced to North America by Trans Canada Air Lines.”665 Informational materials for travel 
agents and passengers about the Viscount in general always included a section on the engines 
and usually showed a cross-section of the turbine to explain that a “propeller-turbine engine 
employs a method of operation entirely different to the reciprocating gas engine with which we 
are familiar.” The method of operation was explained, at least to a degree that laypersons would 
understand, alongside flowery superlatives about Rolls-Royce: “no other manufacturer has so 
honoured a name, so star-studded a history.” 666 Passengers appeared to have forgotten the last 
time TCA bought a Rolls-Royce-powered airliner, since it was confidently referred to as “the 
symbol of reliability in automotive and aircraft engine manufacture.” 667 
The arrangement and spacing of the engines, projected far from the leading edges of the 
wing, as well as the fact that there were very few moving or reciprocating parts made the 
Viscount a much more comfortable ride than piston-powered aircraft. This was one of the 
reasons McGregor was so impressed with the Viscount when he first encountered it in the late 
                                               
665 Adv. 1341, 1954, Air Canada Fonds, RG70, vol. 113, LAC. 
666 Adv. 44439-12-54-50M, 1954, Air Canada Fonds RG70, vol. 113, LAC. 
667 Or at least, TCA wanted them to forget. Adv. 44883, 1956, Air Canada Collection 005.005 
Box 09, CASM. 
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1940s and one of the reasons TCA eventually chose it over competing American models. It also 
became a major selling point. Just as the North Star was regularly characterized as the “great 
four-engined North Star Skyliners,” the Viscount was introduced on the market as the 
“Incomparable Viscount.” The material prepared for travel agents focused on “the combining 
factors of the propeller-turbine engines...smart cabin interior design, [and] speed and quietness of 
flight, [that] make the Viscount ride one of matchless comfort. Passengers like to arrive 
‘Viscount fresh.’” 668 Whatever “Viscount fresh” meant, it was a condition borne of a smooth, 
quiet ride, so smooth and quiet that “you won’t find a ripple in your coffee,” “half dollars 
obediently stand on edge and there’s no danger of eyestrain when you read your newspaper.” 669 
                                               
668 Whatever that means. Memorandum, “TCA’s Viscount—a New Standard of Flight,” March 
1955, Air Canada Fonds RG70, vol. 113, LAC. 
669 Adv. 44883, 1956, Air Canada Collection 005.005 Box 09, CASM.  
Figure 15: 1955 promotional material for the Vickers Viscount. 
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Descriptions of how easy it was to read, sleep, eat, and converse with fellow passengers and 
cabin crew were also common features of early Viscount promotions, which helped TCA’s 
efforts to connect complex new technologies with everyday flying experiences.  
TCA might have over-emphasized Rolls-Royce’s manufacturing record, but that was 
nothing compared to its description of the Viscount’s comfort features. In one informational 
brochure, three discrete mentions of how smooth and quiet the Viscount was—a “remarkably 
low noise- and vibration-level,” the “remarkable freedom from vibration,” and “the [Viscount’s] 
smoothness and effortless ease”—appeared within three pages of each other.670 Viscounts were 
“turbine-hushed,” “smooth as silk,” “zephyr-swift,” “cloud-cradled,” and could “SPIN away the 
miles in a whisper.” 671 It made sense to focus on the Viscount’s passenger comfort features 
because not only was the smooth and quiet ride due to a new modern type of engine, but noise 
reduction was a subject “on which we [at TCA] were inclined to be a little bit tender.”672 
Passenger comfort was still a delicate issue, and the airline was working on initiatives to quiet its 
North Stars at the same time it was preparing the Viscount for service. One of those initiatives 
was the cross-over system discussed in Chapter 3 that directed the exhaust away from the 
fuselage of the aircraft. Compared to the North Star, selling a whole new aircraft built to be quiet 
and vibration-less, was easy. The first magazine ads (Figure 15) for the Viscount showed 
passengers such as a sleeping girl cuddling a doll, and the tagline “so swift...so smooth...so 
restful.” The series infrequently mentioned turbine power, hidden in small letters under the first 
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appearance of the word “Viscount.” Instead, the copy emphasized that “in 1955 TCA passengers 
will be the first on this continent to experience the delightfully restful flight, and remarkable lack 
of vibration which distinguish this swift-flying aircraft.”673 Restful flight and a new propulsion 
system created what one early ad for the trade market referred to as “a notable ‘double-first’ in 
airline operation on this continent”; TCA was looking to the future of air travel, but was still 
forced to reconcile with its past struggles with noise reduction and passenger comfort.674 
The smooth ride was not the only improved aspect of the TCA passenger experience. The 
“trade-mark of the Viscount,” as McGee called it, was the aircraft’s “distinctive oval 
window.”675 The Viscount’s double-layered “Panorama” windows were the largest in the 
industry—26 inches high and 19 inches wide—and required specialized testing to ensure that 
they would not shatter as the difference between cabin and outside pressure increased with 
altitude. The double-layered windows, like the engines and like the North Star’s new cabin 
pressurization, had both an operational and comfort function. They helped maintain structural 
integrity when the cabin was pressurized at altitude, and they reduced fogging and icing for 
better views. They also featured heavily in promotional material. Windows were a recurring 
motif in the first informational booklets designed for travel agents and the public; the cover 
featured a window-shaped cut-out framing a Viscount and supported by Vickers’s lion logo. It 
was common to show illustrations of passengers in their seats and describe their experiences, but 
in Viscount promotions the windows were generally the focus of the illustrations instead of the 
passengers. Travel agents were told to encourage passengers to bring cameras because “yes, even 
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the passenger on the aisle can enjoy an uninterrupted view” and passengers were reminded that 
“broad panoramic views” were “a flight-seeing thrill.” 676 The extra-large windows paired with 
the “ultimate flight experience” of vibration-free flight turned your seat on the Viscount into: 
“Your flying armchair with the ‘picture window.’ The opportunity to view Mother Earth 
from a vantage point high in the air has always been one of the fascinating 
accompaniments of plane travel. The Viscount in this, as in so many ways, sets a wholly 
new standard in air travel...Here indeed is your ‘Armchair with the Picture Window,’ 
from which you can comfortably observe the constant changing cloud formations, or 
view with serene superiority the face of the countryside below. Here indeed is a deeply 
cushioned, comfortably reclining haven where you can relax and rest, while your swift 
Viscount speeds across the miles to your destination.”677 
 
TCA was not the only airline to sell the Viscount’s windows—Pigott accuses “every airline’s 
public relations people” of this—but they had a special currency in Canada based on its history 
of using aerial views as part of a high-modern envirotechnical experience.678 As discussed in 
Chapter 1, bush flying, aerial legibility, and surveying projects illustrated the ways in which 
Canadian technological ability could be modified to suit the nation’s geographic realities. The 
Viscount was easily the most successful aerial-views mechanism in TCA’s arsenal, with no 
uncomfortable engine noise and even bigger windows than the North Star; if it had been built in 
Canada, the Viscount would have been a very powerful symbol of Canadian technological 
nationalism. Passengers noticed, writing to TCA that the Viscount was “terrific for comfort and 
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viewing.”679 On this front, at least, it appeared that TCA’s jet-age priorities were the same as 
they were in the immediate postwar years. 
The impetus behind all of these advertising strategies was to get passengers comfortable 
with the idea of a new type of airplane and to convince them of “the progressiveness of TCA” in 
choosing this leading-edge technology.680 This was more difficult to do for the Viscount than the 
North Star because the Viscount was only peripherally Canadian, but the idea that to fly 
Viscount was to prefer Viscount was a relatively easy sell. “Your first flight in a Viscount will be 
an occasion you will always remember,” claimed an early promotional brochure.681 “Happy is 
the air traveller whose destination permits him to fly by TCA Viscount,” began another.682 It 
turned out that passengers did prefer the Viscount, and apparently bristled if they learned that 
their flights would be on other types of aircraft. The editors of Between Ourselves even noticed 
the high volume of laudatory comments about the Viscount and added a disclaimer to the 
September 1955 “What Others Think of Us” testimonial section that “judging from the general 
consensus of opinion, our company can be both proud and justified in having decided to augment 
its equipment with such a plane.”683 In the following issue they added a subsection to the “What 
Others Think of Us” column called “Viscount Briefs,” which included short comments such as 
“more Viscounts...please,” “MY TRIPS on your Viscount are of the finest,” and simply “best 
ride ever.”684 This was a change of pace from a decade of complaints about the North Star, which 
was still being disparaged by passengers. One set of “Viscount Briefs” was printed next to a 
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comment from a passenger wondering why there was no outlet for electric razors on the North 
Star, for example. After their first flight on a Viscount in the summer of 1955, a passenger 
suggested that “the Viscount be used in your trans-Canada flights as soon as possible. The noise 
factor of the North Star...is still sufficient to influence a great many people...to use the U.S. 
airlines for long trips...I am certain your company would be surprised at the business lost this 
way.”685 Despite a lack of explicit Canadian mythology, the Viscount took less work to get the 
passengers on board, literally and figuratively. The modern Canadian envirotechnical nation was 
perhaps becoming a bit less Canadian. 
Like the North Star, the Viscount was relatively unique to TCA and represented the latest 
in air travel technologies, but unlike the North Star, the Viscount essentially advertised itself. 
TCA could therefore use the plane’s goodwill with passengers to continue to self-fashion as a 
standout airline because of its technological choices. Nowhere is this more evident than TCA’s 
advertising Viscounts to the American market, largely because TCA was not under as much 
pressure to emphasize the Canadian-ness of the airplane itself. Although it was only briefly the 
only airline flying Viscounts in North America, TCA was certainly the largest airline using the 
largest numbers of turboprops for some time due to the fact that turboprops in general were best 
suited for short- to medium-range flights and were therefore more appealing to local or small 
regional airlines. TCA deliberately used its Viscounts to show that it was “ahead of other carriers 
south of the border” in advertisements for Americans that used such modern techniques as white 
space “to give the feeling airiness and distinction” and a “planned lack of superlatives.”686 
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Advertisements to the American market needed to have what McGee called “‘snob’ appeal,” 
especially because of the saturation of U.S. airline advertising, and the first discrete Viscount 
campaigns targeting Americans had snobs in spades.687 One featured a series of well-dressed 
men and women, each of whom “INSISTS on TCA Viscount to Canada.” Sporting their finest 
furs, these discerning consumers were getting “a thrilling glimpse of tomorrow’s air travel—
today!” by choosing TCA, “the airline that brought turbo-prop flying to America.”688 This 
campaign was wildly successful: it began in Fall 1955, was expanded in early 1956, appeared in 
magazines such as National Geographic, the New Yorker, and Time, and had an estimated total 
circulation of over 5 million.689 McGee believed that another campaign from 1956 featuring a 
series of “posed photographs” of “typical reasons for visiting Canada,” including a woman in a 
skiing costume, did an “excellent national job for us in the U.S.” because “we have ‘hung our 
hat’ on the fact that we are the only airline operating Viscounts to Canada.”690 It appeared in 
national magazines such as Time and claimed that “only TCA flies the world’s most modern 
airliner—the turbo-prop Viscount to Canada.”691  
Interestingly, TCA took pains to remind both American and Canadian passengers that the 
Viscount’s new modern systems were not too new or too modern by contrasting it with the 
service they would find on all of TCA’s fleet. In one 1955 newspaper advertisement, a smiling 
stewardess shares the latest “news about TCA”: the airline was bringing “smooth-flying 
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Viscounts” to North America. “Along with so much that’s new goes something that’s cosy [sic] 
and traditional,” the copy claimed, “the thoughtful, alert friendliness of the people TCA chooses 
to serve you.”692 The other advertisement in this series relied on TCA’s frequent use of children. 
A small boy named Tommy has left a note for the stewardess on his TCA flight saying that “I 
want to marry you because you were so nice to me on my trip.” The advertisement copy takes 
this as proof that TCA had both “shiny new planes” and “old-fashioned hospitality and 
helpfulness.” Tommy’s story was supposed to contrast TCA’s potentially intimidating modern 
jets with smaller and more intimate experiences and paved the way for the “Karen” series that 
opened this chapter. When situated inside TCA’s first foray into turbine power, these techniques 
suggested that “the most modern types of aircraft” could be compatible with “old-fashioned” 
service values, representing another discursive blend of past and future, and old and new.693 The 
Viscount may have had “every modern feature” of “tomorrow’s” airliners, but TCA still had to 
align it with older paradigms by evoking climatic barriers to mobility, aerial legibility, and 
personable service.694 
 
 “Giant Jets,” TCA’s All-Turbine Fleet and Jet-Age Travelways 
“The Viscounts were well bedded down on the line when we began looking toward a new 
era which would revolutionize international flying and change the concept of global distances,” 
wrote long-time TCA pilot George Lothian in his 1979 memoirs. “The big jets were looming 
closely over the horizon.”695 In this section, I will examine how TCA introduced what public-
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facing material frequently called “big jets”—the American-built Douglas DC-8—into its fleet, 
especially as they contributed to airline infrastructure in Canada in general. Like the Viscount, 
the DC-8 was heralded as a step into the travel future and was strategically introduced on the 
twentieth anniversary of TCA’s first transcontinental flight. Its new type of powerplant—a true 
“jet”—was incorporated into the airline’s publicity as a highly futuristic, highly modern type of 
transportation that was, as always, best suited to Canadian air-mindedness. However, the DC-8 
and the expanded jet-age infrastructure accompanying it were not without detractors and 
controversies. This short story is therefore not simply about the jets themselves, but also about 
Canada’s jet-age airports, the new patterns of mobility that emerged as increased numbers of 
passengers moved to and from those airports, and the figurative fallout from them. Canada’s 
entry into the jet age in earnest was a turbulent ride, which began three years before TCA’s first 
“big jet” entered service. 
1957 was a big year at TCA. The airline was celebrating 20 years of service. It was also 
the airline’s first without Howe, who had kept TCA in his portfolio regardless of which Cabinet 
position he held since he proposed the Trans-Canada Air Lines Act. He was defeated in the June 
1957 federal election and was replaced by new Minister of Transport George Hees. McGregor 
also used 1957 as a chance to reinvigorate his focus on passenger relations. Because he realized 
that jet travel would fundamentally change the passenger experience, he hired the airline’s first 
discrete operations research manager and sought to modernize TCA’s reservation system, the 
subject of the next short story. Most importantly here, it was when TCA announced to the flying 
public that it was transitioning its entire fleet to turbine power. The airline had publicly 
announced its intent to purchase DC-8s in 1956, and in January 1957 shared that it would be 
purchasing 20 turboprop Vickers Vanguards, the larger cousin of the Viscount known for its 
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“double-bubble”-shaped fuselage, and phasing out its remaining DC-3s, North Stars, and Super 
Constellations. Flight magazine referred to TCA’s order of 20 Vanguards as “historic,” not only 
because at over $67 million it was the largest order placed in Britain for any product, but because 
of TCA’s “strong let’s-get-rid-of-the-props” attitude despite a lack of incentive in the form of 
domestic competition.696 This meant that by the end of 1961, if all went to plan, TCA would be 
the first airline in the world to have 
an all-turbine fleet. 
Because of this, fleet 
planning was a major focus of 
TCA’s advertising material in and 
around 1957. The Advertising 
department called it the “Planning 
Year” and created a series of 
institutional advertisements for 
newspapers and magazines titled 
“Progress Report by TCA.” They 
all used what McGee called “bold 
and dramatic layout and art 
technique to symbolize TCA’s 
entry into the ‘jet age’ and at the 
same time to portray the 
considerable scope of TCA’s future 
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planning.” 697 TCA had issued “progress-report” style advertisements before, usually as an end-
of-year summary highlighting the airline’s accomplishments, but this six-month campaign 
deliberately constructed 1957 as a watershed moment at TCA. The airline self-fashioned through 
these ads as forward-facing, using industrial layouts featuring blueprints, modern-looking graphs 
and charts, and lots of text. TCA was not yet in the jet age, but centering this campaign around 
what the airline planned to do continued some of the trends found in early Viscount promotions 
by focusing on TCA’s “firsts” and its eagerness to bring in the most modern technology from 
elsewhere and adapt it to Canadian needs.  
The first advertisement from the “Planning Year” campaign was an overview of fleet 
planning in general. It highlighted the “three fine aircraft...each ahead in its field” that would 
make up TCA’s all-turbine fleet by 1961: Viscount, Vanguard, and DC-8. The majority of the ad 
space is taken up by illustrations of the “future fleet,” but there was still plenty of room for 
superlatives about the “years of exhaustive study and evaluation” that TCA was undertaking in 
order to build a well-balanced all-turbine fleet, starting with the “now famous Viscount.”698 
Three other advertisements through the summer of 1957 each focused on a different aircraft and 
a fourth highlighted new reservations research, which will be discussed in the next short story. 
The one about the Viscount hung its hat on volume; ten Viscounts appeared flying in a birdlike 
“V” formation and the eye is immediately drawn to the bold, oversized numeral “25,” 
representing how many Viscounts were then in service. “TCA planners were confident that the 
Viscount would give outstanding service,” the copy claimed. “They were right. What could not 
be foreseen, however, was that the Viscount in a few months would so completely captivate the 
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air travelling public!” Of course, no ad for the Viscount was complete without mentioning that 
TCA “brought prop-jet flying to North America.”699 The Vanguard and DC-8 were advertised 
rather differently, mostly because they were not yet in service. A single Vanguard was pictured 
from above, which McGee claimed “lends a dramatic and different touch to this particular 
advertisement,” sitting on a runway made up of a stylized blueprint. This symbolized “the 
planning aspect of this campaign” and looked very different from how airplanes were 
traditionally pictured in mid-century airline advertising: airborne or on the ground, shown in 
profile or three-quarter view, almost always facing towards the reader’s right.700 The nose of the 
Vanguard leads the reader’s eye towards the claim that “TCA sets the pace in jet age planning 
[with the] new Vanguard for medium range routes.” As a “luxurious newcomer to Canadian 
skies,” the Vanguard could coast on the goodwill set up by its predecessor while adding extra 
cargo capacity.701 This allowed the airline to eventually phase out its all-cargo flights that were 
generally flown by piston-powered airliners such as the DC-3.  
As TCA’s first full jet, the DC-8 was introduced with much more fanfare (Figure 16). Its 
“progress report” focused on the “startling advances” and “dramatic changes” that “the era of the 
jet airliner” would bring, starting the tradition of referring to the DC-8 as a “Giant” jet. 
Compared to the “progress reports” about the Viscount, Vanguard, and all-turbine fleet, the DC-
8 campaign was decidedly more flowery and devoted more space to the description of the 
“extensive evaluation of every type of long-range aircraft expected to be available in the next 
few years” than to passenger comfort or what routes the DC-8 would fly.702 It also featured a 
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scientific-looking but ultimately meaningless line drawing of two DC-8s in flight across a grid 
meant to signify speed and distance. 
The actual inauguration of TCA’s DC-8 service in the spring of 1960 was a different 
affair. The first set of advertisements released for the Canadian, American, and British markets 
were dynamic and colorful and evoked movement and the human experience instead of 
“science” and “planning.” The visual through-line for the campaign was a young couple jumping 
exuberantly into the air, waving their hats and TCA-branded valises, and framed by arrows and 
bold taglines such as “Let Yourself GO” and “GO TCA Jet!” 703 Rather than looking to the 
future, as was the focus in the “planning” campaign, TCA mobilized its past, relying on older 
tropes of transcontinentality and Canadian distances. This was because there was even less that 
was Canadian about the DC-8 than the North Star or even the Viscount; without technological 
Canadian-ness to rely on, TCA was left with the effect its services would have on environmental 
Canadian-ness. TCA’s transcontinental DC-8 service was introduced on the 21st anniversary of 
the airline’s first transcontinental flights in 1939. An advertisement “designed to dramatise the 
impact of the first DC-8 Jetliner Service across Canada” claimed in bold type that it “comes on 
the 21st anniversary—to the day—of TCA’s first service across Canada [and] brings the most 
striking advances in 21 years. TCA Jetliner Service will set completely new standards—not only 
in speed, but also in luxurious comfort.” 704  
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This was a useful 
anniversary to exploit. Although 
21 was not a particularly round 
number, evoking TCA’s first 
transcontinental flight 
connected jets, another one of 
those “black-boxed” 
technologies that was even more 
difficult to understand because 
it lacked visible moving parts, 
to the travel trajectory that TCA 
had built for itself in the 1930s 
and 1940s. It could rely on Canadian aviation history to make its jets seem like a type of modern 
technology passengers could trust and one that was especially suited to Canadian life.705 When 
TCA introduced its first one-stop transcontinental route between Montreal and Vancouver in 
1961, for example, it named the airplanes flying the route “Silver Dart” after the airplane used in 
Canada’s first controlled powered flight (Figure 17). Despite the fact that the original Silver Dart 
was not even close to transcontinental, flew in Nova Scotia, a province not even served by the 
new “Silver Dart,” and was not affiliated in the least with TCA, it still used the name, featured a 
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silhouette drawing of the aircraft in its ads, and suggested that it had “pioneered the 
Commonwealth airline industry. TCA is proud to maintain this tradition of leadership.”706  
Transcontinentality also worked as a tool to help explain how fast jets were. Promotional 
material released before the DC-8 entered service encouraged passengers to “just think, 
Vancouver and Toronto will be only four hours apart.”707 The rhetoric here was not far off from 
TCA’s manipulation of history and geography in its earliest promotional material. Even the 
stylized maps that appeared in advertisements introducing TCA’s transcontinental jet service, 
which used forced perspective to make Canada appear larger, would not have been out of place 
in the 1940s. In a 1958 feature about Canada’s “Age of Speed,” Globe and Mail literary editor 
William French extended the well-established transcontinental travel teleology into the jet age: 
“In 1946, flying from Toronto to Vancouver by Trans-Canada Air Lines was still 
something of an adventure. The fastest scheduled time for the trip was 17 hours, [mostly 
in] an ear-cracking DC-3...Now...[TCA] whisks travellers from Toronto to Vancouver 
non-stop in living-room comfort in less than half the time—eight hours and 15 minutes. 
But the best is yet to come. Two years from now, when TCA takes delivery of its all-jet 
DC-8s, the same trip will take four hours...[T]he new giants of the sky will shrink this 
country—and the world around it—to a size that would have made Jules Verne 
boggle.”708 
 
It’s all here. The “adventure” and “ear-cracking” discomfort of earlier forms of transportation. 
The progressive shrinking of travel times and comfort levels. How mind-boggling modern air 
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travel might seem to famous travelers (or, in this case, travel-related science-fiction writers) of 
the past. TCA’s “giant jets” were giants in more ways than one, acting as ideal spokes-planes for 
a nebulously defined “future” of air travel, much as the North Star had done ten years earlier. 
Like promotional material from the 1940s and early 1950s, Canada seemed to grow and 
shrink whenever the need arose in TCA’s jet-age advertisements. The ability of airplanes in 
general, and TCA’s airliners in particular, to shrink distance re-emerged in new ways in the early 
jet age. Canada was so large that setting speed records, as DC-8s did throughout the early years 
of the 1960s, could be considered not only impressive, but a necessary part of transportation 
progress in Canada. The DC-8’s inaugural flight with TCA on March 27, 1960 set the Montreal-
Vancouver speed record with a flying time of five hours and nine minutes. Piloted by Lothian 
and Herb Seagrim, long-serving Vice President of Operations, it carried all sorts of VIPs, 
including Hees and his wife, McGregor, and eventual Air Canada president John Baldwin.709 
Canada also stayed “small” when it needed to, especially when the task was selling the DC-8’s 
destinations, which were all in Canada in the early 1960s. In these types of promotions, the idea 
of “saving time,” although it never really disappeared, was given new life. Now, not only would 
passengers save time compared to rail or vehicle travel, they would also save time compared to 
other types of airplanes and “see how the distance melts away when you go TCA Jet!”710  
Advertisements for the DC-8 through its first year or so of service were dominated by 
arrows. Sometimes those arrows evoked dynamism and modernity, as when they surrounded the 
“Let yourself GO!” couple. When positioned around the airplane itself, arrows suggested speed 
and movement. Sometimes too they traversed destination images, which stood in for the airplane 
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as it flew over a variety of Canadian places. Speed, dynamism, and diversity of vacation choices 
were all included in “saving time” rhetoric; as one DC-8 newspaper advertisement from Spring 
1960 claimed, “wherever it is across Canada that you’ve chosen for your vacation, just a few 
pleasant hours in the air will get you there. You’ll be at your destination ready to get right on 
with your plans, the same day you leave home.”711 Arrows passed over bustling cities, pastoral 
lakes, and majestic mountains, all of which appeared to be so close to one another that they were 
only an easy jet jaunt away. 
It did not take long for Canadians to take to jets, both as a discursive hallmark of high 
modern culture and as an actual mode of transportation. According to McGregor, TCA began 
looking for ways to phase out its Viscounts and Vanguards as early as 1963 because “the public 
regarded anything other than jet travel as passé.”712 However, the transition to full turbine was 
not embraced with open arms by everyone. First, the transcontinentality enthusiastically 
portrayed in the airline’s promotional materials did not work so well in practice. The smaller 
cities served by TCA’s short-haul “milk runs” using DC-3s did not have the infrastructure to 
support jets, which was alarming to politicians who saw TCA’s transition to turbine power as a 
harbinger of the airline neglecting certain parts of Canada. A Member of Parliament from 
Saskatchewan complained to Hees in 1959 that his riding, “a very air-minded city, with almost a 
pioneer’s record in the aviation field,” would lose regularly scheduled service as TCA phased out 
its piston airliners.713 The unpopularity of transcontinental travel—that is, passengers rarely flew 
from Vancouver to Toronto—was also used as fodder for parliamentarians who advocated for 
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the privatization of TCA, the introduction of domestic competition, the reduction of government 
subsidies, or some combination of the three. Northern Ontario MP Douglas Fisher, who 
ironically held the seat previously held by Howe, complained about how much money TCA had 
spent “in order to enter the jet field.” “What do we actually gain by getting to Vancouver from 
Montreal or Toronto a couple of hours faster, or in coming the other way?” he asked in March 
1960.714 These sorts of questions destabilized earlier constructions of air travel as necessary for 
Canadian unity and of TCA’s responsibility to all of Canada by staying on the cutting edge of 
technological progress. Jets were too big and too fast to serve the country’s best interests; 
Canada’s envirotechnical status as an aviation nation was threatened by this type of airplane. 
Next, even passengers and politicians who had embraced the idea of jets as the future of 
travel were not so enthusiastic once they experienced them firsthand. Lothian described the 
process like this: 
“On the first few take-offs Mr. Canadian Citizen looked up in wonder at the great giant 
passing overhead. Such majesty, such an incredible demonstration of power, what an all-
encompassing, all enveloping, soul-searing sound. Stunned and a little pleased he stood 
transfixed, a feeling of pride entering his soul as he read the insignia of his national 
airline on the DC-8’s side. When his scrambled brain returned to normal, he realized this 
was to be a new way of life and all hell broke loose.”715 
 
Jets, “Mr. Canadian Citizen” soon learned, were extremely noisy, and the expanded airports that 
appeared on the outskirts of population centers through this period concentrated the noise around 
sprawling Canadian suburbs.716 The elegant high-modern image of a cutting-edge airplane 
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branded with the name “Canada” and a red maple leaf, shrinking the country and offering its 
passengers the “God’s-eye-view” of their magnificent nation, had reached its limits. Noise was a 
common concern in cities across North America, where airports were being retrofitted or 
reconstructed to accommodate jets. Runways needed to be longer, landscaping needed to be 
flatter to allow control towers and aircraft to have uncompromised visibility, and capacities 
needed to grow in general. Increasingly crowded skies troubled airport-adjacent communities, 
which sought legal, legislative, and grassroots recourse. At New York City’s Idlewild airport 
(later John F. Kennedy International), for example, mothers threatened to push their baby 
strollers onto active jet runways to protest the noise, and property owners in the nearby Rosedale 
neighborhood sued the New York Port Authority in 1961 for loss of property value.717 Like other 
high-modern megaprojects, those living in the vicinity of mid-century airports were not passive 
recipients of “modern development,” but instead shaped their own jet-age experiences. 
The two largest airports built through the late 1960s to “handle the expected onslaught of 
people” in Canadian cities who had caught what airport historian Bret Edwards calls “jet-age 
fever” were Montreal-Mirabel Airport (opened in 1975) and what would eventually be called 
Lester B. Pearson International Airport, located in the Malton neighborhood of Mississauga at 
the north-west corner of Toronto.718 The site on which Pearson, as it is informally known in the 
twenty-first century, was built had been a municipally-owned airport serving Toronto since the 
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late 1930s. During the war it had hosted one of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan’s 
Canadian flight schools and the Victory Aircraft factory and subsequently became a hub of 
Canadian aviation manufacturing. By the 1950s, however, the infrastructure at Malton could not 
keep up with the size, weight, and frequency of jet flights and the City of Toronto sold the airport 
to the federal Department of Transport in 1958; the airport was demolished and reconstructed 
piecemeal through the 1960s. The first new terminal was opened in 1964. 
Despite the fact that Malton had a long aviation history (and continued to be the site of 
cutting-edge Canadian aerospace development such as the Avro Canada CF-105 Arrow long-
range interceptor), it was not easy to turn the site into an airport suitable for Canada’s passenger 
jet age. Malton had grown since the 1930s because of the aviation industry there—the A. V. Roe 
Canada factory employed 50,000 people—but there was still a substantial rural population in the 
1960s as well as those who still saw the region as an escape from urban Toronto life.719 The 
increased traffic raised concerns about noise and congestion, and residents mobilized almost 
immediately to bring their concerns to the attention of the government. A chicken farmer living 
just west of the airport had to give up his farm because the noise scared his chickens out of 
laying eggs, township councillors told the federal Deputy Transport Minister in a 1961 local 
hearing. Another councillor claimed that he no longer visited family in Malton because “it’s too 
noisy and the whole house rattles when the jets fly over.”720 The new airport terminals at Malton 
had scarcely been completed when the federal government announced another massive 
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expansion in 1968. Transport experts had expected the increases in demand for passenger air 
travel to tail off by the mid-1960s, but they had not. Malton, Toronto, and Mississauga all kept 
expanding as planned suburbs encroached on and eventually displaced farming communities. 
Malton residents wrote to the Minister of Transport en masse in opposition to the expansion and 
sent a contingent to the inaugural meeting of the Society for Aircraft Noise Abatement.721 At the 
end of the year, the decision was reversed and the government instead began planning for a 
second international airport site in Pickering on the east end of Toronto. The “Pickering Plan” 
was also abandoned by the mid-1970s and now Lester B. Pearson International Airport is the 
largest airport in Canada. 
Like the airport in Pickering, Mirabel is also a “failed” project. Originally planned to 
supplement and eventually replace Montreal’s airport at Dorval, now Pierre Elliott Trudeau 
International Airport, the initial enthusiasm for Mirabel rode the wave of nationalism and 
Montreal boosterism provided by Expo 67, Canada’s centennial world’s fair in Montreal. Also 
like the Pickering Plan, the plans for Mirabel began well into the jet age after it became clear that 
the demand for air travel was not going to wane anytime soon. Therefore, Mirabel was a very 
forward-looking airport; the government’s expropriation of almost 100,000 acres of land in 1969 
meant that it would be the largest airport in the world by a significant margin. Because of its 
scale, state involvement, and on-the-ground resistance from human and non-human actors, 
airport historian Bret Edwards argues that Mirabel should be characterized as a megaproject “in 
the purest sense.”722 As a megaproject, Mirabel represented the jet-age Canadian state’s 
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preoccupation with air travel and physically and discursively re-shaping the nation’s geography 
to fit its narratives of mobility across space.723 It was also a physical manifestation of optimism 
about the nation’s growth and transportation future, its massive size a signal that Canada would 
continue to lead in aviation and that its population was modern and global.  
It was that very scale that led to the downfall of Mirabel; as policy scholars Elliot 
Feldman and Jerome Milch put it, “no one in [the Ministry of] Transport had thought through the 
consequences of such a decision.”724 10,000 people in the rural village of Sainte-Scholastique 
were displaced by the expropriation and received little-to-no assistance from the state, and those 
who stayed witnessed a technocratic “controlling and sterilizing” of their lived landscape.725 As 
megaprojects are wont to do, Mirabel ran over-budget, behind schedule, and into hurdles such as 
disagreements between the airlines and state about whether Mirabel would handle domestic as 
well as overseas routes. It opened in October 1975, about a year later than expected and just in 
time for Montreal to host the 1976 Summer Olympics. Even with that added traffic, fewer than 3 
million passengers flew through Mirabel in 1976; after a disappointing two decades, the airport 
ceased commercial operations entirely in 2004.726 The reasons that Mirabel “failed” are many—
passengers did not like having separate airports for domestic and international flights, it was not 
served well by highways or rail, and the energy crisis of the mid-1970s made air travel an all-
around expensive endeavor—but its ascension and decline show the impact that “giant jets” had 
on how the state and everyday Canadians imagined travel.  
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Jets transformed modern travelways in other ways not limited to the act of flying. Not 
only did airports expand and noisy jets interrupt the rhythms of daily life, but getting somewhere 
by jet was a different experience than getting somewhere by piston-powered airplane because of 
the accessibility of those airports. Both Mirabel and Toronto International were very difficult to 
access from their respective city centres; public transit options were minimal, as were parking 
and access road options. Sainte-Scholastique in particular was over 30 miles from downtown 
Montreal and a promised rail link never materialized. From the public’s point of view, getting to 
the airport became the airline’s problem because passengers expected one continuous service 
between leaving their home and taking off. Passengers had been complaining to TCA about 
taxis, car services, and airport parking since the 1940s, but, like everything else, the increased 
volume of the jet age made these complaints more frequent and more visible. In a 1960 CBC 
interview, McGregor described a futuristic scenario in which rotary-wing aircraft, rail, monorail, 
or some combination thereof would create a seamless transport experience where passengers 
could be “checked out, have their tickets lifted on the way to the airport, enter the airport and the 
aircraft as checked-out passengers with their baggage entirely dealt with, and be airborne in a 
matter of minutes from the leaving of the downtown city center.”727 McGregor got so inured to 
fielding questions about airport access that in a question-and-answer session a year later he 
misinterpreted a press question about if taxiway transportation (that is, getting from the terminal 
to the airplane) would ever go as fast as 20 miles per hour, answering that he “cannot virtually 
guess as to when you will be able to attain an average speed of 20 miles per hour between here 
and the airport.” Once corrected, he apologized for missing “the fine edge of your [the 
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reporter’s] sarcasm” to uproarious laughter and then answered a question about prospective 
helicopter access to Toronto airports.728 Although McGregor could not offer reassuring concrete 
solutions to airport congestion in either case, the press and passenger preoccupation with it was 
an indication that the “jet age” represented much more than just flying somewhere on a jet. 
TCA needed to adjust just about everything to accommodate their “giant jets.” The 
airplanes themselves warranted new advertising strategies which drew on tropes such as 
transcontinentality but without the technological Canadian-ness of their predecessors. They were 
still doing the same modern time-space compression as the North Star, but faster, further, and 
carrying larger loads. This made it even more important for TCA to lean on modern Canadian 
envirotechnicality to support the work it was doing, but also more difficult as the increased size, 
speed, and volume limited the continuation of a unified promotional identity for the airline that 
itself relied on a unified Canadian identity. Canada’s jet age began to look like everyone else’s 
jet age, with massive “placeless” airports and the same airplanes that operators in the United 
States, France, New Zealand, and Italy (among others) were using by the mid-1960s. Because of 
this, the voices questioning what remained Canadian enough about TCA to warrant public 
ownership grew louder through the 1960s, resulting in revamped passenger relations, a new 
name for the airline, a slide from nuanced expression of place into caricature, and eventually the 
deregulation of the airline. 
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“TCA’s Private Genie”: ReserVec and Public Ownership in the Jet Age 
In keeping with TCA’s other anniversaries, the airline used its 25th birthday to celebrate 
its future rather than its past. In spring 1962, TCA debuted the world’s first real-time 
computerized airline reservations system: ReserVec I. Built by the Canadian branch of British 
computer firm Ferranti, ReserVec—short for “Reservations Electronically Controlled”— made 
its debut two years before American Airlines’ SABRE system. Unlike SABRE, which was 
plagued with problems, ReserVec “performed beautifully from the start,” exceeding its planned 
60,000 transactions-per-day pace and serving as the backbone of TCA’s reservations 
infrastructure for nine years.729 This short story is about why and how TCA was able to be the 
first in the world in this regard, and how the development of ReserVec was a response to two 
factors that might be considered reverse salients in TCA’s envirotechnical vision of modern 
Canada: its service and its monopoly. A “reverse salient,” a term used in military engineering 
adapted by Thomas Hughes in his 1983 book Networks of Power, is an aspect of a technological 
system that is not in lock-step with the rest, slowing the system down and requiring 
“concentrated action” to proceed.730 It does not necessarily have to be technological—Hughes’ 
example in Networks of Power is an economic disadvantage—and in this case, what was holding 
TCA back was the public perception of its monopoly status. That some saw TCA’s public 
ownership as a source of complacency was a “critical problem” unforeseen by TCA’s “system 
builders”—another Hughes term—Howe and McGregor, that limited both TCA’s physical 
operations and its corporate efficiency. ReserVec was one of those “innumerable...inventions and 
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technological developments [that] result from efforts to correct reverse salients.”731 By 
developing ReserVec over the last few years of the 1950s and first few of the 1960s, TCA was 
able to twist these criticisms and suggest that rather than complacency and the mistreatment of 
passengers, public ownership meant that it could experiment with new technologies such as 
computers and jets without the risk of succumbing to free-market forces. The development of 
ReserVec was therefore both a reaction to critics of TCA’s customer service and a chance to 
build some of Canada’s earliest general computers away from free-market precariousness. This 
short story is also about computerized reservations systems as symptomatic of a larger trend 
towards a new scaling-up of passenger relations as air travel became mass transit in the jet age. 
Reservations had long been a problem for TCA’s public relations. The most popular 
reservations system, used by TCA and other large airlines in the 1940s and 1950s, used teletype 
and telephone. Major hubs such as Toronto were connected to local sales offices and, much like 
a children’s game of “telephone,” there were many opportunities for the system to break down. 
First, because the data were displayed visually on hardboard wall charts and updated by either 
manual re-writes or color-coding, availability and a passenger’s ability to book their ticket was 
determined by their reservation agent’s sight lines to the display board. It also meant that the size 
of reservations staff was limited by those same sight lines, making booking a long and repetitive 
process; Flight magazine mentioned in 1959 that one unnamed airline “provides reservations 
clerks with binoculars to allow them to contemplate the far-distant flight control board,” along 
with other “strange devices” to keep up with reservations in the jet age.732 Another major issue 
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was speed, as once a flight was full and the “stop sale” message had been sent out to ticket 
agents, there could be a long delay before all agencies received the message and stopped selling 
tickets, leading to overbooking and disgruntled passengers. Sometimes those delays were as long 
as six hours, which led to ticket agents withholding a small number of seats to allow for 
cancellations and last-minute requests, but this too was far from ideal and was not a permanent 
solution as the “big jets” loomed on the horizon.733 Like other airlines in the 1950s, TCA was 
growing rapidly—the fleet expanded by one-third, passenger capacity by 90 per cent, and 
passenger demand had more than doubled between 1952 and 1955—and the ad-hoc workarounds 
for its reservations weak points were providing diminishing returns.734  
Although this was not an issue entirely unique to TCA, the airline’s critics used its 
reservations weaknesses to argue that TCA was becoming complacent thanks to its public 
ownership. Passengers and parliamentarians alike believed that domestic competition would 
keep the airline “on its toes,” so to speak, and re-orient TCA away from buying the latest planes 
and towards shoring up its passenger base. “I think TCA needs some competition,” complained 
one passenger after her family’s reservation was mistakenly cancelled.735 Others suggested that 
“there is nothing wrong with TCA that good competition wouldn’t cure” and that “competition is 
very healthy and TCA doesn’t have any!” in their comments to the airline.736 One of the 
legislative arguments for either privatizing TCA or introducing domestic competition was that 
the airline was gaining a reputation of being what MP W. B. Nesbitt called “best in the air, worst 
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on the ground.” His constituents complained to him about unnecessary, unexplained delays that 
seemed “to happen more frequently with Trans-Canada Air Lines than with other air lines.” 737 
Another MP added that disembarking passengers were treated “like a bunch of cattle” at the 
Malton airport and that “a little more competition” would “improve the service.”738 This was, of 
course, not the only reason critics believed TCA needed competition or privatization, but the 
focus on reservations and service suggests that there was a fundamental rift between TCA’s 
critics and supporters about what a state airline was for. If it was a public good, as McGregor and 
Howe believed it to be, then competition would be like having “two sources of lighting supply, 
two sources of sewage disposal or two sources of garbage collection” in the same municipality, 
which “doesn’t make good economic sense,” as McGregor told the Air Transport Board in the 
late 1950s.739 Competition would therefore disrupt TCA’s ability to provide effective public 
infrastructure. If, on the other hand, it was a monopoly funded by the taxpayers, then competition 
would keep TCA healthy by limiting unsustainable growth, unnecessary expenditures, and 
mistreatment of consumers.  
This was also a regional issue. Large cities in Ontario and Quebec were well-served by 
TCA’s most advanced aircraft and services, but points West were not. As mentioned above, TCA 
DC-3s continued to service smaller towns and cities in the Prairie provinces, but were on 
borrowed time. The press reported in 1960 that it was only with “some reluctance” that TCA was 
planning to replace the DC-3 with Viscounts, rather than eliminating the routes entirely in the jet 
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age.740 Furthermore, the West was also served by Canadian Pacific Airlines (CPA). Founded in 
the early 1940s as the air arm of the Canadian Pacific Railway, much as TCA had come out of 
the CNR, CPA was another direct descendant of the bush flying industry. Instead of flying east-
west along the trans-Canada airway, however, CPA continued to work in what might still have 
been considered “bush” territory, serving communities along north-south axes in Canada’s 
western provinces that fed into TCA’s trunk routes. Its first president, long-time CPR executive 
Edward Beatty, almost immediately proposed merging CPA with TCA, as he saw their services 
as complimentary and equally important to physical and discursive nation-building, and began 
applying for route licenses along the airway in the late 1930s. The CPR’s attempts to secure a 
foothold in the Canadian aviation landscape proved unsuccessful. Beatty, the loudest voice in 
favor of amalgamation, died partway through the process. Despite a $7 million investment in 
these feeder lines by buying up the routes and fleets of smaller bush flying companies, CPA was 
essentially cut out of any national aviation schemes by Howe and TCA’s board, who were 
concerned about merging its then-profitable enterprise with CP’s struggling one. Under Howe’s 
advisement, Prime Minister Mackenzie King announced TCA as the government’s “chosen 
instrument” for transcontinental and overseas travel in April 1943, just in time for TCA to begin 
flying as the CGTAS.741 CPA was barred from flying any of the same routes as TCA and was 
limited to a small number of routes left over from its bush flying days. 
These limits were met with resistance by CPA’s postwar president, former bush pilot 
Grant McConachie, who took office a year before McGregor at TCA. By all accounts a 
gregarious, charismatic leader, McConachie pushed the government for expanded routes, 
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obtaining its first international route (Vancouver to Sydney, Australia) in November 1948.742 As 
a state airline, TCA essentially had first pick of international routes, and McGregor’s experiences 
with TCA Atlantic and the financial turmoil of the late 1940s meant that he “had no yen for 
marginal air routes,” as McConachie’s biographer Ronald Keith suggests. Because “his credo 
was expansionist,” McConachie and CPA snapped up unprofitable routes through the 1950s, 
including all trans-Pacific flights and a Montreal-Amsterdam route, and in 1957 TCA’s 
monopoly began to crumble.743  
Social historian Don Nerbas argues that this was largely because of the Canadian political 
climate; after 22 years of Liberal leadership in Parliament (with Howe as TCA’s staunchest 
defender), a Conservative Prime Minister was elected in 1957 and Howe lost his seat. New 
Prime Minister John Diefenbaker did not share Howe’s “philosophy of strategic government 
intervention” geared toward using the state to fine-tune national growth by focusing on particular 
industries, and instead opened limited transcontinental flights to CPA.744 Although it did not 
advertise the same way TCA did in the 1950s—McConachie preferred word-of-mouth and 
promotional stunts such as giveaways—CPA was dismantling not only TCA’s monopoly on air 
routes but also its monopoly on aviation discourse in Canada.745 By the late 1950s, as TCA was 
bringing in its “giant jets,” putting out “Progress Reports,” and dodging questions about its 
shoddy passenger service, the specter of competition in earnest was looming. Passengers west of 
Winnipeg had been served by multiple Canadian airlines since the interwar years, so their 
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perspective was different than those from large cities in the East. TCA’s loudest critics came 
from the West, who instead relied on Vancouver-based CPA to serve their air transport needs. 
Why did the state need to support TCA, they wondered, when their communities were being 
served perfectly well through private enterprise? Although it still had the financial support of 
Parliament, TCA finally had to grapple with those new perspectives as CPA’s routes began 
infringing on its own. 
ReserVec worked well as a response of all of this. First, it could remedy TCA’s service 
woes, which had the added benefit of showing that it could continue to innovate without other 
airlines to keep it on its figurative toes. There are two sets of assumptions that can be made about 
TCA’s responses to its monopoly. The first is that TCA was always on the offensive because it 
could experiment with cutting-edge technologies such as turboprop engines and computers 
without fear of failure. An expensive risk could mean the end of an airline in free markets such 
as the United States, but TCA had a guaranteed line of support and could therefore try new 
things. This argument also works in reverse, as TCA needed to constantly defend its state status 
through these innovations. They were proof that competition was not a necessary condition for 
continual technological improvement. Given that ReserVec beat its closest competitor by 
approximately two years, it served both of these approaches to competition. “Worst on the 
ground” could be reframed as “first on the ground” and the introduction of computers could 
demonstrate the airline’s devotion to passenger relations. It also suggested that as public 
enterprise, TCA was best suited to patronize and foster Canadian technological development. Its 
$3.25 million contract with Ferranti-Packard gave the firm “the cash, the technological 
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opportunity, and the credibility” to create Canada’s first general-purpose computer.746 This was 
great for TCA’s optics as well; McGregor bragged about the “triumph of electronic engineering 
on the part of our own technical staffs, working in conjunction with technical groups outside the 
company.”747 Promotional material and press coverage emphasized the idea that TCA was 
working with a Canadian firm to make a Canadian computer, implying that early computing 
could and should be a state-supported effort. From a public relations point of view, ReserVec 
helped TCA self-legitimize as a state airline, Ferranti-Packard self-legitimize as a private firm, 
and both self-legitimize as necessary parts of the modern Canadian communications landscape. 
Like other North American and European airlines, TCA began experimenting with 
automatic reservations in the late 1940s, using mechanical systems developed during the war. 
TCA hired communications engineer Lyman Richardson in 1949 to experiment with the 
University of Toronto’s Ferut computer, manufactured by Ferranti in Britain, but it was unable to 
perform in real time, which was vital for airline reservations.748 Based on Richardson’s report on 
his work with Ferut, TCA concluded that whatever it eventually implemented required what 
Canadian computing historian John Vardalas has called “a fusion of computation, 
communication, and human interface considerations.”749 This “unique and bold” fusion was 
precisely what Ferranti Canada had done with their Digital Automated Tracking and Resolving 
(DATAR) system, developed with contracts from the Royal Canadian Navy and the Defence 
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Research Board through the middle part of the 1950s.750 DATAR had been built very quickly—it 
had gone from proof-of-concept to working prototype in less than four years—but the effort 
required to implement it and the waning interest in large military projects after the Korean War 
meant that the military saw “little merit” in implementing it.751 However, the lessons learned 
from DATAR helped Ferranti Canada’s successful bid to TCA by foregrounding the human-
machine interface rather than the most complex part of the system (the central computer). At 
TCA, the reservations agent was the pivot point between passenger and airplane, and therefore 
their communication with the computer was the most important aspect of any booking system. 
Ferranti Canada pitched the idea of the “Transactor,” based on Richardson’s observation 
that ticketing agents wrote down information on scraps of paper as they spoke to passengers on 
the telephone. To use the “Transactor,” agents would mark booking information on a pre-printed 
card with a pencil, which they would then insert into the machine. The card would be pressed 
against a reading plate equipped with sensors that would detect the conductivity of the graphite 
pencil lead and send the information to the central computer. The central computer would then 
indicate availability by punching out a pre-printed mark on the same card. The whole process 
took approximately five seconds. Six “Transactors” were hooked up to Ferut to demonstrate the 
viability of the system to the TCA executive and board in October 1957.752 The demonstration 
was sufficiently novel to be picked up by the New York Times, which emphasized the 
“immediate” and “up-to-the second” real-time aspects of the new system.753 It also impressed the 
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TCA executives, who authorized $3.25 million for construction of the “Transactors” and 
“Gemini” central computer by 1959 despite pressure from IBM. IBM had been working on the 
SABRE system for American Airlines, but in a “bold” move that “took courage,” TCA chose to 
work with a Canadian company. In their history of Ferranti-Packard, Vardalas and historian 
Norman Ball argue that this choice helped establish Ferranti Canada as a major player in 
computing and emphasizes the critical role that the state has had in the development of Canadian 
technology and enterprise.754 The name “ReserVec” was chosen from an employee contest in 
1960, installation and testing began in the spring of 1961, and full-scale operations began in 
January 1963.755 
The themes of TCA’s ReserVec-related promotional material were three-fold and very 
much related to the airline’s larger issues with self-legitimation and the state. First, the 
computerized reservation was used as proof that the airline was taking its passenger relations 
seriously. Reservations were placed alongside paradigm-shifting technologies such as turbine 
engines to “make the point that TCA is planning to bring Canadians better service on the ground 
as in the air.”756 Giving it the “Progress Report” treatment in 1957 was just one way to cement 
the idea that at TCA, the jet age encompassed much more than just “jets.” The speed-up of the jet 
age required all-new infrastructure, “so TCA is...making use of the modern miracle of 
electronics. Reservations offices across the continent would be connected directly with a giant 
electronic ‘brain’...completely automatic, able to plot every seat on every flight months in 
advance, to give flight information and make reservations, in seconds.”757 This was an important 
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aspect of the “Planning Year” according to McGee, and looking ahead to TCA’s new 
reservations system would show that the airline “is capable of keeping in step.”758 Furthermore, 
painting TCA as consistently forward-looking connected electronic reservations to the rest of the 
Canadian aviation imaginary, as a 25th anniversary advertisement reminded passengers. “TCA’s 
responsibility, of course, has been linking a huge, thinly-populated country tightly together,” it 
claimed. Part of that responsibility was that it had to be “always alert to new concepts” and was 
therefore “applying miracles of electronic science to improve passenger service.”759 Putting 
ground services on par with the other changes at TCA showed that the airline did not need 
competition or deregulation to continue to innovate on both fronts and that overhauling the 
reservations system was just as important as buying the latest aircraft. “The standards demanded 
by the jet age,” as one 1958 newspaper advertisement called them, required a well-rounded 
approach to the entire air travel experience.760 By developing and installing a pioneering 
computerized reservations system, TCA had a concrete example with a catchy portmanteau name 
of its devotion to its passenger base of Canadian taxpayers.  
The “Progress Report” was released a good half-decade before ReserVec was operational, 
so it relied on vague retro-futuristic imagery—lines, graphs, squares—that evoked “science” and 
“technology” to make the airline seem like the cutting edge in passenger service. This is 
suggestive of the second theme; like the North Star’s pressurized cabin before it, ReserVec was 
painted as both magical and mundane, a science-fiction future and an everyday present. It was 
common in 1950s and early 1960s advertising rhetoric to refer to computers as “electronic 
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brains,” as TCA’s advertisements did. It was also common to focus on the machine itself, 
backgrounding the labor necessary to build and run it.761 This meant, like other modern 
technologies including airplanes, that computers were black-boxed and potentially scary to the 
modern consumer. This was less of an issue at TCA, as the airline 
was not selling computers in and of themselves, but it still had to 
project that it was comfortable with computers and keeping up 
with the most modern developments in passenger service. 
Promotional material that featured ReserVec therefore walked a 
fine line between explaining how the system worked in order to 
demystify it and maintaining that mystique in order to make it 
seem exciting and new.  
Once the system was in place at TCA, advertisements in 
which it was featured frequently explained in simplified terms 
how it worked. For example, Ferranti-Packard took out a 
congratulatory advertisement focusing on both the 25th anniversary 
of the airline and “the initial implementation of your ReserVec 
system.” The ad (Figure 18) showed pictorially the process of 
reserving a seat with TCA: first the agent prepares the marked 
card and inserts it into her “set,” and then “your request is 
transmitted to a computer located in Toronto” capable of confirming 
the reservation in “2 seconds.”762 A TCA advertisement from 1963 
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explained how the “Transactor” and main ReserVec system “‘talk’ constantly to one another.” 
ReserVec was characterized in that same ad as “TCA’s private genie,” a “remarkable device,” 
and a “Canadian-made electronic ‘Aladdin’s Lamp.’” 763 The 25th anniversary promotion 
discussed above mentions the “miracles” of electronics. ReserVec’s black boxes had to be both 
maintained and forcibly opened if passengers were to accept it as equal parts common to their air 
travel experience and a symbol of TCA’s jet age innovation. 
The third theme, although not applied as deliberately as the others, hinted at the type of 
service TCA would continue to offer in the jet age. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, TCA had 
long featured women in its advertisements and imagined woman travelers as a more-or-less 
discrete demographic for its services. TCA’s reservations agents were often women, as their 
work was considered largely clerical and was therefore gendered female, and their smiling faces 
and characteristic hands-free telephone headsets were staples of TCA’s promotional material. 
Advertisements suggested that reservations agents would care for passengers and that they acted 
as a sort of matchmaker, pairing up passengers with the flights best suited to their needs. In a 
system campaign from late 1957—just after TCA publicly announced that it was developing 
computerized reservations—a smiling agent in a calm but busy office “makes a thousand dates.” 
Armed with a headset and a pencil, “her job is to do everything possible to get you on the flight 
you prefer, to give you a pleasant start to your journey...You’re dealing with someone who 
knows air travel intimately, who will make every effort to fulfill your wishes.” Aside from a 
brief mention of the “streamlined electronics systems” that the airline was developing and the 
fact that it uses photography, this advertisement would not have been out of place a decade 
                                               




before.764 The model for the ad was a real member of TCA’s reservations staff in Montreal, who 
McGee thought “symbolize[d] efficiency and friendly service” and would “enable the general 
public to visualize the ‘behind-the-scene’ operation” of the airline.765 Once ReserVec was 
implemented in the early 1960s, women continued to feature prominently. As Marie Hicks has 
recently shown in their work on women and computing in Britain, advertising and promotional 
images for computers almost always showed women as examples of “how it might look to use a 
computer, humanizing opaque, intimidating, and potentially confusing machines.”766 Again, 
TCA was not selling computers, but ReserVec agents worked as a sort of bridge between the 
cutting-edge technological and service-based public images of the airline. Reservations agents 
were shown taking orders over the telephone, sending their punched card signals to the 
mainframe, and turning its response into a paper ticket; passengers did not interact with 
ReserVec themselves, but instead would see a change in their interactions with human service 
agents. As stewardesses did for the airplanes themselves, reservations agents using high-tech 
machines gave a human face to modern technologies that might seem threatening to everyday 
passengers. TCA could have all the high-end jets and computers it could afford, but it could not 
forget that it moved people as well as airplanes.  
Selling ReserVec as equal parts modern technology and human experience allowed TCA 
to prioritize both of those aspects of air travel in its public-facing material, hinting that a 
monopoly might encourage innovation and attention to service rather than stifle it. Subsequently, 
the story of ReserVec is a window into TCA’s crumbling hold on Canadian aviation discourse in 
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the jet age. Not only were passengers and politicians increasingly critical of the airline, seeing 
through its triumphalist narratives and suggesting that a state airline might not be in the best 
interest of Canada’s geographic realities, but regional competition was nipping at TCA’s heels. 
Developing a real-time electronic reservations system using one of Canada’s first general-
purpose computers helped TCA stand out from its actual and discursive competition. It added 
ReserVec to its long list of “firsts” in the jet age to help justify its public status—CPA certainly 
could not have afforded the expense and risk—and emphasize the role of state enterprise in 
Canadian technological development. Airplanes were no longer the only technology that TCA 
had to try and fold into its rhetoric of space and nation, and even then “space” and “nation” 
meant something very different in the 1960s, as will be discussed in the next short story. 
 
Jet-Age Sun Destinations 
There were a lot of similarities between TCA’s sun destination advertising in the piston 
era and in the jet age. For example, the airline maintained many of its graphic design strategies, 
such as using saturated colors, incorporating photographs, and making frequent uses of “sun” in 
images and copy. A late 1957 southern destination brochure with the tagline “Fly South,” for 
example, featured “what we consider to be typical illustrations for such areas,” McGee wrote in 
his release memo.767 Haloed by a yellow sun, a photorealistic woman in a bathing costume is 
helped off of a pool deck by her male companion; their positioning, with her body facing the 
reader and the majority of his body obscured by the water, echoes the Florida campaigns 
discussed in Chapter 4. A direct mail campaign from the same season used a “novel approach” 
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by mobilizing some animal mascots.768 “Why bear the winter?” asked one, in which a cartoon 
bear prepares to hibernate until he learns of TCA’s southern services. He eventually finds 
himself dozing against a palm tree wearing swim trunks and sunglasses as a Lockheed Super 
Constellation flies across the sun overhead. Another mailer featured a trio of birds modeling 
proper migration behavior: heading south by TCA with suitcases and cameras in tow. Not only 
does the Super Constellation fly across the sun, but the “o” in 
“South” is a stylized sun. 
Perhaps the most overt example of these three 
techniques—color, suns, photography—is in a national brochure 
from 1958. The cover is dominated by the name of the 
destination, Florida, in large red letters, with the “O” replaced by 
an anthropomorphic smiling yellow sun (Figure 19). “Using the 
sun as the ‘O’ for extra impact” McGee claimed, would help the 
brochure “stand out in literature racks,” as would the “bright 
colours, typical of Florida and Southern climes.” The remainder 
of the brochure’s cover is taken up by a photograph of a couple 
waterskiing in red and yellow bathing costumes. “Colourful 
shots of typical scenes,” such as palm trees and beaches make up 
the rest.769 The brochure implored travelers to “winter in the Sun,” 
since “Even Old Mr. Sun spends the winter in Florida!” 
                                               
768 Memorandum by J. A. McGee, “Southern Services Direct Mail Program,” 18 January 1957, 
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769 Memorandum by J. A. McGee, “Florida Promotion Folder English and French,” 21 January 
1958, Air Canada Collection 005.005 Box 08, CASM. 
Figure 19: “Florida,” 1957. 
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“That’s a pretty bright idea when you stop to consider the icy prospect of another long, 
cold Canadian winter. Snow and sleet...slippery streets...bitter, biting North wind! 
Brr...Who wouldn’t trade all this in a minute for days of lazy, lying around on Florida’s 
sun-baked, sandy beaches...Best of all, you can be in the heart of this sun and fun-filled 
land in just a few hours...simply fly in comfort—non-stop—by TCA...And why shouldn’t 
you? Winter is so far away...and you’re in Florida!”770 
 
Although this brochure features all the typical early-1950s graphic cues, the copy betrays its jet 
age vintage and highlights the major shifts in the airline’s sun destination strategies that are the 
focus of this section: emphasizing the transformative power of jets, the emergence of Florida as a 
key “sun destination,” and the eventual displacement of “time travel” as a discursive strategy by 
constructing Canadian winters as unpleasant, uncomfortable, and worth escaping.  
As many other advertisements did in this period, promotions for flights to Florida and the 
Caribbean evoked “magic carpet” imagery when describing the method of travel.771 In the jet 
age, however, the carpets were even more magical. They went faster and further, carried more 
passengers, and soared through the air without so much as a spinning propeller to betray the 
effort necessary. They also increasingly flew non-stop to sun destinations, reinforcing their roles 
as transformative machines. As an early 1960s newspaper advertisement suggested, warm-
weather vacations were one of the “luxuries of the jet-age world.”772 In late 1958, TCA’s In 
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Flight magazine featured a history of Caribbean travel and considered “the advent of the four-
engined airliner in the late ‘40s” as responsible for a postwar surge in southern vacations because 
it had “the range and speed to bring the islands to the very doorsteps of those who were seeking a 
new travel interest.”773 If the North Star was powerful enough to discursively move entire islands 
closer to Canada, jet-age advertisements claimed, imagine how much more work a jet could do. 
The word “jet” itself even did some of this heavy lifting, frequently replacing “fly” as the 
operative verb in advertising headlines and copy. The tagline “Jet TCA South to the Sun” 
appeared frequently in newspaper and display promotions through this period, suggesting that 
the act of “jetting” was more transformative than the act of flying.774 “Jet South by Air Canada,” 
one mid-1960s newspaper advertisement implored; “swiftly, smoothly, easily, Air Canada jets 
you to islands of unbelievable charm! Within hours, you’re in a world that’s out of this world... 
Whether your tastes are simple or sophisticated, your Travel Agent can help you find an island to 
suit them—and Air Canada jets you there in hours!”775 In advertisements like these, “jet” also 
replaced the word “get,” which opened the door for some awkward portmanteaux such as 
“jetaway” to describe jet-powered getaways to sun destinations. Even the language of jet-
powered sun destination travel was different than older rhetoric. 
Although “south” remained a catch-all category as it had in the 1940s and 1950s, Florida 
emerged in particular as a popular warm-weather vacation destination for both Canadians and 
Americans through the 1960s, largely because it was accessible by car. Historians of tourism 
agree that the privately-owned automobile and national highway systems, more than any other 
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transportation and infrastructure, modified the travel and tourism habits of everyday North 
Americans. Travelers wishing for a respite from winter conditions in eastern Canada had been 
driving to Florida since the interwar period, following the Queen Elizabeth Way super-highway, 
completed in 1939 and connecting Toronto with Hamilton, Niagara Falls, and the U.S. border, 
and then the network of American federal highway systems. In fact, Torontonians were able to 
drive to Florida decades before they were able to drive to Calgary or Vancouver; apparently 
attracting tourists was a higher priority in modern Canada than transcending the nation’s 
distances by car.776 In Florida’s case, as tourism scholar Godefroy Desrosiers-Lauzon has 
argued, automobile tourism did not give way to “uncontested domination by airlines,” and even 
at the end of the twentieth century “automobile use by Florida-bound tourists has faltered a lot 
more slowly than the modernist trope suggests.”777 Traveling to Florida by car in the postwar 
period was convenient for a number of reasons—costs were lower if traveling with a group, for 
example, and travelers would not have to rent a car to get around in Florida—and it also 
encouraged “snowbird” behavior. Rather than squeezing as much leisure as possible into “two 
weeks,” “snowbirds” visited Florida multiple times and spent more time and money there.778  
Automobility and repeat long-term visits became hallmarks of the modern Florida 
vacation experience, especially for Canadians seeking a break from their winters.779 As 
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mentioned in Chapter 4, this increased access bled into aviation discourse. Canadian tourists 
were more interested in Florida than the Caribbean, and even though attracting new business 
from “snowbirders” was considered a lost cause, the airline’s public-facing material followed the 
trends by focusing on Florida. Advertisements for Florida made use of all the regular tropes, 
including women in bathing suits, beach activities, and palm trees, but with an occasional dose of 
Florida-specific images. One 1964 series featured a photograph of an anthropomorphized orange 
wearing sunglasses and engaged in some subtle wordplay: “Winter in warm, sunny Florida 
appeal to you?”780 Pithy puns aside, TCA’s jet-age sun destination advertising was increasingly 
Florida-oriented. Internal advertising memoranda even listed sun destinations as “Florida and the 
Caribbean” instead of “the Caribbean and Florida” as they had in the 1950s.  
Although Florida became the key “sun destination” in the jet age, the Caribbean did not 
entirely disappear from TCA’s public-facing material. Through the mid-1960s, Cockfield, 
Brown began to segment their Caribbean advertising even further, developing print 
advertisements designed to convince residents of the British and French Caribbean to travel to 
Canada. These frequently made use of the same rhetoric TCA used to sell Canada to Canadians 
in the 1940s by resting on Canada’s size and geographic diversity. “Think big when you come to 
Canada,” Air Canada claimed in an advertisement bound for Jamaica newspapers. “We’ve got 
4,800 miles of great country coast-to-coast to keep you entertained! Big, bustling cities, wide 
open spaces, peaceful towns—there’s a place and a pace to suit everyone visiting in Canada. 
We’ll give you a big welcome, too.”781 An advertisement that appeared in Bajan Magazine 
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highlighted that there was “so much to do” in Canada “from Peggy’s Cove in the East to rodeos 
in the West” and featured a collage of stereotypical Canadian place-images: a bear, a rodeo, a 
mountain, a First Nations child beside a tipi, and a city skyline. Impressively, the woman 
passenger pictured in this advertising series is black.782 Even the centennial was sold in the 
Caribbean as a year of varied activities in varied locations, from Expo 67, “the greatest World’s 
Fair ever held” in Montreal and the Pan-Am Games in Winnipeg, to golf tournaments, yachting 
championships, football and track-and-field meets, and even a “moose-calling contest” in 
Saskatchewan. 783 These descriptions are reminiscent of the varied activities—even including 
golf and yachting—that TCA used to sell the Caribbean to Canadians two decades before. These 
examples show the increasing diversity of Air Canada advertising through the jet age, but they 
also highlight what happens when the key aspects of Canadian environmental identity are 
focused outward. This is especially obvious in one spring 1968 campaign developed for British 
and French Caribbean newspapers, which claimed: 
“Canada is air conditioned. Come on up and cool off a bit. We think our Canadian 
summers are pretty warm. Once in a while the temperature even gets up over 85. We’d 
call that a scorcher. You’d probably call it balmy. Balmy summer days make whatever 
you’re doing more fun. And when you come to Canada, you’ll find lots of fun things to 
see and do—from the spectacular Rocky Mountains of British Columbia, east across the 
prairies to Toronto and Montreal...to the beautiful quiet coves of the Atlantic Provinces. 
The best way to get to Canada is with Air Canada, of course...We’ll give you a nice, 
warm reception.”784 
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This campaign, which was also printed in French with extra references to Quebec, flips Canadian 
climatic identity. An 85-degree day might be a “scorcher” to a Canadian, but it’s a balmy 
reprieve for a Jamaica or Bermuda local; Canadians were encouraged to warm up to sun 
destination winters just as Jamaicans were encouraged to “cool off” in Canadian summers.  
Advertisements such as these prove that Canadian climates had become a rhetorical tool 
rather than an active concern for Air Canada advertisers, more stereotype than strategy. So, “if 
you spend winter like this,” posited one 1964 advertisement showing a miserable couple pushing 
through a snowstorm on an urban street, “spend just a few hours” sitting on a plane with a 
smiling stewardess, “and enjoy a holiday like this in Nassau or Jamaica...Join the ‘Sun Set’ 
aboard a giant AIR CANADA DC-8 Jet!”785 Like older advertisements, the final illustration in 
the set showed a horse-drawn buggy and women in bathing costumes, but the reader also saw 
pictured the miseries of their own winters. As depictions of Canadian seasons became more and 
more stereotypical, it became more difficult to reconcile them with a century of climatic 
triumphalism. Subsequently, Air Canada advertisers through the late 1960s had a much easier 
time dispatching with the delicate balance of time and space used to sell sun destinations a 
generation before and relied instead on exaggerated depictions of Canadian winters, discursively 
leaving them behind entirely instead of shortening or fast-forwarding through them.  
This is most evident in Air Canada’s increased substitution of “summer” with “winter” in 
its advertising taglines. That is, instead of focusing on the act of time travelling through the 
seasons to Canadian summer conditions in the Caribbean, advertisements shifted the focus to the 
uncomfortable winter conditions travellers would leave behind. In keeping with the airline’s 
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trend towards portmanteaux, for example, a campaign from the 1963-64 winter season (Figure 
20) claimed that Florida was “Sunforgettable!” 
“Pack up all your cares and winter woes—then deposit them in the nearest snowbank. 
Just be sure to bring lots of summer clothes when you head South with Sun (and TCA) 
away from the miseries of cold winter weather. This year, swap the season of snow and 
slush for a session of sun and fun on golden sandy beaches of fabulous Florida—the land 
where ice comes in a cube and tall glass—not in a storm!”786 
 
The emphasis was on what passengers might leave behind, deposited in the nearest snowbank. 
An advertisement from the same season, which did not improve on the wordplay with its tagline 
about a “Floridandy winter holiday,” suggested that travelers “kick off your overshoes. Take off 
your winter overcoat. Settle down and be spoiled by Air Canada.”787 Another series, this time of 
small 2-column 100-line newspaper advertisements, featured simplified black-and-white 
illustrations of technologies Canadians used to separate themselves from their winters and how 
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they might shake off the yoke of those technologies. A standing radiator and thermostat, for 
example, was paired with the command “this winter, turn it down and go South.” 788  
As was the case with North Star-era advertising, the trappings and symbols of winter 
were discursively exchanged for those of summer, but with an added sense of urgency and 
permanence. Once passengers took off their overshoes and experienced winter in Florida, they 
might never put their overshoes back on. One series, from late 1967, featured a photograph of a 
couple sitting back-to-back on the beach (Figure 21). The woman, not surprisingly, is wearing 
sunglasses and a bikini and facing the camera; we only see her guitar-playing male partner from 
behind. “How you feel about winter often depends on where you sit,” the advertisement claimed, 
with the implication that the only way to “warm up to winter” was to “lean up against a friendly 
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CASM. 
Figure 20: "Sunforgettable" in English and French, 1963-1964. 
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back and relax...and let the sun bake you brown.”789 That is, the only way to enjoy winter was to 
spend it in a place that was not Canada. Another advertisement from the same season introducing 
Air Canada’s daily non-stop service to Miami, asked “how could a numb-fingered, bone-chilled, 
slush-splattered, puddle-hopper become a winter-lover in just a few hours? By flying non-
stop...to Miami with Air Canada.” Here was another bikini-and-sunglasses-wearing sunbathing 
woman, but this time sandwiched between a picture of the same woman in a winter coat 
struggling against a blizzard and the sleek DC-8 that had whisked her away to Miami. “It’s easy 
to be a good sport about winter,” the advertisement claimed, when you could spend it with the 
“best winter sports” who were already in Florida.790 Apparently, the Canadians who knew winter 
best knew to spend it elsewhere. 
The allure of the tropics, always present in TCA’s sun destination promotions, was 
therefore accompanied during the jet age by an imagined urge to get away from Canadian 
winters. Winter was painted as a sort of disease of ennui, for which Air Canada had a cure: “6 
jets a day to keep winter away. All non-stop!”791 The airline assigned itself and its jets pseudo-
medical expertise that instantly solved everyday Canadians’ most urgent problems with winter, 
an extension of older climate-and-health rhetoric that transferred the curative properties onto the 
transportation itself. For example, Air Canada self-fashioned as an “Escape Specialist,” as one 
French-language campaign from 1969 called it, taking Canadian travelers away from both the 
“problems of other methods of transportation” and the problems of their imagined winters.792 In 
so doing, the airline constructed its sun destinations as different from the other places it flew. It 
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even created an “imaginary” society of “sun-worshippers” in the late 1960s who understood the 
allure of the tropics: “Club Calypso.” 
Being a member of “Club Calypso” meant that you understood firsthand how “different” 
the tropics could be. However, unlike the difference evoked by piston-era sun destination 
advertisements—a difference in time and speed—the jet-age differences between the tropics and 
Canada had the potential to physically change club members. One French-language 1964 
advertisement showed a couple giggling conspiratorially as they disembarked from a plane 
carrying cameras and wearing straw hats. Although it was printed in black-and-white, this ad was 
meant to show that “the tanned faces you encounter this winter are all coming back from sun 
country. If you feel too ‘pale faced’ and a bit jealous, it’s your turn” to fly Air Canada.793 
Tanning, as historians of the body, medicine, and tourism have shown, had been used as a sign of 
status and mass leisure in the Americas since at least the late nineteenth century, but ballooned in 
popularity after the 1940s thanks to the postwar travel boom and the influence of movie stars and 
mass-manufactured cosmetics. Oils and lotions meant to encourage tanning (the sales of which 
doubled in America between 1951 and 1956) and sunless tanning products such as UV lamps 
were hallmarks of the mid-century obsession with tanned skin as was, of course, the growing 
discourse of the tropical vacation.794 In the Canadian context, the contrast between sandy 
summer bronzes and snowy winter whites was especially noticeable, and Air Canada 
promotional material used the contrasts in skin tones to its advantage to make the allure of 
Florida and the Caribbean even more visually appealing. The winter 1957-1958 animal-mascot 
direct mail campaign included Casper the Caterpillar, who despite his small size (“caterpillars 
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don’t make much mileage in the snow”) was able to 
travel south with TCA. “He’s playing in the sun and 
sand right now. How about you?” one mailer asked. 795 
Although likely simply chosen because of the 
alliteration, invoking the “Casper the Friendly Ghost” 
character, popular in comics and movies through the 
1950s, may have reminded passengers of their own 
pale faces. The “faces of winter,” as a 1969 magazine 
advertisement called them (Figure 21), had “a happy 
smile, a healthy tan, a relaxed feeling,” and were 
decidedly not in Canada thanks to the “Come-On-
Down-To-Calypso-Country-Airline.”796  
The full-color “faces of winter” ad shows 
close-ups of Canadian tourists basking on the beach 
next to locals, reflecting the idea that by bronzing their 
skins they were somehow becoming more tropical and 
creating connections to the tropics that physically 
changed them. Historian Catherine Cocks has argued 
that using a tropical vacation as an opportunity to tan 
was a type of “playful experiment in becoming 
nonwhite” that was both separate from and connected to 
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Figure 21: Tanning as performative 




the troubling relationships between Euro-Americans and African- and Indigenous Americans.797 
Tourism promoters in warm-weather destinations such as Florida in the first few decades of the 
twentieth century suggested that bronzing the skin was a way to recapture a connection to nature 
and leisure that modern urban life was beginning to eliminate. The term “coat of tan” was 
frequently used in popular magazines and tourism material, Cocks writes, foregrounding the 
temporary nature of the tan—affinity with brown-skinned locals was literally only skin deep and 
could quickly disappear—as well as the uses of tanning as a “seasonal accessory.”798 In the jet 
age, Canadians had many ways of bronzing themselves, from artificial tanning beds to face and 
body makeup, but the seasonality of snowbird travel made the real thing much more potent. Not 
only were Canadians removing their boots and mittens when they flew south with Air Canada, 
but they were figuratively shedding their skin and returning as a different person. The “Club 
Calypso” experience was so transformative as to almost be religious; one brochure for the 1970-
1971 winter season referred to it as “Air Canada’s secret society of sun-worshippers” and added 
a “warning: each [destination] is out to win your heart and soul—to become your perennial 
‘place in the sun.’ So take heed, hedonists!”799 Once they drew Canadians in, warm-weather 
destinations would change them inside and out to the point that they might not let them leave. 
What did all of this mean for modern Canadian envirotechnicality? There had always 
been a folkloric angle to Canadian cold-weather self-fashioning, but by the last third of the 
twentieth century a suite of modern technological systems was further removing people from the 
lived experience of winter. Everyday Canadians could divorce the material experience of their 
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geography and climate from the cultural aspects that in turn helped to reconcile the apparent 
contradiction of being a “true north” people while, for example, watching hockey games in 
heated indoor arenas. As Desrosiers-Lauzon has argued, “Canadian winter, despite its length and 
its intensity, despite its identity-making function, [and] despite its integration inside popular 
culture, is no longer what it used to be.”800 Jet planes were not the only culprit here. Natural gas 
became available to heat urban Canadian homes in the late 1950s, for example, and the nation’s 
first indoor shopping mall opened in Vancouver in 1950, but jets were a big, fast, noisy 
scapegoat.801 Canadian intelligentsia grappled with how to reconcile winter identity with air 
travel culture, especially because Air Canada’s “giant jets” carried more people than ever south. 
This struggle was represented in the mid-1970s by concerns about a “travel deficit”: Canadians 
spent more money travelling abroad than foreigners spent travelling in Canada. Newfoundland 
MP John Crosbie suggested in a 1977 session of Parliament that “all of us have heard of the ‘ban 
the bomb’ campaign. What we need is a ‘ban the tan’ campaign. Every Canadian who dares to 
go south next winter and returns to Canada with a tan should be ostracized.” He graciously added 
that, “if hon. Members get a tan from the lights in this Chamber, we can explain that.”802  
Although ostensibly he was talking about tourism dollars, Crosbie articulated the jet age 
concern about how to maintain a national identity based upon geography and climate when they 
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were so easy to abandon. Desrosiers-Lauzon has connected these state efforts to mitigate the 
“travel deficit” to the “technological conquest” and subsequent cultural devaluation of Canadian 
winter, since by the 1970s the prevailing opinion was “that a distaste for winter and a taste for 
Florida sunshine were evidence of a declining commitment to Canada.”803 This is also an 
example of the “dialectic” process of modernization that James Vernon discusses in Distant 
Strangers. As the state addressed the problems of governing from a distance by generating 
“abstract systems of thought and organization,” many “failed to trust and were alienated” by 
them, regardless of their efficacy, and “generated fresh attempts to reembed economic, social, 
and political relations in person and place.”804 Generating new markers of belonging—pale faces 
perhaps, or outdoor hockey, or snow-shoveling—as the “speed-up” made the world feel 
increasingly impersonal and abstract was a way to make sense of Canadian modernity.  
 
Conclusion: The Shrinking of the World and the End of TCA 
In a speech to the Montreal Rotary Club in 1959—between the introduction of the 
Viscount and the “big jets” and as TCA was well on its way to developing ReserVec—Vice 
President of Traffic Gordon Wood reflected on what jet travel would do to both Canada and the 
rest of the world: 
“Air transport has been shrinking the globe to the point where the world, in terms of 
traveling time, is smaller today than Canada was twenty years ago. At this moment, 
Tokyo is as close to Montreal as Winnipeg was in 1939. Tomorrow, or 18 months from 
now when the big jets are in full operation throughout the world, there will be few places 
on the face of the globe more than 24 hours away from one another...The great 
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transnational destinations of most travelling Canadians will be a comfortable nap’s 
distance between lunch and dinner.” 
 
“In the context of Canadian history,” Wood said, it is “not surprising” that Canadians have taken 
to the air in large numbers and become “one of the world’s most travelled peoples.” What was 
surprising was that because of all of this travel, Canadian enterprise, scholarship, culture, and 
diplomacy was making its way around the world; “air transport has widened our scope and 
increased the world’s awareness of Canada.”805 This has all the hallmarks of a TCA-boosting 
speech—perhaps even a John Fisher “pride-builder” report—from the 1930s or 1940s, but with 
one major change: it is the world, not Canada, that has been reduced to “one day wide.”  
This was time-space compression scaled-up, sped-up, and extended, since it took only twenty 
years for the rest of the globe to shrink to the size of Canada. With this expansion and extension 
came a standardization in the air travel experience. Jet-age airports, for example, became 
“placeless places,” “uninhabited and inauthentic,” designed only for passing through.806 The food 
was the same, the décor was the same, and the choreographed movement through space was the 
same. More and more of the air travel experience through the last four decades of the twentieth 
century was subject to this process, but this consolidation was accompanied by a fragmentation 
in both passenger demographics and the discourse surrounding air travel. The communications 
                                               
805 Speech by W. Gordon Wood to the Montreal Rotary Club, December 8, 1959, Air Canada 
Fonds RG70, vol. 132, LAC. 
806 Timothy Cresswell, On the Move: Mobility in the Modern Western World (New York: 
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Nation, and Self (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 153-166. 
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technology that was supposed to bind Canada together and to the rest of the world was actually 
dividing as airport noise pitted cities against the federal government and airlines against their 
passengers, and TCA’s promotional material privileged the allure of international destinations 
and their fare plans over a single collective vision of nature, technology, and nation. TCA’s jet 
age discourse was splintered partially because, unlike its counterparts in Britain or the United 
States, there were no Canadian jets of which passengers could be proud.807 
TCA had done such a god job of making air travel mundane—an arduous task for airlines all 
over the United States and Europe in the first half of the twentieth century—that it appeared too 
mundane to support modern Canadian-ness. “Familiarity destroyed Jet Age glamour,” argues 
historian Virginia Postrel, “because Jet Age glamour wasn’t about the actual experience of 
flying. It was about the idea of air travel.”808 At TCA, the idea of air travel was intimately tied to 
what it meant to be Canadian, using technologies to make sense of identity-forming distances 
and character-building climates, and Canada’s jet age therefore reveals the limits, contradictions, 
and unintended consequences of that idea. Ultimately, jets were too modern to support modern 
Canadian envirotechnicality, leading to the dissolution of TCA’s envirotechnical rhetoric and, 
eventually, the airline itself. 
 
                                               
807 Jenifer Van Vleck suggests that American-built passenger jets “reanimated aviation’s cultural 
significance as a symbol of American national greatness.” The same could not be said of Canada. 
Van Vleck, Empire of the Air, 240. 
808 Virginia Postrel, The Power of Glamour: Longing and the Art of Visual Persuasion (New 




On June 1, 1964, TCA’s switchboard operators began answering the telephone with “Air 
Canada” instead of “Trans-Canada Air Lines” for the first time. This is one of two ways that this 
project about creating, maintaining, and disrupting the modern envirotechnical nation could end. 
Because this project has been about TCA, it may seem natural to finish at the point where TCA 
stopped being TCA. Throughout this project, I have traced a variety of Canadian national 
symbols that touched on envirotechnical themes. Some of them were deliberately constructed by 
TCA such as the North Star, and some, such as “Canadian Winters,” were already part of 
Canadian culture. By treating the name Trans-Canada Air Lines as another such symbol, 
discussing the conditions that led to its replacement helps highlight how the seams of modern 
Canadian envirotechnicality were pushed until they failed. TCA becoming Air Canada was the 
end of a particular sociotechnical imaginary based on constructions of geography and climate, 
enterprise, and the state. “Names,” linguist Star Vanguri has recently argued, “create cultural 
narratives via their distribution and circulation, in turn cementing them in public memory in a 
way that masks them as neutral.”809 In the case of TCA, the names its stakeholders chose were 
part of the airline’s larger public-facing vision of technology, environment, and nation, but were 
not sufficiently elastic to keep up with high-modern Canada.  
                                               
809 Star Medzerian Vanguri, “Toward a Rhetorical Onomastics” in Rhetorics of Names and 
Naming (New York: Routledge, 2016), 5. For more on onomastics, the study of proper names, 
and meaning, see Carole Hough, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Names and Naming, (Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 2016), Guy Puzey and Laura Kostanski, eds., Names and Naming: People, Places, 
Perceptions and Power (Bristol: Multilingual Matters, 2016), and Oliviu Felecan and Alina 
Bughesiu, eds., Onomastics in Contemporary Public Space (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars 
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Despite a public-facing rhetoric that “cemented” the work that TCA as a name (and as an 
airline) was supposed to do as neutral, the politics of the name “Trans-Canada Air Lines” were 
questioned almost as soon as it was deployed. It wasn’t just that being “trans-Canada” simply did 
not mean anything to TCA’s stakeholders by the 1960s, but also that the needs and wants of 
those stakeholders were changing. The push to change TCA’s name was explicitly about 
language, culture, and the bilingualism debate in mid-century Canada, which had been important 
to Francophone policy-makers for decades but reached something of a fever pitch in the 1960s. 
However, like other names at the airline (see my discussion of “North Star” in Chapter 2), it was 
also framed by TCA’s technological choices and questions about the government’s responsibility 
to its citizens. Both of the airline’s names reflected what a state airline was supposed to do for 
Canada in the historical moments in which they were chosen. That is, an “Air Canada” Canada 
and a “Trans-Canada Air Lines” Canada were different Canadas, revealing the limits of the 
envirotechnical imaginaries at the heart of this project.  
The official French translation of TCA was the cumbersome “les Lignes aeriennes trans-
Canada,” and French-language newspapers in Quebec and France began using “Air Canada,” 
modeled after Air France, almost immediately. A 1950 survey of French-Canadian newspapers 
by Vice President of Traffic Anson McKim found many different variations on the name, 
including “Trans-Canada,” “Air Canada,” and “Les Trans-Canada Airlines.” There was no real 
satisfactory solution; neither TCA’s official French name nor “Air Canada” was particularly 
useful and attempts to find a name that worked in both languages and kept the TCA acronym had 
come up short. Although McKim cautioned against it, TCA began officially using “Air Canada” 
 
 313 
on its French material for use in Quebec, Atlantic Canada, and France in the mid-1950s.810 It 
often appeared alongside “TCA” in these ads, and was also used in European markets where, as 
McGregor wrote in his memoirs, “the designation ‘Trans-Canada’ was virtually without 
commercial meaning.”811 This exercise had alerted TCA’s Public Relations and Traffic managers 
that they “had not gone far enough in the use of the French language” and that they needed to 
“create a French atmosphere” in not only advertising, but also ticket offices, mailrooms, and 
official signage.812 In April 1953, Howe proposed amending the Trans-Canada Air Lines Act to 
allow the use of “Air Canada” as a “descriptive name” because it had “wide recognition in the 
French-speaking sections of the country.”813 Despite this, TCA spent the 1950s avoiding any 
official stance on bilingualism, and when questioned on whether the 1953 amendment meant that 
TCA was considering a new name, Howe answered with a definitive “No.” It was only to protect 
“Air Canada” and endorse it in the Québécois market.814 Even when bilingualism was used as a 
selling point, it was done with disclaimers. A 1960 ad campaign touting TCA’s “Welcome-
Bienvenue” service as a particularly “Canadian characteristic” for example, was worded 
carefully “taking care not to imply that complete bilingualism exists across the airline.”815 
Because the name of the airline was enshrined in the Trans-Canada Air Lines Act, it had to 
officially be changed in Parliament. Niagara Falls MP Judy LaMarsh had first suggested 
                                               
810 Letter from Anson McKim to Gordon McGregor, 29 March 1950, Air Canada Fonds RG70, 
vol. 132, LAC. 
811 McGregor, The Adolescence of an Airline, 140. 
812 Letter from Anson McKim to Gordon McGregor, 29 March 1950, Air Canada Fonds RG70, 
vol. 132, LAC. 
813 Canada, House of Commons Debates, April 13, 1953 (C. D. Howe), 
http://parl.canadiana.ca/view/oop.debates_HOC2107_04/467?r=0&s=1. 
814 Canada, House of Commons Debates, April 13, 1953 (C. D. Howe), 
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815 Memorandum by J. A. McGee, “U.S. Publication Advertising—‘Welcome-Bienvenue’ 
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changing the name in 1962 in order to “bring into conformity” the names used “outside the 
continental limits of this country” with those used in Canada, but perhaps because she was a 
junior back-bencher the bill did not make it past the first reading.816 By early 1963 francophone 
MPs began asking Minister of Transport George McIlraith when and how TCA would begin 
using “Air Canada” on its aircraft and on other official national platforms in order to “to prove to 
the world that Canada is a bilingual country.”817 McIlraith or his Parliamentary Secretary would 
usually bring up the cost of re-painting the fleet and the “misunderstanding and confusion” of air 
traffic controllers faced with seeing so many names painted on the aircraft.818 This was only 
sometimes explicitly linked to actually changing the name of the airline and was usually 
addressed as a case of government spending on frivolities such as aircraft paint. One MP actually 
suggested that this would all be resolved if “a few members of Parliament bought the paint” and 
did the work themselves and McIlraith, tongue-in-cheek, declined to comment on the “artistic 
ability of members of Parliament.”819 The effort to change the name in earnest finally gathered 
momentum once Jean Chrétien, who would serve as Prime Minister from 1993-2003, revived 
LaMarsh’s idea through his own Private Member’s Bill in 1964.820 This came during a 
groundswell of Québécois nationalism and questions about how to best represent all of Canada’s 
(Euro)linguistic interests in government and national enterprise.821  
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It was also tied to the purchase of a new aircraft at TCA in 1963. The airline had narrowed 
its choices to a French-made Super-B Caravelle and the American DC-9. The eventual choice of 
the DC-9, as well as the fact that there were no French-Canadians on TCA’s board despite its 
headquarters in Montreal, was construed by Québécois politicians as an affront to French-
Canadian interests. McGregor framed this choice in his usual diplomatic way by arguing that the 
Caravelle was less suited to TCA’s needs and Canada’s conditions. “It is no business of TCA to 
be critical of the merits of any aircraft,” he wrote in Between Ourselves in November 1963, “but 
it would also seem that each DC-9 bought by TCA will be of greater advantage” than the 
Caravelle. 822 However, he was caught on a hot microphone during a December committee 
meeting calling it “no great shakes” and TCA’s worst possible aircraft choice. McGregor wrote 
in his memoirs that this felt like saying “‘What an ugly baby!’ to its doting grandmother.”823  
This, coupled with other statements from the committee meeting in which TCA’s policy of 
enforcing English proficiency for all workers (including those who did not deal with the public, 
such as mechanics) was revealed, was the proverbial match that lit the dynamite. Approximately 
1000 students marched on TCA’s downtown Montreal offices on December 12 chanting “Hang 
McGregor” and throwing tomatoes and eggs at the building. Some held signs with separatist 
logos and slogans. McGregor met with student leaders and told the crowd—which had to be 
broken up by police once it spilled onto Rue St. Catherine during rush hour—that “Air Canada” 
would soon be seen on airplanes and that “if the program of bilingual publicity...continued in the 
next two or three years the way it had in the past, ‘Air Canada’ might become the official 
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name.”824 He also clarified his hot-mic comments, claiming that the Caravelle might be “no great 
shakes” now, but when it was designed a decade prior it was “good for its day.”825 However, the 
damage had been done; as historian David Meren argues in his book on Canada-France relations, 
“the comments went to the heart of sensitivities over French Canada’s economic marginalization 
and neo-nationalist determination to develop Quebec’s technical capacity and industrial base.”826 
This scandal turned the spotlight towards language and identity issues at TCA, so when 
Chrétien’s Private Member’s Bill came up in early 1964, it passed quickly and with little debate 
in the House of Commons. Even then, the press and some “old-timers,” as pilot George Lothian 
called those who had been with TCA since the beginning, saw the name change as pandering to 
Quebec’s interests and incurring extra costs for what amounted to a cosmetic rebranding of the 
airline.827 However, language was not the only issue at stake in changing the name of Canada’s 
state airline. When the bill came to be read in the Senate in March 1964, the sponsoring Senator, 
Salter Hayden, suggested that: 
“In the beginning, when we established the Trans-Canada Air Lines, such a name for a 
purely domestic operation may have been perfectly proper. But in these times, with the 
extent of international operation...it is misdescriptive, in my opinion, to use the title ‘Trans-
Canada Air Lines.’...I say this is just a case of Trans-Canada growing up, and becoming 
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international as well as national...It is very fortunate too that in French and in English you 
use exactly the same word.”828 
 
Of course, as I have shown, TCA was international first. It wasn’t “trans-Canada” until nearly 
two years after it began operations. But that did not matter; it was the symbolic 
transcontinentality that was fading from public discourse. Like other Anglophone legislators, 
Hayden saw the bilingual nature of the name and the meaning of being “trans-Canada” as 
parallel issues. The amendment’s loudest critic in the Senate, Prince Edward Island-based Orville 
Phillips, was particularly concerned with what “Air” and “Canada” might symbolize instead. He 
felt that “the term Air Canada is meaningless. It could be a radio wave, or a radar wave, and at 
this time of year it could simply be a cold blast of air from the North Pole. It does nothing to 
convey the idea of an airline.”829 But it did have a meaning, just not a literal one. “Air Canada” 
meant a Canada united by language and culture, a Canada that represented the needs of all of its 
constituents, and a Canada that was willing to keep up with shifting national self-fashioning.  
After some prodding from Francophone Senators, Phillips withdrew his objection, the 
amendment was passed to committee and given Royal Assent at the end of March, and the 
airline’s switchboard operators began answering the telephone with “Air Canada” on June 1. To 
announce the change, the airline ran a simple advertisement in all major Canadian newspapers in 
the last few days of May (Figure 22). Almost entirely text save a black-and-white silhouette of a 
four-engined jet, the advertisement was tinged with “a little nostalgia” and suggested that “it is 
obvious...that the name ‘Trans-Canada Air Lines’ is no longer an adequate description—even 
                                               
828 Canada, Senate Debates, March 11, 1964 (Salter Hayden), 
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though it was entirely appropriately chosen, nearly three decades ago.”830 Times changed, and so 
therefore must the name of Canada’s state instrument for air travel.  
The physical conversion programme was gradual. In order to cut costs by approximately 
$500,000, aircraft were re-painted piecemeal during their regularly scheduled maintenance and 
promotional material—including brochures, stationery, name-badges for crew, baggage tags, 
signage, and TCA-branded sugar packets—were re-issued only once stocks ran out. “Trans-
Canada Air Lines” did not entirely disappear either. The airline maintained the rights to the old 
name and logo, which had been replaced by a similar maple-leaf design without “TCA” in the 
center, in order to prevent their use by another carrier. Furthermore, “to many...there will always 
                                               
830 Display Ad. 36, The Globe and Mail, May 29, 1964, B14. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Figure 22: TCA's name-change advertisement 
the Globe an  Ma l, May 29, 1964. 
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be a sentimental attachment to the old name,” the Globe and Mail reported, such as a customer 
who, upon hearing an operator answer the telephone with “Good morning, Air Canada,” replied: 
 
“You can call yourselves whatever you like, but to me you’ll always be TCA.”831 
 
Annoyed “old-timers” aside, the new name was met with relatively little fallout once 
implemented and its role in debates about language rights and Canadian bilingualism policy has 
been largely neglected by historians. There is a small body of literature on Canadian bilingualism 
in the 1960s, but it is mostly in relation to Québécois nationalism and culture, language 
education, and provincial and federal politics writ large, not technology.832 Although the change 
was mostly due to French-language rights in Canada and took place in the middle of agitation 
about Quebec’s place in Canadian politics and culture, it is also worth discussing how the 
version of Canada that “Trans-Canada Air Lines” represented and the version that “Air Canada” 
represented were quite different. A “TCA” Canada was a “technological nationalism” Canada, 
one that celebrated a single nation bound physically by communications technologies. The 
collapse and homogenization of Canadian distances by airplanes was framed as a public good, 
much as nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century rail and telecommunications discourse had 
done. An “Air Canada” Canada was a Canada united culturally by language in which the modern 
compression of distance was perhaps so mundane as to be taken for granted.  
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 In this dissertation, I have raised questions about what TCA’s Canada looked and felt like 
in its first thirty years of service. Not just confined to Canada, the high-modern acceleration of 
time, collapse and globalization of space, and technological intrusions on everyday life were met 
with concern and anxiety as both state agents and everyday consumers wondered what would 
happen as it became increasingly difficult to feel a sense of belonging-in-place. James Vernon 
refers to this as a “society of strangers”; despite high-modern technological systems appearing to 
bring people closer together, governance and other interpersonal interactions were increasingly 
taking place from a distance. TCA’s public-facing material shows us how these anxieties played 
out in one particular national context, one where distance was already part of collective visions 
of belonging. Canada’s culture of “bigness” makes the case study in this project especially 
resonant because the new high-modern elasticity of space was disorienting enough without space 
in and of itself providing support for the nation. Furthermore, could Canada remain a “true 
North, strong and free,” if sun destination vacations made the seasonal experiences of “North” 
optional? “Space” in the form of bigness and “time” in the form of seasons had been vital to 
Canadian self-fashioning for generations before the Trans-Canada Air Lines Act, and so TCA 
was forced to support them in its public-facing material in order to sell itself as a Canadian state 
agent while disrupting them by virtue of simply being an airline. 
This paradox could not be maintained into the jet age, and so TCA changing its name to 
Air Canada is one way that this story might end. After all, this project has been about the limits 
of a specific sort of modern envirotechnicality based on constructions of space and time, and a 
new name for the airline suggests that those limits had been reached. Trans-Canada Air Lines as 
a name gestured towards Canadian distances—trans—and even Lines indicated movement 
across space. TCA had worked tirelessly through the 1940s and 1950s to try and make it and its 
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services fit already-established paradigms of mobility, seasonality, and technological 
nationalisms with little to show for it. TCA becoming Air Canada could be interpreted as the 
airline finally recognizing that it had not made the modern Canadian envirotechnical nation work 
on its behalf. The other way this story might end is to place Air Canada’s public-facing discourse 
inside the larger trend of re-evaluating national symbols as Canadians prepared to celebrate the 
100th anniversary of Confederation in 1967. 
Historians have fixated on the centennial in their studies of modern Canadian 
nationalism, especially in light of Canada’s sesquicentennial in 2017.833 Paul Litt has recently 
argued, for example, that state-sanctioned centennial celebrations fixated on a “national myth-
symbol complex” of shared geography and shared heritage.834 The Canadian relationship to 
technology in particular was a concern for critics during the centennial years, especially as 
television and mass culture “bestrode the Canadian scene,” as historian Leonard Kuffert has 
argued.835 The threat of American popular culture creeping north of the border was especially 
nerve-wracking for the Canadian intelligentsia, who sought a solid set of uniquely Canadian 
national symbols and place-images to which modern Canadian nationalism could be tethered. 
Aviation was not one of them. Despite its discursive and physical nation-building role in the 
latter half of Canada’s first 100 years, it was neither a good representative symbol of past Canada 
nor a rallying point for contemporary late-modern Canada. 
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The largest centennial-related project was the Expo 67 world’s fair in Montreal. Of 
course, the 50 million visitors would not have made it to Expo without accessible jet travel, nor 
would Montreal have been able to accommodate all those visitors without “grooming a trio of 
airports”—the open-to-civilians St. Hubert military airfield, the nearby St. Jean, and Montreal 
International—as Flying magazine reported.836 However, airplanes simply did not appear in the 
symbols, images, music, and other constructions developed for Expo and the centennial, despite 
Montreal-based Air Canada turning 30 that year. Air Canada had a pavilion at Expo, but as far as 
I can tell there was only a small amount of Canadian content. The pavilion was themed around 
the evolution of flight, with an eye-catching cantilevered helical design based on one of 
Leonardo da Vinci’s flying machines but also resembling “today’s jet engines,” as an Air Canada 
magazine ad claimed. “As you proceed through the exhibit cells nestled beneath the blades, you 
move from bat wings to kites, to balloons, to gliders, to trimotor aircraft to jet plane. Slowly you 
conquer the skies without leaving the ground and the travel posters you see every day become 
the places you visit. The world is smaller to your reach, larger to your mind.”837 Air travel was 
imagined as responsible for shrinking the world, but its responsibility for shrinking Canada in 
particular was not part of this imaginary. Instead, the most popular technological expression of 
Canada’s past at the centennial was trains. Gordon Lightfoot’s “Canadian Railroad Trilogy” was 
commissioned by the CBC for the centennial, and the second-largest state expenditure on the 
centennial after Expo was something called the “Confederation Train.” The purple train, which 
criss-crossed Canada through the centennial year, had six history-and-culture themed cars and a 
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whistle that was programmed to play the first tones of “O Canada.”838 Over ten million 
Canadians—approximately half of the nation’s population—saw the Confederation Train and 
caravan as it visited their towns and cities, from Moose Jaw to Moncton, Edmonton to 
Edmundston, Victoria to Vercheres.839 
 
Why wasn’t there a “Confederation Plane”? The simple answer would be that there were 
no airplanes at Confederation, and that the railways were, as I have discussed in the introduction 
and first chapter of this dissertation, a key aspect of nineteenth-century settler Canadian national 
political, social, and philosophical thought. Rail was discursively constructed, even as it was 
being built in the 1880s, as a unique Canadian envirotechnical paradigm, binding a scattered 
nation, overcoming the barriers of geography and climate, and pulling a fledgling settler country 
into modernity. However, if TCA’s public-facing discourse was to be believed, commercial 
airplanes were the trains of the twentieth century, doing all of this same work even more 
effectively than rail. TCA’s North Stars shrunk Canada down until it was only one day wide. 
They flew in all weather conditions and erased any differences between summer and winter 
travel. They even brought exotic places with exotic climates closer to Canada. Still, despite 
TCA’s best advertising efforts, commercial airliners do not have the same resonance in national 
culture that rail (still!) does because in attempting to make airliners fit those same 
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envirotechnical paradigms, TCA overturned them. The “monstrous acceleration of the world,” as 
sociologist Hartmut Rosa has called it, of technological modernity changed the real and imagined 
relationships between Canadians, the territory on which they lived, and the technologies they 
used to traverse that land.840 The efficacy and extreme nature of aviation was met with 
ambivalence; it could both shrink the nation for the purposes of nation-building and also shrink it 
into oblivion. By the late 1960s, Air Canada’s three decades of emphasizing aviation’s role in 
national technological history, physical nation-building, and the mobility of everyday Canadians 
simply had not taken in ways that the airline had hoped it might. When scholars, politicians, and 
cultural commentators grasped for something “solid” in their late- and postmodern constructions 
of nationhood in the years around the centennial, they grabbed onto the railways, not the airways.  
 
This is not a uniquely Canadian story, and not a uniquely aviation story. Technologies of 
modernity—planes, trains, and automobiles, telephones and televisions, news media and 
shopping centers—have all been assigned the ability to bring us together while driving us apart. 
How many of us complain that the young people in our lives use their phones at the dinner table 
instead of talking, when they’re using them to communicate with their friends elsewhere? There 
is something about the way these technologies appear to unmoor space and time from the clock, 
calendar, and map that makes us uneasy and forces us to reckon with what those clocks, 
calendars, and maps meant to us in the first place: a shared sense of place and belonging.  
We look for what David Harvey calls “fleeting, superficial, and illusory means whereby an 
individualistic society of transients sets forth its nostalgia for common values,” grasping for 
                                               
840 Hartmut Rosa, Social Acceleration: A New Theory of Modernity (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2013), 35. 
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things that are solid when all is air.841 In this dissertation, I have shown that airplanes and the act 
of air travel were at times both the something “solid”—a symbol of Canadian-ness, a concrete 
example of homegrown technological ability—and the method by which Canadian distances and 
Canadian climates, which had previously been “solid,” melted away. Not surprisingly, Air 
Canada is now one of many Canadian airlines—it deregulated in the late 1980s— and aside from 
perhaps different snacks or cabin crew uniforms, flying Air Canada feels the same as flying any 
other large airline in North America. The “gaps” that John Fisher was proud to have closed by 
flying on a TCA North Star in 1947 have collapsed so much as to form a sort of singularity. 
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